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While	  conservatives	  of	  all	  stripes	  generally	  supported	  the	  Vietnam	  War,	  
particularly	  at	  its	  onset,	  I	  will	  show	  that	  the	  debate	  to	  end	  conscription	  reveals	  a	  rift	  
between	  traditional	  conservatives	  who	  supported	  the	  draft	  and	  libertarian	  
conservatives	  who	  opposed	  it	  (while	  generally	  supporting	  the	  war).	  	  Furthermore,	  
though	  they	  shared	  the	  goal	  of	  ending	  the	  draft,	  libertarian	  conservatives	  and	  New	  
Left	  protesters	  agreed	  on	  little	  else.	  	  The	  protesters’	  primary	  goal	  was	  to	  prevent	  
future	  wars	  like	  Vietnam.	  	  Conservatives,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  embraced	  the	  all-­‐‑
volunteer	  army	  in	  part	  to	  maintain	  executive	  branch	  independence	  in	  foreign	  
affairs.	  
One	  aspect	  of	  this	  thesis	  will	  be	  addressing	  the	  definitions	  of	  liberal,	  
conservative,	  and	  libertarian.	  	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  thesis,	  I	  define	  liberalism	  as	  a	  
political	  philosophy	  that	  seeks	  to	  use	  the	  power	  of	  government	  to	  ease	  the	  
inequalities	  produced	  by	  the	  unrestrained	  free	  market.	  	  Liberals	  in	  the	  1960s	  split	  
on	  the	  issue	  of	  conscription.	  	  Traditional	  liberals,	  adhering	  to	  the	  Cold	  War	  
consensus,	  viewed	  the	  draft	  as	  a	  necessary	  part	  of	  American	  defense.	  	  President	  
Kennedy’s	  promise	  in	  his	  inaugural	  address,	  that	  the	  United	  States	  would	  “pay	  any	  
price”	  to	  prevent	  the	  spread	  of	  communism	  typified	  this	  commitment.	  	  The	  dilemma	  
that	  conscription	  poses	  for	  liberalism,	  as	  Eliot	  A.	  Cohen	  has	  pointed	  out,	  is	  that	  the	  
draft	  clashes	  with	  the	  liberal	  abhorrence	  of	  compulsion,	  while	  selective	  service	  
violates	  the	  liberal	  belief	  in	  egalitarianism.	  	  Thus,	  the	  New	  Left	  arose	  in	  the	  early	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1960s	  in	  response	  to	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	  	  New	  Left	  liberals	  objected	  to	  
both	  forced	  service	  in	  the	  war	  as	  well	  as	  the	  inequities	  of	  the	  way	  Selective	  Service	  
administered	  the	  draft.	  	  	  
Many	  historians	  have	  written	  on	  the	  New	  Left	  protestors’	  objections	  to	  
conscription	  during	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  and	  the	  split	  between	  traditional	  liberals	  (the	  
Old	  Left)	  and	  the	  New	  Left.	  	  However,	  historians	  have	  not	  addressed	  the	  
conservative	  response	  to	  the	  end	  of	  the	  draft	  to	  the	  same	  degree.	  	  The	  arguments	  of	  
libertarians,	  led	  by	  Milton	  Friedman,	  have	  received	  considerable	  attention	  it	  is	  true.	  	  
However,	  historians	  have	  given	  less	  attention	  to	  defenses	  of	  the	  draft	  from	  
traditional	  conservatives.	  	  Furthermore,	  while	  many	  texts	  have	  focused	  on	  the	  end	  
of	  the	  New	  Deal	  coalition,	  the	  end	  of	  the	  draft	  was	  also	  one	  part	  of	  a	  split	  between	  
traditional	  conservatives	  and	  libertarian	  conservatives	  that	  occurred	  at	  the	  same	  
time.	  
For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  thesis,	  I	  will	  make	  the	  following	  distinctions	  between	  
traditional	  conservatism	  and	  libertarian	  conservatism	  with	  regard	  to	  their	  
respective	  views	  of	  conscription	  during	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	  	  Traditional	  
conservatives’	  emphasis	  on	  respect	  for	  established	  order	  and	  anti-­‐‑communism	  
strengthened	  their	  support	  for	  the	  draft.	  	  They	  believed	  the	  nation	  needed	  drafted	  
young	  men	  to	  contain,	  or	  even	  roll	  back,	  communist	  advances	  around	  the	  world.	  	  
Furthermore,	  the	  disrespect	  shown	  to	  traditional	  sources	  of	  authority,	  especially	  the	  




In	  contrast,	  libertarian	  conservatives	  favored	  limited	  encroachments	  by	  the	  
government	  into	  the	  personal	  lives	  of	  Americans.	  	  One	  way	  this	  belief	  manifested	  
itself	  was	  in	  their	  opposition	  to	  conscription.	  	  Libertarian	  conservatives	  were	  not	  in	  
favor	  of	  weakening	  the	  United	  States	  military.	  	  In	  fact,	  they	  believed	  that	  the	  United	  
States	  could	  field	  a	  stronger	  military	  if	  its	  soldiers	  served	  voluntarily	  than	  if	  they	  
were	  unwilling	  conscripts.	  	  Economists	  including	  Milton	  Friedman	  and	  Walter	  Oi	  
also	  focused	  on	  the	  economic	  costs	  to	  conscripts,	  in	  terms	  of	  lost	  wages	  and	  
opportunities,	  which	  they	  argued	  resulted	  from	  forced	  conscription.	  
In	  spite	  of	  this	  support	  for	  conscription	  among	  both	  traditional	  liberals	  and	  
traditional	  conservatives,	  the	  forces	  of	  change	  prevailed.	  	  The	  New	  Left’s	  protests	  
against	  the	  draft	  worked	  in	  tandem	  with	  the	  libertarian	  conservatives’	  arguments	  in	  
the	  pages	  of	  national	  magazines	  and	  newspapers,	  and	  planning	  sessions	  at	  high	  
levels	  of	  the	  United	  States	  government,	  to	  end	  conscription	  by	  1973.	  	  This	  came	  
despite	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  was	  significant	  opposition	  to	  abandoning	  the	  draft	  among	  
the	  American	  public	  when	  President	  Nixon	  first	  announced	  his	  intention	  to	  explore	  
ending	  conscription.	  	  How	  this	  change	  occurred,	  and	  specifically	  how	  conservatives	  
reacted	  to	  the	  end	  of	  conscription,	  will	  be	  the	  subject	  of	  this	  thesis.1	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CONSERVATISM,	  UNIVERSAL	  MILITARY	  TRAINING,	  	  





	   Chapter	  I	  will	  discuss	  the	  coming	  of	  World	  War	  II	  and	  the	  debate	  over	  the	  
draft	  in	  1940.	  	  Conservative	  noninterventionists	  opposed	  the	  peacetime	  draft	  both	  
because	  it	  expanded	  the	  reach	  of	  the	  federal	  government	  as	  well	  as	  made	  U.S.	  entry	  
into	  World	  War	  II	  more	  likely.	  	  The	  narrative	  will	  then	  move	  to	  the	  postwar	  
discussion	  regarding	  President	  Truman’s	  proposal	  for	  Universal	  Military	  Training	  
(UMT)	  versus	  continuing	  the	  draft.	  	  Most	  conservatives	  favored	  conscription	  to	  face	  
the	  Soviet	  Union	  but	  opposed	  UMT,	  and	  on	  this	  point	  they	  united	  with	  the	  left.	  	  The	  
chapter	  concludes	  by	  noting	  some	  parallels	  between	  the	  debate	  over	  UMT	  and	  that	  
of	  the	  draft	  during	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	  
During	  the	  Cold	  War,	  traditional	  conservatives	  generally	  provided	  strong	  
support	  for	  a	  muscular	  posture	  toward	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  one	  backed	  by	  the	  
conscription	  of	  young	  men	  into	  the	  United	  States	  armed	  forces.	  	  This	  was	  in	  marked	  
contrast	  to	  the	  views	  of	  many	  conservatives	  prior	  to	  World	  War	  II;	  isolationist	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sentiment	  among	  conservatives	  remained	  strong	  in	  the	  United	  States	  until	  shortly	  
before	  Pearl	  Harbor.	  	  The	  mid-­‐‑1930s	  deliberations	  of	  the	  Senate	  Special	  Committee	  
on	  Investigation	  of	  the	  Munitions	  Industry,	  headed	  by	  Republican	  Gerald	  P.	  Nye	  of	  
North	  Dakota	  provide	  an	  apt	  illustration	  of	  that	  isolationism.	  	  Allegations	  that	  
munitions	  manufacturers	  and	  bankers	  might	  have	  spurred	  U.S.	  entry	  into	  the	  
previous	  World	  War	  for	  selfish	  reasons	  made	  news,	  whether	  those	  allegations	  were	  
wholly	  verifiable	  or	  not.	  	  Nye's	  committee	  comprised	  four	  Democrats	  and	  two	  other	  
Republicans.	  	  Of	  the	  latter,	  Arthur	  H.	  Vandenberg	  of	  Michigan,	  like	  Nye,	  represented	  
a	  strain	  of	  Midwestern	  agrarian	  Republicanism	  that	  opposed	  interference	  in	  
European	  affairs	  and	  distrusted	  the	  Eastern,	  internationalist	  wing	  of	  the	  Republican	  
Party.	  	  While	  the	  committee	  could	  “not	  show	  that	  wars	  have	  been	  started	  solely	  
because	  of	  the	  activities	  of	  munitions	  makers	  and	  their	  agents,”	  the	  committee	  did	  
attack	  the	  “selfishly	  interested	  organizations”	  that	  could	  “goad	  and	  frighten	  nations	  
into	  military	  activity.”	  	  The	  Nye	  Committee’s	  findings	  influenced	  American	  public	  
opinion	  regarding	  European	  entanglements	  and	  contributed	  to	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  
Neutrality	  Acts	  between	  1935	  and	  1939.1	  
Indeed,	  the	  failures	  of	  World	  War	  I	  heavily	  influenced	  isolationist	  policy	  
makers	  and	  citizens	  in	  the	  1930s.	  	  In	  April	  1935,	  as	  Italy	  massed	  troops	  in	  North	  
Africa	  for	  the	  October	  attack	  on	  Ethiopia,	  American	  veterans	  of	  World	  War	  I	  
                                                                                                                          
1	  U.S.	  Congress,	  Special	  Senate	  Committee	  Investigating	  the	  Munitions	  Industry,	  Munitions	  
Industry:	  	  Report	  on	  Existing	  Legislation,	  74th	  Congress,	  1st	  session,	  1936,	  Senate	  Report	  944,	  part	  5,	  1-­‐‑
9,	  58,	  cited	  in	  Ronald	  E.	  Powaski,	  Toward	  an	  Entangling	  Alliance:	  	  American	  Isolationism,	  
Internationalism,	  and	  Europe,	  1901-­‐‑1950	  (New	  York:	  	  Greenwood	  Press,	  1991),	  66-­‐‑67;	  Robert	  E.	  
Jenner,	  FDR’s	  Republicans:	  	  Domestic	  Political	  Realignment	  and	  American	  Foreign	  Policy	  (Lanham,	  
Maryland:	  	  Lexington	  Books,	  2010),	  53-­‐‑59;	  David	  M.	  Kennedy,	  Freedom	  From	  Fear:	  	  The	  American	  
People	  in	  Depression	  and	  War,	  1929-­‐‑1945	  (New	  York:	  	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2005),	  394-­‐‑95.	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marched	  on	  Washington	  D.C.	  and	  laid	  wreaths	  on	  graves	  of	  three	  representatives	  
who	  had	  opposed	  President	  Wilson’s	  request	  for	  a	  declaration	  of	  war	  against	  
Germany	  in	  1917.	  	  President	  Franklin	  D.	  Roosevelt	  signed	  the	  first	  Neutrality	  Act	  on	  
August	  31,	  1935.	  	  Thus,	  when	  two	  or	  more	  nations	  were	  at	  war,	  the	  President	  was	  to	  
embargo	  weapons	  shipments	  to	  all	  sides	  of	  the	  conflict.	  	  The	  act	  also	  authorized	  the	  
President	  to	  warn	  Americans	  against	  traveling	  on	  ships	  belonging	  to	  belligerent	  
nations.	  	  Congress’	  clear	  intention	  was	  to	  forestall	  American	  entry	  into	  another	  
European	  war,	  when	  attacks	  by	  German	  submarines	  against	  American	  ships	  might	  
again	  lead	  to	  a	  loss	  of	  neutrality	  and	  military	  involvement.	  	  Although	  officers	  in	  the	  
House	  of	  Representatives	  did	  not	  take	  roll	  call	  to	  document	  the	  vote	  there,	  the	  vote	  
in	  the	  Senate	  was	  “nearly	  unanimous.”	  	  No	  Republican	  voted	  against	  the	  bill,	  with	  
internationalists	  on	  the	  East	  coast	  joining	  Midwestern	  isolationists	  in	  support.	  	  The	  
Neutrality	  Act	  of	  1937	  upped	  the	  ante,	  outlawing	  the	  shipment	  of	  military	  items	  to	  
belligerent	  nations	  and	  prohibiting	  Americans	  from	  traveling	  to	  belligerent	  nations	  
on	  the	  ships	  of	  those	  nations.	  	  The	  1937	  act	  did	  allow	  nations	  at	  war	  to	  purchase	  
nonmilitary	  items,	  but	  only	  on	  a	  “cash-­‐‑and-­‐‑carry”	  basis,	  and	  only	  if	  they	  shipped	  the	  
purchased	  items	  in	  foreign-­‐‑flagged	  vessels.	  	  Again,	  support	  in	  the	  Senate	  was	  an	  
overwhelming	  63	  to	  6	  vote.	  	  Despite	  ominous	  developments	  in	  Europe	  and	  Asia,	  
isolationism	  still	  reigned	  in	  America.2	  	  	  
                                                                                                                          
2	  Kennedy,	  Freedom	  From	  Fear,	  393-­‐‑94,	  400-­‐‑2;	  Robert	  Dallek,	  Franklin	  D.	  Roosevelt	  and	  
American	  Foreign	  Policy,	  1932-­‐‑1945	  (New	  York:	  	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1995),	  102-­‐‑8;	  Robert	  A.	  




On	  October	  5,	  1937,	  three	  months	  after	  Japan’s	  attack	  on	  China,	  President	  
Roosevelt	  delivered	  the	  “Quarantine	  Speech”	  in	  Chicago.	  	  The	  President	  compared	  
war	  to	  a	  “disease”	  and	  “contagion”	  which	  the	  United	  States	  must	  confront	  through	  
“positive	  endeavors	  to	  preserve	  the	  peace.”	  	  The	  public's	  reception	  was	  cold,	  and	  
Roosevelt	  retreated	  from	  this	  position	  the	  following	  day,	  even	  hinting	  that	  his	  
administration	  might	  push	  for	  “stronger	  neutrality.”	  	  The	  New	  York	  Times	  compiled	  
excerpts	  from	  the	  editorial	  pages	  of	  the	  nation’s	  newspapers	  the	  next	  day;	  these	  
excerpts	  illustrated	  the	  divisions	  between	  isolationists	  and	  interventionists	  among	  
U.S.	  opinion-­‐‑makers.	  	  The	  Washington	  Post	  criticized	  America’s	  “ostrich	  hunt	  for	  
security”	  up	  to	  that	  point	  and	  called	  on	  Roosevelt	  to	  “make	  explicit	  the	  assurances	  
implied”	  in	  the	  Quarantine	  Speech.	  	  Similarly,	  the	  Cincinnati	  Enquirer	  lauded	  the	  
president	  for	  finally	  reorienting	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  to	  “repress	  international	  
gangsterism.”	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  Philadelphia	  Inquirer	  warned	  against	  “any	  
punitive	  partnership	  with	  nations	  that	  have	  interests,	  and	  in	  some	  cases,	  possible,	  
motives	  different	  from	  ours.”	  	  Striking	  an	  isolationist	  tone,	  the	  editors	  warned	  of	  the	  
“pitfalls	  that	  beset	  the	  path	  of	  the	  aggressive	  peacemaker,	  however	  well-­‐‑
intentioned.”	  	  Robert	  McCormick’s	  non-­‐‑interventionist	  Chicago	  Tribune	  went	  
further,	  charging	  that	  Roosevelt’s	  quarantine	  might	  force	  the	  United	  States	  into	  war	  
with	  “aggressor	  nations.”	  	  The	  editors	  pointedly	  compared	  Roosevelt’s	  position	  to	  
that	  of	  President	  Woodrow	  Wilson	  prior	  to	  U.S	  involvement	  in	  World	  War	  I,	  a	  
parallel	  that	  Americans	  who	  were	  fearful	  of	  repeating	  what	  they	  perceived	  to	  be	  the	  
mistakes	  of	  1917	  could	  not	  have	  missed.	  	  A	  poll	  published	  on	  October	  24,	  1937	  
indicates	  that	  most	  Americans	  were	  not	  ready	  for	  a	  decisive	  confrontation	  of	  the	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world’s	  dictators.	  	  Only	  37	  percent	  were	  willing	  to	  boycott	  Japanese	  goods	  in	  
retaliation	  for	  Japan’s	  invasion	  of	  China,	  much	  less	  take	  the	  drastic	  action	  that	  might	  
actually	  force	  Japan	  to	  cease	  aggression	  in	  Asia.3	  	  	  
The	  situation	  for	  the	  European	  democracies	  became	  more	  perilous	  from	  this	  
point	  on,	  as	  Germany	  annexed	  Austria	  in	  March	  1938,	  then	  took	  the	  Sudetenland	  in	  
October,	  and	  finally	  swallowed	  the	  rest	  of	  Czechoslovakia	  in	  March	  1939.	  	  After	  
Germany	  touched	  off	  World	  War	  II	  with	  its	  September	  invasion	  of	  Poland,	  Congress	  
passed	  another	  Neutrality	  Act.	  	  This	  law,	  signed	  in	  November	  1939,	  ended	  the	  arms	  
embargo	  so	  that	  Britain	  and	  France	  could	  now	  buy	  weapons	  from	  American	  
manufacturers.	  	  However,	  isolationists	  in	  Congress	  revived	  the	  lapsed	  cash-­‐‑and-­‐‑
carry	  requirement	  of	  the	  1937	  Neutrality	  Act.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  law	  forbade	  all	  loans	  
and	  credit	  to	  warring	  nations,	  by	  the	  American	  government	  as	  well	  as	  private	  banks.	  	  
Many	  Americans	  were	  coming	  to	  terms	  with	  the	  likelihood	  of	  a	  war	  with	  the	  Axis	  
Powers.	  	  Gallup’s	  poll	  on	  October	  2,	  1938	  showed	  that,	  while	  Americans	  desired	  to	  
avoid	  war,	  43	  percent	  believed	  that	  a	  war	  between	  Britain	  and	  Germany	  would	  force	  
the	  United	  States	  to	  enter	  the	  conflict.	  	  Still,	  57	  percent	  believed	  the	  U.S.	  could	  avoid	  
entry	  into	  a	  war	  in	  Europe.4	  
	   The	  1940	  Republican	  nomination	  proved	  to	  be	  an	  important	  showdown	  
between	  isolationist	  and	  interventionists	  within	  the	  party.	  	  Reflecting	  the	  party’s	  
                                                                                                                          
3	  Kennedy,	  Freedom	  From	  Fear,	  405-­‐‑6;	  “Nation-­‐‑Wide	  Press	  Comment	  on	  President	  
Roosevelt’s	  Address,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  October	  6,	  1937;	  George	  Gallup,	  “Majority	  of	  Voters	  Unwilling	  
to	  Boycott	  Japan,	  National	  Poll	  Shows,”	  Washington	  Post,	  October	  24,	  1937.	  	  	  
4	  George	  Gallup,	  “Public	  Divided	  on	  Question	  of	  Nation	  Staying	  Out	  of	  War,”	  Los	  Angeles	  Times,	  
October	  2,	  1938.	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strong	  isolationist	  bent,	  and	  before	  the	  full	  extent	  of	  Hitler’s	  depredations	  in	  Europe,	  
Senator	  Vandenberg	  was	  the	  frontrunner	  in	  one	  December	  1937	  poll	  while	  Wendell	  
Willkie,	  the	  eventual	  nominee,	  was	  not	  even	  on	  this	  list.	  	  By	  November	  1938,	  polls	  
registered	  that	  Thomas	  E.	  Dewey	  had	  become	  the	  frontrunner,	  with	  the	  support	  of	  
about	  one-­‐‑third	  of	  the	  Republican	  electorate.	  	  Senators	  Vandenberg	  and	  Robert	  A.	  
Taft	  of	  Ohio	  each	  garnered	  about	  18	  percent,	  according	  to	  the	  same	  poll.	  	  All	  three	  
were	  isolationists,	  Vandenberg	  and	  Taft	  more	  so	  than	  Dewey.	  	  Vandenberg	  had	  even	  
warned	  against	  moving	  “toward	  American	  participation	  in	  other	  peoples’	  wars”	  by	  
giving	  the	  president	  too	  much	  discretion	  in	  foreign	  affairs.	  	  Vandenberg	  adopted	  a	  
position,	  which	  he	  called	  “insulationsim,”	  meaning	  that	  he	  wanted	  to	  insulate	  the	  
United	  States	  from	  foreign	  invasion	  through	  a	  strong	  national	  defense	  program.	  	  
“Protected	  by	  a	  great	  ocean	  on	  either	  side,	  the	  United	  States	  need	  fear	  no	  other	  
nation,	  if	  we	  mind	  our	  own	  business,”	  he	  declared.	  	  Senator	  Taft,	  on	  a	  campaign	  tour	  
through	  the	  Midwest	  in	  late	  1939	  used	  President	  Wilson’s	  internationalism	  as	  a	  
cudgel	  with	  which	  to	  attack	  the	  Democrats	  as	  the	  country	  faced	  once	  again	  the	  
choice	  of	  whether	  to	  enter	  a	  war	  in	  Europe.	  	  Taft	  called	  the	  Republicans	  the	  “peace	  
party,”	  and	  further	  warned	  that	  entrusting	  the	  Democratic	  Party	  with	  the	  war	  would	  
lead	  to	  a	  complete	  loss	  of	  freedom	  at	  home,	  which	  he	  believed	  would	  start	  with	  the	  
draft.	  	  Conscription	  inevitably	  led	  to	  the	  loss	  of	  Americans’	  “individual	  liberty,”	  and	  
ultimately	  to	  “totalitarianism,”	  he	  argued.	  	  Dewey	  also	  took	  an	  isolationist	  stance	  
during	  the	  1940	  campaign,	  although	  that	  may	  have	  been	  as	  much	  due	  to	  the	  
influence	  of	  important	  advisors	  as	  personal	  belief.	  	  In	  his	  St.	  Louis	  speech	  of	  March	  
1940,	  he	  attacked	  the	  integrity	  of	  Roosevelt’s	  New	  Deal	  programs,	  claiming	  “broken	  
7  
  
promises,	  contempt	  for	  the	  Constitution	  and	  flagrant	  abuse	  of	  power”	  by	  the	  
Democratic	  administration.	  	  That	  being	  the	  case,	  he	  asked	  how	  the	  American	  people	  
could	  trust	  Roosevelt’s	  promise	  to	  “keep	  this	  Nation	  out	  of	  war.”	  	  In	  a	  speech	  in	  
Milwaukee	  on	  the	  same	  tour,	  Dewey	  asserted	  that	  it	  was	  “imperative”	  for	  the	  United	  
States	  to	  avoid	  becoming	  “involved	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  in	  foreign	  wars.”5	  
	   Corporate	  lawyer	  and	  liberal	  Republican	  Wendell	  Willkie	  ultimately	  received	  
the	  Republican	  nomination,	  with	  support	  of	  publishing	  magnates	  like	  Henry	  Luce	  of	  
Time	  and	  the	  internationalist	  wing	  of	  the	  Republican	  Party,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  late	  surge	  in	  
grassroots	  support.	  	  Although	  he	  had	  expressed	  interest	  in	  the	  presidency	  in	  early	  
1940,	  Willkie	  did	  not	  formally	  announce	  his	  candidacy	  until	  early	  June,	  only	  a	  few	  
weeks	  before	  the	  Republican	  Convention	  in	  Philadelphia.	  	  Nevertheless,	  he	  steadily	  
gained	  in	  Gallup	  polls	  against	  the	  frontrunner	  Thomas	  Dewey	  throughout	  the	  spring	  
of	  1940.	  	  Before	  receiving	  the	  nomination	  and	  through	  the	  election,	  he	  focused	  his	  
attacks	  on	  Roosevelt’s	  domestic	  programs.	  	  In	  March	  1940,	  he	  argued	  that	  
Republicans	  should	  “challenge	  the	  New	  Deal	  primarily	  on	  its	  domestic	  conduct,”	  
which	  he	  believed	  put	  the	  United	  States	  on	  the	  path	  to	  “tyranny	  and	  enslavement,”	  
instead	  of	  letting	  the	  “campaign	  to	  be	  fought	  out	  on	  the	  question	  of	  foreign	  policy,”	  
                                                                                                                          
5	  Kennedy,	  Freedom	  From	  Fear,	  433-­‐‑34;	  Institute	  of	  Public	  Opinion,	  “Vandenberg	  in	  Lead	  For	  
1940	  Nomination,”	  Washington	  Post,	  December	  5,	  1937;	  “Vandenberg	  Urges	  a	  Rigid	  Neutrality,”	  New	  
York	  Times,	  December	  11,	  1938;	  Susan	  Dunn,	  1940:	  	  FDR,	  Willkie,	  Lindbergh,	  Hitler—the	  Election	  amid	  
the	  Storm	  (New	  Haven:	  	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2013),	  63,	  73-­‐‑74,	  76-­‐‑77;	  “Taft	  Sees	  War	  as	  1940	  Issue,”	  
Los	  Angeles	  Times,	  November	  21,	  1939;	  James	  L.	  Lacy,	  “Military	  Manpower:	  	  The	  American	  Experience	  
and	  the	  Enduring	  Debate,”	  in	  Andrew	  J.	  Goodpaster,	  Lloyd	  H.	  Elliott,	  and	  J.	  Allan	  Hovey,	  Jr.,	  eds.,	  
Towards	  a	  Consensus	  on	  Military	  Service:	  	  Report	  of	  the	  Atlantic	  Council’s	  Working	  Group	  on	  Military	  
Service	  (New	  York:	  	  Pergamon	  Press,	  1982),	  31-­‐‑32;	  “Dewey	  Assails	  Foreign	  Policy	  of	  Roosevelt,”	  
Washington	  Post,	  March	  28,	  1940;	  Marshall	  Newton,	  “New	  Deal	  Fosters	  Slump,	  Says	  Dewey,”	  New	  York	  
Times,	  March	  30,	  1940.	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where	  he	  largely	  agreed	  with	  Roosevelt.	  	  While	  Willkie	  argued	  the	  United	  States	  
should	  not	  send	  its	  own	  troops	  to	  Europe,	  he	  did	  call	  on	  the	  American	  government	  
to	  offer	  direct	  aid	  to	  Britain	  and	  France.	  	  Only	  three	  weeks	  after	  he	  made	  this	  
pronouncement,	  France	  fell	  to	  the	  Germans	  and	  the	  British	  barely	  escaped	  at	  
Dunkirk.	  	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  world	  events	  influenced	  the	  Republican	  delegates	  who	  met	  
only	  two	  days	  after	  the	  surrender	  of	  France	  to	  the	  Nazis.	  	  On	  June	  21,	  a	  Gallup	  poll	  
registered	  that	  Willkie	  had	  nearly	  doubled	  his	  support	  in	  only	  a	  week,	  while	  
frontrunner	  Dewey	  had	  lost	  5	  percent.	  	  Willkie	  won	  the	  nomination	  on	  the	  sixth	  
ballot	  in	  an	  unprecedented	  fashion,	  having	  never	  held	  elective	  office	  and	  after	  many	  
political	  commentators	  had	  written	  him	  off	  as	  a	  “dark	  horse”	  candidate	  only	  weeks	  
before.	  	  One	  factor	  in	  his	  surprise	  win	  was	  the	  critical	  state	  of	  world	  affairs	  in	  June	  
1940.6	  	  	  
	   In	  response	  to	  Axis	  advances	  across	  Europe	  and	  Asia,	  President	  Roosevelt	  
confronted	  the	  issue	  of	  manpower	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1940.	  	  Like	  Roosevelt,	  the	  non-­‐‑
interventionist	  Republicans	  recognized	  the	  threat	  posed	  by	  the	  Axis	  Powers.	  	  Many	  
people	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  interventionist/isolationist	  divide	  agreed	  that	  the	  United	  
States	  must	  undertake	  some	  kind	  of	  preparedness	  campaign,	  especially	  after	  the	  fall	  
of	  France	  in	  June.	  	  Issues	  surrounding	  rearmament	  were	  important,	  but	  just	  as	  
important	  was	  the	  question	  of	  how	  the	  United	  States	  would	  field	  an	  army	  capable	  at	  
a	  minimum	  of	  defending	  the	  United	  States	  from	  aggressors.	  	  Roosevelt	  himself	  had	  
                                                                                                                          
6	  Dunn,	  79-­‐‑86;	  “New	  Deal’s	  Tyranny	  Hit	  by	  Wendell	  Willkie,”	  Los	  Angeles	  Times,	  March	  16,	  
1940;	  “Willkie	  Seeks	  American	  Aid	  For	  the	  Allies,”	  Atlanta	  Constitution,	  May	  29,	  1940;	  Kennedy,	  
Freedom	  From	  Fear,	  438-­‐‑40;	  George	  Gallup,	  “Willkie	  Has	  Sensational	  Spurt	  In	  Preconvention	  
Popularity,”	  Washington	  Post,	  June	  21,	  1940;	  “Willkie	  Wins	  Republican	  Nomination	  As	  Delegates	  
Stampede	  on	  6th	  Ballot,”	  Atlanta	  Constitution,	  June	  28,	  1940.	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pondered	  this	  question	  as	  well.	  	  In	  his	  acceptance	  speech	  of	  July	  19,	  he	  maintained,	  
"some	  form	  of	  selection	  by	  draft”	  was	  needed,	  as	  it	  had	  been	  during	  World	  War	  I.	  	  He	  
made	  this	  assertion	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  feared	  it	  could	  doom	  the	  Democratic	  
Party	  in	  November.	  	  Fortunately,	  Willkie	  not	  only	  refused	  to	  make	  the	  draft	  an	  issue,	  
but	  went	  so	  far	  as	  to	  say	  that	  he	  would	  rather	  lose	  the	  election	  than	  come	  out	  in	  
opposition	  to	  it.	  	  He	  even	  actively	  supported	  conscription	  during	  the	  campaign	  as	  
“the	  only	  democratic	  way”	  to	  raise	  an	  army.	  	  Hiram	  Johnson,	  an	  isolationist	  senator	  
from	  California,	  stated	  that	  Willkie’s	  support	  “broke	  the	  back”	  of	  any	  resistance	  to	  a	  
conscription	  bill.	  	  The	  American	  public	  quickly	  moved	  to	  support	  the	  draft.	  	  The	  50	  
percent	  favoring	  such	  a	  law	  in	  June	  1940	  had	  increased	  to	  an	  overwhelming	  86	  
percent	  by	  August,	  enabling	  Congress	  to	  pass	  a	  truly	  bipartisan	  bill,	  47-­‐‑25	  in	  the	  
Senate	  and	  232-­‐‑124	  in	  the	  House.	  	  Roosevelt	  signed	  the	  Burke-­‐‑Wadsworth	  Act	  on	  
September	  16,	  1940,	  which	  authorized	  the	  first	  peacetime	  draft	  in	  American	  history.	  	  
While	  isolationists	  in	  the	  Senate	  had	  tried	  to	  limit	  the	  area	  of	  service	  for	  draftees	  to	  
“the	  continental	  United	  States	  and	  its	  possessions,”	  the	  final	  version	  of	  the	  bill	  
authorized	  service	  across	  the	  Western	  Hemisphere	  and	  all	  of	  the	  overseas	  
possessions	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  including	  the	  Philippines.	  	  Still,	  this	  was	  a	  measure	  
designed	  to	  build	  up	  the	  defenses	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  prevent	  a	  possible	  
German	  attack	  on	  Latin	  America,	  in	  violation	  of	  the	  Monroe	  Doctrine.	  	  Over	  the	  next	  
year,	  the	  United	  States	  conscripted	  one	  million	  men	  and	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  war,	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the	  U.S.	  government	  drafted	  ten	  million	  more,	  with	  another	  two	  million	  
volunteering.7	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   The	  December	  7,	  1941	  attack	  on	  Pearl	  Harbor	  united	  Americans	  and	  ended	  
the	  debate	  between	  isolationists	  and	  interventionists.	  	  Senator	  Arthur	  H.	  
Vandenberg,	  the	  isolationist	  who	  had	  served	  on	  the	  Nye	  Committee,	  wrote	  in	  his	  
diary	  that	  the	  attack	  “ended	  isolationism	  for	  any	  realist.”	  	  Two	  days	  after	  the	  attack,	  
President	  Roosevelt	  acknowledged	  the	  changed	  reality	  that	  the	  United	  States	  faced.	  	  
George	  Washington	  had	  pointed	  out	  in	  his	  Farewell	  Address	  of	  1796	  that	  the	  vast	  
Atlantic	  Ocean	  separated	  the	  new	  United	  States	  from	  the	  affairs	  of	  Europe.	  	  Now,	  
Roosevelt	  acknowledged	  that	  America's	  "ocean-­‐‑girt	  hemisphere"	  no	  longer	  kept	  the	  
country	  safe	  from	  attack.	  	  Because	  of	  the	  new	  threats	  to	  the	  United	  States	  homeland,	  
public	  attitudes	  regarding	  American	  foreign	  policy	  underwent	  important	  changes	  as	  
compared	  to	  the	  isolationist	  sentiment	  that	  had	  gripped	  significant	  parts	  of	  the	  
country	  before	  the	  attack	  on	  Pearl	  Harbor.	  	  Throughout	  the	  war	  and	  into	  the	  early	  
postwar	  era,	  the	  American	  public	  overwhelmingly	  supported	  an	  interventionist	  
foreign	  policy	  backed	  by	  conscription.	  	  Because	  the	  draft	  was	  nearly	  universal	  and	  
because	  of	  the	  local,	  decentralized	  structure	  of	  draft	  boards,	  conscription	  during	  
                                                                                                                          
7	  “Text	  of	  the	  President’s	  Speech	  Accepting	  3d	  Nomination,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  July	  19,	  1940;	  
Jean	  Edward	  Smith,	  FDR	  (New	  York:	  	  Random	  House,	  2007),	  466;	  “Senate	  Keeps	  Draftees	  In	  
Hemisphere,”	  Hartford	  Courant,	  August	  27,	  1940;	  “Complete	  Text	  of	  Peace-­‐‑time	  Conscription	  
Measure,”	  Hartford	  Courant,	  September	  15,	  1940;	  Suzanne	  Mettler,	  Soldiers	  to	  Citizens:	  	  The	  G.I.	  Bill	  
and	  the	  Making	  of	  the	  Greatest	  Generation	  (New	  York:	  	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2005),	  26-­‐‑27;	  Michael	  
S.	  Sherry,	  In	  the	  Shadow	  of	  War:	  	  The	  United	  States	  Since	  the	  1930s	  (New	  Haven:	  	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  
1995),	  48-­‐‑49;	  Kennedy,	  Freedom	  From	  Fear,	  459.	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World	  War	  II	  was	  perceived	  as	  fair	  and	  therefore	  received	  overwhelming	  public	  
support.8	  
	  
The	  American	  military’s	  fear	  of	  a	  return	  to	  isolationism	  compounded	  
postwar	  fears	  that	  the	  American	  economy	  might	  sink	  back	  into	  depression.	  	  
Immediately	  after	  the	  war,	  the	  public	  not	  only	  pushed	  for	  rapid	  demobilization,	  but	  
an	  equally	  quick	  end	  to	  conscription.	  	  Even	  before	  the	  war	  against	  Japan	  had	  
concluded,	  Senator	  Taft	  attacked	  the	  “stupid,	  stubborn	  policy	  of	  the	  War	  
Department,”	  which	  persisted	  in	  drafting	  large	  numbers	  of	  men.	  	  Such	  sentiments	  
were	  common	  in	  the	  ranks	  as	  well.	  	  For	  instance,	  an	  anonymous	  naval	  officer	  
stationed	  in	  California	  in	  August	  1945	  demanded	  an	  end	  to	  all	  “compulsory	  military	  
training”	  in	  all	  nations,	  including	  the	  United	  States,	  as	  a	  way	  to	  achieve	  world	  peace.	  	  
Responding	  to	  political	  pressure	  from	  Capitol	  Hill	  as	  well	  as	  unrest	  from	  many	  men	  
in	  uniform,	  President	  Truman	  came	  out	  against	  a	  continued	  draft	  during	  peacetime	  
only	  a	  few	  days	  after	  the	  bombing	  of	  Nagasaki.	  	  In	  the	  short-­‐‑term,	  however,	  Truman	  
acknowledged	  privately	  that	  it	  would	  be	  impossible	  to	  end	  the	  draft.	  	  At	  least	  in	  the	  
immediate	  future,	  he	  did	  not	  want	  to	  rely	  solely	  on	  volunteers	  because	  of	  the	  threat	  
to	  national	  security	  posed	  by	  an	  undermanned	  military.	  	  Army	  Chief	  of	  Staff	  General	  
George	  Marshall,	  among	  others	  in	  the	  Army,	  convinced	  the	  president	  to	  continue	  the	  
                                                                                                                          
8	  Dallek,	  Franklin	  D.	  Roosevelt	  and	  American	  Foreign	  Policy,	  309-­‐‑13;	  Miranda	  S.	  Spivack,	  
“Roots	  of	  Isolationism	  Deep	  in	  U.S.	  History,”	  Hartford	  Courant,	  December	  7,	  1991;	  George	  C.	  Herring,	  
From	  Colony	  to	  Superpower:	  	  U.S.	  Foreign	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  1776	  (New	  York:	  	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	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  of	  President	  Roosevelt’s	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  on	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  War,”	  Hartford	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  R.	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  Foreign	  Policy,	  Rev.	  ed.	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  MI:	  	  University	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  Press,	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  Q.	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  (Lawrence,	  KS:	  	  University	  Press	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  Kansas,	  1993),	  60-­‐‑61,	  85-­‐‑87.	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draft	  to	  maintain	  occupation	  duties	  in	  Germany	  and	  Japan,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  
commitments	  around	  the	  world.	  	  In	  the	  long-­‐‑term,	  however,	  military	  planners	  
hoped	  to	  return	  to	  volunteer	  professionals	  backed	  by	  the	  National	  Guard.9	  
	   The	  Cold	  War	  dashed	  prospects	  of	  an	  easy	  end	  to	  the	  draft.	  	  Important	  
American	  leaders,	  President	  Truman	  foremost	  among	  them,	  came	  to	  view	  the	  Soviet	  
Union,	  an	  erstwhile	  ally,	  as	  a	  serious	  threat	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  	  In	  the	  fall	  of	  1945,	  
the	  Soviet	  Union	  refused	  American	  calls	  for	  self-­‐‑determination	  for	  Romania,	  
Bulgaria,	  and	  the	  Balkan	  nations.	  	  Truman	  believed	  Soviet	  intransigence	  in	  these	  
areas	  augured	  Stalin’s	  determination	  to	  dominate	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  the	  Middle	  
East.	  	  George	  F.	  Kennan	  sent	  his	  “Long	  Telegram”	  from	  Moscow	  on	  February	  22,	  
1946,	  arguing	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  intended	  to	  destabilize	  Western	  democracies	  
and	  expand	  communism	  around	  the	  world.	  	  The	  United	  States	  must	  stop	  such	  
expansion	  at	  every	  turn,	  Kennan	  argued,	  pushing	  a	  policy	  that	  its	  proponents	  
eventually	  called	  Containment.	  	  Although	  this	  analysis	  did	  not	  become	  public	  
knowledge	  until	  July	  1947,	  it	  reinforced	  Truman’s	  growing	  suspicions	  of	  Soviet	  
intentions.10	  	  Winston	  Churchill	  publicly	  delivered	  a	  warning	  on	  March	  5,	  1946	  that	  
an	  “iron	  curtain”	  had	  split	  Europe	  between	  the	  democratic	  West	  and	  Soviet-­‐‑
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  York:	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  University	  Press,	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  American	  Foreign	  Relations	  Since	  1898	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dominated	  East.	  	  These	  events	  clearly	  influenced	  public	  opinions	  about	  foreign	  
policy	  in	  general,	  as	  well	  as	  conscription	  specifically.	  	  A	  poll	  in	  March	  1946	  showed	  
that	  72	  percent	  of	  Americans	  believed	  that	  their	  nation	  should	  maintain	  an	  active	  
role	  in	  the	  world,	  with	  both	  Republicans	  and	  Democrats	  agreeing	  in	  equal	  numbers.	  	  
Furthermore,	  the	  formerly	  isolationist	  Midwest	  was	  now	  tied	  at	  71	  percent	  with	  
East	  Coast	  interventionists	  in	  that	  belief.	  	  A	  full	  77	  percent	  of	  Americans	  supported	  
spying	  on	  other	  countries.	  	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  strong	  departure	  from	  pre-­‐‑war	  views	  
was	  mistrust	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  a	  consequent	  fear	  that	  the	  United	  States	  might	  
soon	  face	  another	  war.11	  
Throughout	  the	  Cold	  War,	  leaders	  of	  both	  major	  parties	  frequently	  invoked	  
memories	  of	  appeasing	  Adolf	  Hitler	  to	  convince	  the	  public	  that	  such	  passivity	  only	  
served	  to	  embolden	  dictators.	  	  As	  long	  as	  Americans	  believed	  their	  nation's	  foreign	  
policy	  was	  capable	  of	  preventing	  similar	  aggression,	  they	  supported	  it.	  	  Immediately	  
following	  World	  War	  II,	  65	  percent	  of	  the	  public	  favored	  the	  draft	  in	  order	  to	  
confront	  the	  Soviet	  threat,	  while	  only	  30	  percent	  believed	  that	  the	  United	  States	  and	  
Britain	  should	  disarm	  and	  end	  military	  training.	  	  Support	  for	  conscription	  did	  waver	  
during	  1945-­‐‑46,	  but	  remained	  remarkably	  high	  even	  then.12	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  George	  Gallup,	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With	  the	  hardening	  of	  U.S.-­‐‑Soviet	  relations,	  the	  United	  States	  entered	  a	  
period	  that	  saw	  a	  "Cold	  War	  Consensus"—a	  period	  during	  which	  members	  of	  both	  
political	  parties	  united	  in	  defeating	  Soviet	  communism	  despite	  their	  respective	  
differences	  in	  the	  domestic	  arena.	  	  Most	  historians	  place	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  
consensus	  at	  the	  rise	  of	  turmoil	  surrounding	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	  	  But	  until	  then,	  one	  
aspect	  of	  the	  consensus	  was	  an	  agreement	  that	  the	  draft	  should	  continue	  in	  order	  to	  
furnish	  the	  U.S.	  armed	  forces	  with	  whatever	  manpower	  it	  needed	  to	  confront	  the	  
Soviet	  enemy.	  	  From	  1940	  to	  1973—excepting	  a	  brief	  period	  during	  1947-­‐‑48—the	  
draft	  was	  a	  permanent	  fixture	  of	  American	  life.13	  
This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  no	  alternative	  proposals	  surfaced.	  	  As	  a	  presidential	  
candidate	  in	  1956,	  Adlai	  Stevenson	  proposed	  ending	  the	  draft	  and	  urged	  the	  re-­‐‑
enlistment	  of	  fully	  trained	  soldiers	  rather	  than	  "multiply[ing]	  the	  number	  of	  partly-­‐‑
trained	  men.”	  	  Whatever	  Stevenson's	  logic,	  traditional	  conservatives	  responded	  
negatively	  to	  his	  proposal,	  which	  received	  only	  lukewarm	  applause	  from	  the	  
otherwise	  supportive	  audience	  at	  the	  American	  Legion	  Convention.	  	  Vice	  President	  
Richard	  Nixon	  vigorously	  defended	  conscription	  in	  a	  speech	  to	  the	  same	  group	  the	  
next	  day,	  charging	  that	  Stevenson	  wanted	  to	  take	  the	  "easy	  way"	  by	  ending	  the	  draft	  
and	  thereby	  shirking	  America’s	  “world	  responsibilities.”	  	  Meanwhile,	  President	  
Eisenhower	  addressed	  the	  conscription	  issue	  in	  a	  live	  address	  to	  the	  nation.	  	  After	  
reciting	  the	  challenges	  the	  United	  States	  faced	  ten	  years	  into	  the	  Cold	  War,	  he	  stated	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that	  it	  would	  be	  foolish	  to	  consider	  a	  suspension	  of	  its	  draft,	  which	  would	  weaken	  
the	  military	  and	  push	  American	  allies	  toward	  “neutralist	  sentiment.”14	  	  Republican	  
Senator	  William	  F.	  Knowland	  of	  California	  went	  even	  further	  by	  claiming	  that	  
Stevenson’s	  proposal	  was	  a	  “blatant	  attempt	  to	  get	  votes"	  instead	  of	  a	  serious	  policy	  
proposal.	  	  Whether	  it	  would	  have	  actually	  gained	  Stevenson	  many	  votes	  is	  debatable	  
given	  the	  American	  public's	  strong	  support	  of	  conscription	  at	  that	  time.	  	  With	  
President	  Eisenhower’s	  reelection	  in	  1956,	  the	  idea	  went	  nowhere.15	  
	   In	  spite	  of	  their	  overwhelming	  support	  in	  1956,	  Americans	  remained	  
ambivalent	  about	  a	  long-­‐‑term	  draft.	  	  Conscription	  was	  justified	  by	  the	  need	  to	  defeat	  
Soviet	  communism,	  most	  Americans	  believed,	  but	  once	  this	  threat	  was	  defeated,	  
they	  expected	  a	  reversion	  to	  voluntarism,	  the	  peacetime	  norm	  until	  1940.	  	  Nixon’s	  
attack	  on	  Adlai	  Stevenson	  during	  September	  1956,	  when	  he	  stated	  that	  he	  would	  
like	  to	  get	  rid	  of	  the	  draft	  if	  world	  conditions	  permitted,	  demonstrates	  this	  
ambivalence.	  	  Similarly,	  Eisenhower	  held	  that	  the	  United	  States	  could	  not	  end	  
conscription	  in	  1956,	  although	  “every	  family	  naturally	  hope[d]”	  for	  the	  time	  when	  
this	  would	  be	  possible.	  	  Tellingly,	  neither	  Eisenhower	  nor	  Nixon	  claimed	  the	  draft	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offered	  a	  permanent	  benefit—only	  that	  it	  was	  then	  necessary	  as	  a	  hedge	  against	  
Soviet	  aggression.	  	  Moreover,	  many	  Americans	  who	  had	  voted	  Republican	  only	  
supported	  the	  draft	  because	  it	  required	  recurrent	  Congressional	  authorization,	  
usually	  every	  four	  years.	  	  Although	  frequently	  these	  votes	  were	  pro	  forma,	  they	  gave	  
at	  least	  the	  appearance	  of	  civilian	  consideration	  and	  oversight	  of	  the	  military.	  	  
Furthermore,	  options	  existed	  for	  volunteers	  who	  wanted	  to	  reduce	  the	  total	  service	  
time	  required	  and	  choose	  their	  branches	  of	  service.16	  
Another	  palliative	  was	  that	  local	  boards	  rather	  than	  administrators	  in	  
Washington,	  D.C.	  determined	  the	  draft	  status	  of	  young	  men.	  	  During	  the	  war	  in	  
Vietnam,	  anti-­‐‑draft	  radicals	  were	  to	  attack	  these	  boards	  for	  allegedly	  
misrepresenting	  their	  communities,	  but	  before	  the	  mid-­‐‑1960s,	  the	  boards	  generally	  
enjoyed	  the	  public’s	  confidence.	  	  Money	  mattered	  as	  well.	  	  Government	  officials	  and	  
taxpayers	  both	  realized	  that	  large	  military	  forces	  deployed	  worldwide	  with	  
advanced	  weaponry	  were	  getting	  more	  and	  more	  expensive.	  	  The	  draft	  proved	  to	  be	  
much	  less	  expensive—at	  least	  to	  taxpayers,	  if	  not	  draftees—than	  paying	  enough	  to	  
attract	  the	  needed	  number	  of	  volunteers.	  	  Undergirding	  these	  considerations	  was	  
considerable	  inertia.	  	  During	  both	  World	  Wars,	  Selective	  Service	  had	  worked	  well	  
enough,	  and	  no	  other	  option	  looked	  any	  better.	  	  Any	  unsuccessful	  change	  risked	  
serious	  consequences	  for	  American	  foreign	  policy.17	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If	  the	  draft	  threatened	  militarism	  to	  some	  Americans,	  the	  several	  postwar	  
universal	  military	  training	  (UMT)	  proposals	  inspired	  a	  similar	  reaction.	  	  President	  
Truman’s	  conception	  of	  UMT	  was	  simply	  to	  give	  young	  men	  a	  “short	  period	  of	  
training.”	  	  Truman	  reasoned	  that	  in	  the	  atomic	  age,	  scientific	  advancements	  were	  
more	  important	  than	  massive	  armies	  were.	  	  Universal	  Military	  Training	  would	  
permit	  a	  smaller,	  less	  expensive	  active	  duty	  military	  as	  long	  as	  a	  large	  contingent	  of	  
trained	  men	  remained	  available	  in	  case	  of	  emergency.	  	  Another	  advantage	  of	  UMT	  
was	  its	  all-­‐‑inclusive	  composition,	  in	  contrast	  with	  Selective	  Service's	  numerous	  
exemptions	  and	  deferments.	  	  Aside	  from	  matters	  of	  budget	  and	  egalitarianism,	  
Truman	  was	  a	  former	  U.S.	  Army	  battery	  commander	  who	  saw	  the	  moral	  and	  
physical	  benefits	  of	  brief	  military	  training.18	  
The	  debate	  during	  the	  drive	  to	  adopt	  UMT	  presaged	  the	  debate	  that	  was	  to	  
break	  out	  twenty	  years	  later	  over	  conscription.	  	  Only	  American	  acceptance	  of	  state	  
intervention	  in	  public	  life	  during	  such	  emergencies	  as	  the	  New	  Deal	  and	  World	  War	  
II	  had	  limited	  the	  former	  to	  a	  choice	  between	  UMT	  and	  a	  continuation	  or	  
resumption	  of	  selective	  service.	  	  In	  contrast,	  during	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  the	  United	  
States	  government	  elected	  to	  scrap	  all	  forms	  of	  coerced	  service	  in	  favor	  of	  
voluntarism.	  	  But	  during	  the	  debate	  over	  conscription,	  and	  even	  after	  adoption	  of	  
the	  all-­‐‑volunteer	  military	  in	  1973,	  isolated	  proposals	  for	  universal	  service,	  either	  
military	  or	  civilian,	  surfaced	  occasionally.	  	  Although	  these	  proposals	  were	  popular	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with	  a	  majority	  of	  Americans,	  most	  elites	  did	  not	  take	  them	  very	  seriously.	  	  During	  
both	  contests,	  race	  issues	  played	  an	  important	  role.	  	  African	  Americans	  demanded	  
equal	  access	  to	  service	  in	  the	  armed	  forces	  during	  the	  UMT	  debate.	  	  In	  the	  debate	  
during	  the	  Vietnam	  War,	  African	  Americans	  claimed	  discrimination	  because	  of	  
overrepresentation	  in	  combat	  units.	  	  	  
In	  his	  final	  State	  of	  the	  Union	  address,	  President	  Roosevelt	  called	  for	  postwar	  
UMT,	  which	  he	  believed	  was	  an	  “essential	  factor”	  to	  maintain	  peace	  after	  the	  war.19	  	  
Roosevelt’s	  death	  left	  President	  Harry	  Truman	  with	  the	  task	  of	  implementing	  
Roosevelt’s	  proposal.	  	  He	  first	  attempted	  to	  get	  UMT	  passed	  in	  1945	  and	  continued	  
to	  push	  Congress	  to	  adopt	  UMT	  through	  the	  early	  1950s.	  	  Under	  pressure	  to	  
demobilize	  quickly	  after	  World	  War	  II,	  Truman	  announced	  during	  a	  press	  
conference	  on	  August	  16,	  1945	  that	  the	  continued	  draft	  was	  only	  to	  “relieve	  the	  men	  
at	  the	  front”	  so	  that	  they	  could	  return	  home.	  	  He	  promised	  a	  later	  recommendation	  
on	  UMT,	  which	  he	  claimed	  was	  “not	  peacetime	  conscription.”20	  	  The	  President’s	  
concrete	  proposal	  came	  on	  October	  23,	  when	  he	  called	  for	  a	  year	  of	  military	  training	  
for	  young	  men	  between	  the	  ages	  of	  eighteen	  and	  twenty.	  	  Because	  Truman	  
distrusted	  the	  professional	  military,	  he	  hoped	  to	  structure	  the	  U.S.	  armed	  forces	  
with	  a	  small	  core	  of	  career	  soldiers	  while	  strengthening	  the	  National	  Guard	  and	  
using	  UMT	  to	  create	  a	  “general	  reserve”	  of	  men	  for	  emergencies.	  	  The	  plan	  only	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exempted	  men	  with	  serious	  disabilities.	  	  Truman	  justified	  the	  program	  with	  the	  
argument	  that	  a	  trained	  citizenry	  meant	  more	  prepared	  soldiers	  for	  future	  wars.	  	  
However,	  he	  also	  attempted	  to	  allay	  the	  fear	  that	  UMT	  threatened	  a	  turn	  toward	  
militarism	  by	  arguing	  that	  a	  "large	  trained	  reserve	  of	  peace-­‐‑loving	  citizens”	  would	  
avoid	  war	  if	  at	  all	  possible.	  	  Because	  Congress	  took	  no	  action	  on	  UMT,	  Truman	  
recommended	  in	  early	  March	  1947	  that	  Congress	  not	  renew	  conscription	  after	  its	  
scheduled	  expiration	  on	  March	  31.	  	  Secretary	  of	  War	  Robert	  Patterson	  advocated	  
this	  course,	  as	  the	  military	  hoped	  to	  move	  to	  a	  volunteer	  system	  backed	  by	  trained	  
citizens.	  	  For	  his	  part,	  the	  president	  hoped	  that	  ending	  the	  draft	  might	  pressure	  
Congress	  to	  pass	  UMT.21	  	  	  
The	  military’s	  plan	  to	  achieve	  full	  strength	  through	  voluntary	  enlistments	  
proved	  unworkable.	  	  Congress	  had	  voted	  to	  increase	  the	  pay	  for	  servicemen	  but	  not	  
enough	  to	  induce	  sufficient	  volunteers	  in	  the	  face	  of	  a	  booming	  economy,	  while	  
further	  salary	  increases	  ran	  headlong	  into	  Truman’s	  desire	  to	  slash	  military	  
spending.	  	  In	  addition,	  world	  events	  conspired	  to	  both	  discourage	  voluntary	  
enlistments	  and	  increase	  the	  need	  for	  manpower	  in	  the	  armed	  forces.	  	  The	  president	  
announced	  the	  Truman	  Doctrine	  on	  March	  12,	  1947,	  after	  communists	  in	  Greece	  
and	  Turkey	  threatened	  to	  subvert	  the	  established	  governments	  in	  both	  countries.	  	  
Then,	  in	  February	  1948,	  Soviet-­‐‑backed	  communists	  overthrew	  the	  democratic	  
government	  in	  Czechoslovakia,	  while	  Chinese	  communists	  were	  moving	  toward	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victory	  in	  their	  civil	  war	  against	  the	  American-­‐‑supported	  Kuomintang	  (KMT).	  	  To	  
many	  observers,	  it	  seemed	  that	  George	  Kennan's	  dire	  predictions	  about	  a	  Soviet-­‐‑
managed	  global	  offensive	  were	  coming	  true.	  	  Truman	  agreed,	  and	  these	  
developments	  made	  U.S.	  military	  preparedness	  for	  containment	  of	  communist	  
encroachment	  that	  much	  more	  essential.22	  	  As	  UMT	  was	  still	  stalled	  in	  the	  legislative	  
process,	  Truman	  went	  to	  Congress	  on	  March	  17,	  1948	  and	  asked	  for	  a	  renewal	  of	  
conscription	  based	  on	  the	  “critical	  nature	  of	  the	  situation	  in	  Europe.”	  	  Specifically,	  he	  
asked	  Congress	  to	  pass	  UMT	  legislation	  as	  well	  as	  renew	  the	  draft	  on	  a	  “temporary”	  
basis.	  	  However,	  once	  again	  circumstances	  prevented	  UMT	  from	  becoming	  a	  reality.	  	  
The	  draft	  resumed	  on	  June	  24,	  1948,	  relieving	  pressure	  on	  Congress	  to	  adopt	  it.	  	  
That	  same	  day	  the	  U.S.S.R.	  cut	  off	  Western	  access	  to	  Berlin,	  reinforcing	  the	  need	  for	  a	  
more	  immediate	  military	  manpower	  solution.	  	  In	  spite	  of	  this	  setback	  for	  UMT,	  in	  
December	  1948	  Truman	  pledged	  to	  press	  the	  new	  Congress	  to	  pass	  his	  proposal,	  
but	  this	  once	  again	  went	  nowhere.23	  	  Finally,	  in	  1951	  during	  the	  height	  of	  the	  Korean	  
War,	  the	  president	  pushed	  once	  more	  to	  get	  Congress	  to	  act	  on	  UMT.	  	  Congress	  did	  
pass	  the	  Universal	  Military	  Training	  and	  Service	  Act	  of	  1951,	  which	  included	  an	  
insistence	  that	  young	  men	  must	  contribute	  to	  the	  defense	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  	  
However,	  Congress	  could	  not	  muster	  the	  votes	  to	  put	  this	  obligation	  into	  effect	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  Thomas	  J.	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through	  creation	  of	  a	  National	  Security	  Training	  Corps,	  which	  would	  have	  inducted	  
and	  trained	  young	  men	  as	  authorized	  by	  the	  1951	  law.24	  
The	  debate	  surrounding	  UMT	  was	  wide-­‐‑ranging.	  	  Some	  arguments	  were	  
practical,	  but	  there	  was	  also	  significant	  ideological	  and	  philosophical	  commentary,	  
both	  in	  support	  and	  opposition.	  	  Fundamentally,	  both	  defenders	  and	  detractors	  of	  
UMT	  believed	  they	  were	  saving	  the	  United	  States	  from	  the	  scourge	  of	  militarism.	  	  
The	  result	  was	  a	  curious	  uniting	  of	  libertarian	  conservatives	  and	  left	  wing	  peace	  
advocates	  in	  opposition,	  while	  traditional	  conservatives	  in	  both	  political	  parties,	  as	  
well	  as	  in	  the	  military,	  defended	  UMT.	  	  A	  similar	  phenomenon	  was	  to	  occur	  during	  
the	  debate	  over	  conscription	  during	  the	  Vietnam	  War.25	  	  	  
The	  Report	  of	  the	  President’s	  Advisory	  Commission	  on	  Universal	  Training,	  
published	  in	  May	  1947,	  came	  out	  strongly	  in	  favor	  of	  Truman’s	  UMT	  plan.	  	  First,	  the	  
commission	  responded	  to	  many	  critics	  of	  UMT	  who	  argued	  that	  trained	  citizens	  
would	  be	  useless	  in	  the	  age	  of	  atomic	  warfare.	  	  The	  commission’s	  report	  outlined	  
the	  need	  for	  trained	  Americans	  “diffused	  throughout	  the	  Nation”	  so	  that	  they	  would	  
be	  available	  wherever	  needed	  in	  the	  event	  of	  an	  atomic	  attack.26	  	  Universal	  training,	  
the	  commission	  contended,	  offered	  aid	  to	  an	  otherwise	  overcommitted	  regular	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military	  during	  enemy	  attacks	  and	  natural	  disasters.	  	  In	  addition,	  UMT	  might	  
provide	  a	  range	  of	  external	  benefits	  such	  as	  providing	  young	  men	  with	  skills	  and	  
habits	  beneficial	  to	  their	  communities,	  increasing	  “national	  unity”	  as	  young	  men	  
performed	  the	  “common	  obligation”	  of	  UMT,	  and	  instructing	  young	  men	  in	  the	  
“obligations	  of	  citizenship”	  to	  increase	  their	  patriotism.	  	  The	  report	  argued	  that	  UMT	  
would	  not	  push	  America	  toward	  militarism,	  just	  as	  World	  War	  II	  veterans	  had	  not	  
become	  “eager	  for	  military	  life.”	  	  In	  an	  especially	  weak	  argument,	  the	  commission	  
responded	  to	  the	  charge	  that	  UMT	  was	  “conscription,	  un-­‐‑American,	  [and]	  
undemocratic”	  by	  equating	  it	  with	  less	  dangerous	  citizen	  obligations	  such	  as	  paying	  
taxes.	  	  As	  historian	  Aaron	  L.	  Friedberg	  so	  pithily	  notes,	  “More	  even	  than	  the	  power	  
to	  tax,	  the	  power	  to	  conscript	  is	  truly	  the	  power	  to	  destroy.”	  	  The	  commissioners	  
dismissed	  the	  "un-­‐‑American"	  charge	  as	  a	  fear	  of	  innovation	  and	  one	  harbored	  by	  
people	  who	  had	  already	  accepted	  the	  dramatic	  increases	  in	  federal	  authority	  during	  
the	  New	  Deal	  and	  World	  War	  II.	  	  Traditional	  conservatives	  inferred	  an	  unduly	  loose	  
interpretation	  of	  the	  Constitution,	  although	  the	  commission	  did	  not	  directly	  address	  
constitutional	  issues	  other	  than	  to	  say	  that	  the	  “democratic	  vote	  of	  the	  
representatives	  of	  the	  people,	  subject	  to	  certain	  safeguards	  provided	  in	  the	  
Constitution”	  was	  enough	  to	  guarantee	  that	  UMT	  was	  not	  undemocratic	  or	  un-­‐‑
American.	  	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  had	  already	  laid	  to	  rest	  such	  constitutional	  issues	  in	  
the	  Arver	  et	  al.	  decision	  in	  January	  1918.	  	  However,	  libertarian	  conservatives	  and	  
anti-­‐‑draft	  radicals	  believed	  the	  Court	  had	  made	  a	  mistake	  in	  this	  case.	  	  Therefore,	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allegations	  of	  unconstitutional	  coerced	  military	  service	  continued	  to	  surface	  
throughout	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  era.27	  	  	  	  
Former	  Army	  Chief	  of	  Staff	  and	  Secretary	  of	  State	  George	  C.	  Marshall	  was	  one	  
of	  the	  foremost	  advocates	  of	  UMT,	  making	  speeches	  and	  appearing	  before	  Congress	  
numerous	  times.	  	  In	  April	  1951,	  Marshall	  published	  an	  essay	  in	  Army	  Information	  
Digest	  called	  “The	  Obligation	  to	  Serve,”	  in	  which	  he	  laid	  out	  in	  detail	  his	  case	  for	  
universal	  service	  and	  Truman’s	  UMT	  proposal.	  	  Looking	  to	  history,	  Marshall	  
highlighted	  the	  “obligation	  of	  every	  person	  in	  the	  community	  to	  defend	  that	  
community”	  that,	  during	  the	  colonial	  era,	  had	  been	  as	  serious	  and	  universal	  a	  
responsibility	  as	  voting	  or	  jury	  service.	  	  Marshall	  noted	  George	  Washington’s	  
affirmation	  of	  citizens’	  duty	  to	  provide	  “personal	  services	  to	  the	  defense"	  of	  the	  
country	  through	  a	  militia	  system	  that	  "pervade[ed]	  all	  the	  States."	  	  It	  was	  a	  clever	  
argument,	  yet	  one	  that	  glossed	  over	  important	  differences	  between	  UMT	  as	  
proposed	  during	  Truman’s	  presidency	  and	  Washington’s	  plan	  for	  state-­‐‑directed	  and	  
controlled	  militias.	  	  In	  1951,	  Marshall	  predicted	  sudden	  wars	  for	  which	  the	  United	  
States	  would	  not	  have	  years	  to	  prepare,	  and	  UMT	  allowed	  the	  rapid	  mobilization	  of	  
millions	  of	  trained	  soldiers	  in	  such	  a	  case.	  	  However,	  Marshall	  hoped	  that	  the	  
massive	  number	  of	  potential	  recruits	  enjoyed	  by	  the	  United	  States	  might	  also	  “give	  
pause	  to	  those	  who	  would	  attack	  us,”	  just	  as	  an	  earlier	  version	  of	  UMT	  might	  have	  
averted	  World	  War	  II.	  	  In	  addition,	  UMT	  was	  a	  hedge	  against	  attack	  on	  the	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“principles	  of	  democratic	  freedom	  which	  our	  Nation	  has	  always	  espoused.”	  	  Here	  
Marshall	  left	  open	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  military	  could	  use	  trainees	  in	  foreign	  wars	  
in	  support	  of	  the	  Truman	  Doctrine	  in	  the	  event	  that	  their	  recruitment	  had	  not	  given	  
pause	  to	  potential	  aggressors.	  	  It	  was	  this	  trend	  toward	  greater	  militarization	  of	  
foreign	  policy	  that	  many	  opponents	  of	  UMT	  feared.28	  	  	  	  	  
On	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  UMT	  debate,	  conservatives	  aligned	  with	  peace	  
advocates	  on	  the	  left	  to	  oppose	  universal	  training.	  	  While	  true	  libertarian	  
conservatism	  had	  not	  blossomed	  in	  the	  United	  States	  at	  this	  point,	  important	  
conservatives	  used	  America’s	  traditional	  fears	  of	  standing	  armies	  and	  government	  
compulsion	  to	  justify	  their	  opposition.	  	  For	  instance,	  in	  August	  1945	  Republican	  
Thomas	  E.	  Dewey	  called	  for	  an	  end	  to	  conscription	  once	  Japan	  had	  been	  defeated.	  	  
“We	  cannot	  practice	  in	  peace	  the	  centralization	  which	  brought	  totalitarianism	  to	  our	  
enemies	  and	  be	  either	  free	  or	  successful,”	  he	  opined.	  	  However,	  Dewey	  also	  called	  
for	  future	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  to	  prevent	  “disasters	  like	  the	  present	  one,"	  an	  
inconsistent	  stance	  for	  someone	  in	  search	  of	  guarantees	  against	  totalitarianism.	  	  He	  
assumed	  that	  fighting	  would	  cease	  once	  the	  United	  States	  achieved	  victory	  in	  World	  
War	  II:	  	  “The	  America	  people	  intend	  to	  win	  this	  war	  and	  to	  be	  done	  with	  fighting	  
both	  at	  home	  and	  abroad,"	  he	  declared.	  	  "When	  victory	  is	  won	  it	  must	  be	  won	  for	  
good.”29	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Dewey	  also	  attacked	  the	  draft	  as	  a	  jobs	  program,	  an	  attack	  that	  resonated	  
with	  many	  who	  remembered	  Selective	  Service	  chief	  Lewis	  B.	  Hershey's	  quip	  about	  
"keep[ing]	  people	  in	  the	  Army	  about	  as	  cheaply	  as	  we	  could	  create	  an	  agency	  for	  
them	  when	  they	  are	  out."	  	  Indeed	  many	  Americans	  feared	  a	  return	  of	  the	  Great	  
Depression	  at	  a	  time	  when	  recently	  discharged	  veterans	  were	  flooding	  the	  job	  
market.	  	  Hershey’s	  comment	  hinted	  that	  the	  administration	  was	  expecting	  or	  at	  least	  
planning	  for	  this	  outcome,	  and	  Dewey	  stoked	  these	  fears.	  	  In	  place	  of	  the	  draft,	  
Dewey	  proposed	  that	  the	  government	  should	  return	  veterans	  home	  as	  soon	  as	  
possible,	  with	  the	  occupation	  of	  Germany	  and	  Japan	  “confined	  to	  volunteers.”	  	  
Regarding	  the	  jobs	  issue,	  Dewey	  claimed	  the	  economy	  would	  recover	  if	  the	  
government	  followed	  pro-­‐‑business	  Republican	  policies	  instead	  of	  continuing	  New	  
Deal	  programs.	  	  What	  Dewey	  of	  course	  did	  not	  foresee	  was	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  new	  
enemy,	  one	  soon	  armed	  with	  atomic	  weapons.	  	  Given	  this	  turn	  of	  events,	  it	  was	  
unfortunate	  but	  necessary	  that	  the	  United	  States	  continue	  engagement—economic	  
or	  military—with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world.	  	  Nor	  could	  Dewey	  have	  predicted	  the	  
economic	  boom	  the	  United	  States	  experienced	  after	  World	  War	  II,	  a	  success	  that	  
negated	  much	  of	  Dewey’s	  criticisms	  of	  Truman’s	  economic	  program.30	  	  	  
Senator	  Robert	  H.	  Taft	  had	  long	  opposed	  conscription	  and	  after	  World	  War	  II	  
he	  became	  a	  fierce	  opponent	  of	  UMT.	  	  In	  February	  1948,	  Taft	  gave	  a	  speech	  in	  
Denver,	  Colorado	  in	  which	  he	  described	  his	  views	  on	  the	  manifold	  flaws	  in	  President	  
                                                                                                                          
30	  Robert	  C.	  Albright,	  “‘Exhausted’	  New	  Deal	  Fears	  Peace,	  Dewey	  Says,”	  Washington	  Post,	  
September	  8,	  1944;	  Warren	  Moscow,	  Dewey	  Considers	  Our	  Affairs	  Abroad	  ‘On	  Brink	  of	  Chaos,’”	  New	  
York	  Times,	  October	  17,	  1944.	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Truman’s	  UMT	  plan.	  	  Primarily,	  he	  argued,	  the	  United	  States	  military	  policy	  should	  
focus	  only	  on	  defense	  so	  that	  the	  U.S.	  military	  did	  not	  become	  an	  army	  of	  
“imperialists."	  	  Taft	  further	  criticized	  the	  excessive	  cost	  of	  UMT,	  a	  projected	  3	  billion	  
dollars	  annually.	  	  Since	  nations	  would	  primarily	  fight	  future	  wars	  in	  the	  air,	  
spending	  money	  on	  a	  large	  ground	  force	  was	  unnecessary	  and	  even	  wasteful.	  	  
Instead,	  Taft	  argued	  for	  a	  strong	  air	  force,	  making	  an	  attack	  on	  America	  next	  to	  
impossible.	  	  Most	  important,	  UMT	  conflicted	  with	  “American	  liberty,”	  Taft	  argued,	  
and	  the	  hallmark	  of	  a	  “totalitarian	  state.”	  	  Like	  Dewey,	  Taft	  lumped	  criticism	  of	  the	  
President	  Roosevelt	  in	  with	  his	  analysis	  of	  UMT.	  	  Proponents	  of	  the	  New	  Deal	  and	  
UMT	  wrongly	  argued	  in	  both	  cases	  that	  only	  “compulsion”	  was	  effective	  to	  fix	  the	  
economy	  and	  meet	  the	  United	  States’	  military	  challenges.	  	  What	  the	  country	  needed	  
instead	  was	  a	  “restoration	  of	  liberty”	  in	  both	  economic	  and	  military	  affairs.31	  
Several	  witnesses	  represented	  farmers’	  organizations	  during	  the	  national	  
debate	  over	  UMT.	  	  Farmers’	  interest	  in	  this	  issue	  primarily	  stemmed	  from	  an	  
antigovernment	  philosophy	  and	  the	  traditional	  isolationism	  of	  the	  Midwest.	  	  J.	  T.	  
Sanders,	  representing	  the	  National	  Grange,	  testified	  before	  the	  Senate	  Committee	  on	  
Armed	  Services	  in	  1948,	  claiming	  that	  the	  Grange	  advocated	  the	  “middle	  course	  
between	  [the]	  two	  extremes	  [of]	  hysteria”	  for	  either	  war	  or	  peace.	  	  Sanders	  
specifically	  stated	  that	  his	  was	  not	  a	  pacifist	  organization,	  but	  one	  that	  sought	  to	  
uphold	  America’s	  “traditional	  policy	  of	  antimilitarism.”	  	  Russell	  Smith	  of	  the	  
                                                                                                                          
31	  Robert	  A.	  Taft,	  “Speech	  to	  the	  Lincoln	  Club	  of	  Denver,	  February	  14,	  1948,”	  in	  The	  Papers	  of	  
Robert	  A.	  Taft,	  Volume	  3,	  1945-­‐‑1948,	  ed.	  Clarence	  E.	  Wunderlin	  (Kent,	  Ohio:	  	  Kent	  State	  University	  
Press,	  2003),	  391-­‐‑99.	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National	  Farmers	  Union	  attacked	  UMT	  because	  any	  “hypothetical	  future	  war”	  would	  
be	  a	  “technological	  war	  and	  a	  civilian	  war.”	  	  Having	  “vast	  masses	  of	  troops”	  would	  be	  
useless	  when	  “our	  cities	  are	  put	  under	  attack	  of	  atomic	  bombs,”	  he	  argued.	  	  Apart	  
from	  its	  effectiveness,	  Smith	  worried	  that	  UMT	  would	  push	  the	  world	  toward	  war	  
instead	  of	  peace,	  a	  position	  that	  Republican	  Senator	  Leverett	  Saltonstall	  of	  
Massachusetts	  criticized	  as	  “appeasement.”	  	  Apart	  from	  the	  moral	  issue	  of	  military	  
service,	  farmers’	  objections	  also	  reflected	  a	  component	  of	  self-­‐‑interest	  since	  farmers	  
would	  lose	  their	  sons’	  labor	  if	  Congress	  adopted	  UMT.	  	  J.	  T.	  Sanders	  argued	  against	  
the	  potential	  corruption	  of	  "young	  sons"	  who	  participated	  in	  UMT—the	  “flower	  of	  
American	  manhood	  physically,	  mentally,	  morally.”	  	  Additionally,	  Sanders	  described	  
the	  National	  Grange	  as	  a	  “farm	  family	  organization	  ...	  most	  of	  whom	  own	  and	  
operate	  their	  own	  farms,”	  the	  clear	  implication	  being	  that	  loss	  of	  their	  sons'	  labor	  
meant	  economic	  hardship.32	  	  	  
UMT	  united	  both	  Senator	  Taft,	  who	  tended	  toward	  libertarian	  conservatism	  
on	  this	  issue,	  and	  agrarian	  organizations.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  conservatives,	  left	  wing	  
groups	  also	  opposed	  UMT	  and	  made	  their	  views	  known	  to	  Congress.	  	  Seymour	  
Linfield’s	  testimony	  provides	  an	  example	  of	  the	  common	  cause	  made	  between	  
conservatives	  and	  liberal	  progressives	  during	  the	  fight	  over	  UMT.	  	  Linfield	  
represented	  the	  Progressive	  Citizens	  of	  America	  at	  the	  hearing	  and	  worked	  as	  the	  
veterans’	  director	  of	  the	  National	  Wallace	  for	  President	  Committee.	  	  During	  the	  first	  
                                                                                                                          
32	  “Statement	  of	  the	  National	  Grange,	  presented	  by	  J.	  T.	  Sanders,	  Legislative	  Counsel,	  
Washington,	  D.C.,”	  Universal	  Military	  Training:	  	  Hearings	  Before	  the	  Committee	  on	  Armed	  Services,	  
United	  States	  Senate,	  80th	  Cong.,	  2nd	  sess.,	  March	  23,	  1948,	  (Washington,	  D.C.,	  U.S.	  Government	  
Printing	  Office,	  1948),	  151-­‐‑53;	  “Statement	  of	  National	  Farmers	  Union,	  presented	  by	  Russell	  Smith,	  
Legislative	  Secretary,	  Washington,	  D.C.,”	  Universal	  Military	  Training,	  144-­‐‑47.	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portion	  of	  that	  testimony,	  several	  senators	  tried	  to	  determine	  if	  Linfield	  was	  a	  
communist,	  or	  had	  ever	  been	  a	  member	  of	  a	  communist	  organization	  in	  the	  1930s.	  	  
He	  refused	  to	  give	  the	  committee	  the	  “yes	  or	  no”	  answer	  that	  they	  requested,	  saying	  
only	  that	  he	  was	  not	  a	  member	  of	  an	  organization	  that	  advocated	  violence	  or	  
overthrow	  of	  the	  government.	  	  He	  did	  proudly	  proclaim	  his	  support	  for	  Henry	  A.	  
Wallace,	  the	  candidate	  for	  president	  on	  the	  Progressive	  Party	  ticket	  that	  year.	  	  He	  
also	  informed	  the	  senators	  he	  had	  fought	  in	  World	  War	  II	  for	  the	  United	  States.	  	  
After	  lengthy	  questioning,	  the	  committee	  finally	  allowed	  to	  make	  his	  statement.	  	  
Linfield	  denied	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  or	  any	  other	  nation,	  “constitute[d]	  a	  threat	  to	  
the	  security	  of	  the	  American	  people.”	  	  The	  communist	  nations	  of	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  
the	  U.S.S.R.	  apparently	  only	  wanted	  to	  rebuild	  after	  World	  War	  II,	  and	  were	  in	  no	  
position	  to	  attack	  the	  United	  States.	  	  He	  then	  accused	  the	  Truman	  administration	  of	  
attempting	  to	  enforce	  the	  Truman	  Doctrine	  with	  “vast	  numbers"	  of	  American	  troops	  
in	  Europe	  and	  Asia.	  	  However,	  the	  bill	  under	  consideration	  by	  Congress	  at	  that	  time	  
specifically	  prohibited	  trainees	  from	  performing	  any	  other	  duties,	  either	  in	  the	  
United	  States	  or	  abroad,	  as	  Republican	  Senator	  Raymond	  Baldwin	  of	  Connecticut	  
pointed	  out.	  	  Ignored	  by	  Baldwin,	  however,	  was	  the	  fact	  that	  trained	  civilians	  
augmented	  the	  potential	  manpower	  that	  the	  United	  States	  could	  bring	  to	  bear	  on	  a	  
foreign	  enemy	  with	  a	  simple	  increase	  in	  draft	  calls.	  	  Critics	  of	  UMT	  on	  both	  the	  right	  
and	  left	  reasonably	  inferred	  in	  this	  fact	  a	  trend	  toward	  greater	  militarism	  of	  U.S.	  
foreign	  policy	  if	  Congress	  adopted	  UMT.	  	  Unfortunately,	  Linfield	  did	  not	  make	  this	  
reply,	  and	  was	  unable	  to	  come	  up	  with	  a	  coherent	  response	  to	  Baldwin’s	  charge.	  	  In	  
a	  scattershot	  attack,	  Linfield	  ended	  with	  references	  to	  various	  “sinister	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consequences	  which	  flow[ed]”	  from	  UMT.	  	  Among	  these	  were	  that	  universal	  training	  
would	  place	  young	  men	  in	  a	  “military	  straitjacket”	  and	  indoctrinate	  young	  men	  with	  
mandatory	  education,	  leading	  eventually	  to	  “Army-­‐‑domination	  of	  our	  colleges.”33	  	  
Linfield’s	  allegation	  here	  presaged	  Vietnam	  War-­‐‑era	  criticism	  of	  the	  military’s	  
influence	  on	  college	  campuses.	  	  However,	  instead	  of	  the	  propaganda	  mission	  that	  
Linfield	  feared,	  the	  military’s	  primary	  role	  in	  prominent	  universities	  was	  to	  guide	  
scientific	  research	  toward	  military	  ends.	  	  Indeed,	  historians	  have	  documented	  the	  
increasing	  influence	  that	  the	  military	  and	  corporations	  that	  had	  defense	  contracts	  
wielded	  with	  universities	  during	  the	  Cold	  War.	  	  Students	  criticized	  the	  close	  
relationships	  between	  their	  universities,	  and	  the	  military	  and	  its	  defense	  
contractors	  during	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	  	  To	  cite	  one	  example,	  Dow	  Chemical	  Company,	  
which	  manufactured	  napalm,	  was	  a	  target	  of	  frequent	  protests	  at	  many	  universities.	  	  
Students	  also	  protested	  R.O.T.C.	  programs	  and	  military	  recruiting	  on	  campus.34	  
In	  spite	  of	  clashing	  opinions	  on	  other	  issues,	  libertarian	  conservatives	  and	  
left	  wing	  peace	  advocates	  united	  to	  oppose	  UMT,	  but	  they	  did	  so	  for	  very	  different	  
reasons.	  	  On	  the	  left,	  Seymour	  Linfield	  and	  others	  like	  him	  did	  not	  view	  the	  Soviet	  
Union	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  	  These	  people	  believed	  UMT	  threatened	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  Linfield,	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  Press,	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  “Dow	  
Chemical	  Attempts	  Recruting	  at	  N.Y.U.,	  and	  a	  Protest	  Results,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  March	  7,	  1968;	  “SDS	  
Leads	  Yale	  Protest	  Against	  Dow	  Recruiters,”	  Hartford	  Courant,	  December	  13,	  1967;	  “Sit-­‐‑In	  of	  100	  
Georgetown	  Students	  Protests	  ROTC,”	  Washington	  Post,	  April	  23,	  1969;	  William	  F.	  Buckley,	  Jr.,	  “The	  
Persecution	  of	  the	  ROTC,”	  Los	  Angeles	  Times,	  May	  12,	  1969;	  “Wesleyan	  SDS	  Students	  Protest	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  Hartford	  Courant,	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  19,	  1968.	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militarization	  of	  American	  society	  and	  provoke	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  to	  respond	  in	  kind.	  	  
The	  goal	  for	  those	  on	  the	  left	  in	  opposing	  UMT	  was	  thus	  to	  keep	  the	  military	  under	  
control	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  war.	  	  For	  example,	  Progressive	  Party	  candidate	  Henry	  A.	  
Wallace	  published	  a	  short	  campaign	  book	  in	  1948	  entitled	  Toward	  World	  Peace,	  in	  
which	  he	  outlined	  his	  vision	  of	  coexistence	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  	  Wallace’s	  
program	  included	  negotiation	  with	  the	  Soviets	  to	  end	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  a	  
reconstruction	  program	  to	  rebuild	  war-­‐‑torn	  Europe,	  including	  nations	  that	  had	  
embraced	  communism.	  	  In	  contrast,	  conservatives	  such	  as	  Robert	  Taft	  recognized	  
the	  threat	  posed	  to	  the	  United	  States	  by	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  called	  on	  America	  to	  
take	  concrete	  action	  to	  stop,	  and	  even	  roll	  back,	  Soviet	  advances.	  	  Taft	  did	  
acknowledge	  the	  infringement	  on	  personal	  freedom	  and	  likely	  increase	  in	  military	  
influence	  incurred	  by	  selective	  service,	  but	  he	  was	  willing	  to	  accept	  conscription,	  
rearm	  Europe,	  and	  deploy	  U.S.	  troops	  there	  to	  confront	  the	  Soviets.35	  	  Universal	  
Military	  Training,	  however,	  went	  too	  far.	  	  Thus,	  while	  libertarian	  conservative	  and	  
those	  on	  the	  left	  found	  common	  ground	  in	  defeating	  UMT,	  their	  purposes	  and	  aims	  
were	  quite	  different.	  	  A	  similar	  marriage	  of	  convenience	  during	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  
saw	  libertarian	  conservatives	  and	  the	  radical	  left	  unite	  to	  end	  conscription.	  	  In	  both	  
instances,	  traditional	  conservatives	  in	  both	  political	  parties	  stood	  in	  opposition	  to	  
this	  temporary	  alliance.	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One	  cannot	  end	  a	  discussion	  of	  UMT	  without	  acknowledging	  the	  complicated	  
racial	  dynamics	  at	  work	  during	  the	  debate.	  	  President	  Truman	  issued	  Executive	  
Order	  9981	  on	  July	  26,	  1948,	  only	  a	  few	  months	  after	  Congress	  had	  renewed	  
selective	  service.	  	  This	  order	  ended	  segregation	  in	  the	  armed	  forces.	  	  Prior	  to	  
Truman’s	  order,	  Southern	  members	  of	  Congress	  opposed	  UMT	  unless	  it	  explicitly	  
allowed	  segregation.	  	  Segregation	  in	  schools	  and	  social	  life	  was	  still	  rigidly	  enforced	  
in	  the	  South	  and	  many	  Southerners	  feared	  that	  “race	  mixing”	  during	  UMT	  service	  
would	  also	  serve	  to	  weaken	  the	  institution	  of	  segregation	  itself	  once	  African	  
American	  trainees—and	  perhaps	  white	  trainees	  as	  well—returned	  home.	  	  In	  
addition,	  most	  camps	  would	  be	  located	  in	  the	  South,	  which	  enjoyed	  mild	  weather	  
year-­‐‑round	  that	  was	  suitable	  for	  training.	  	  White	  southerners	  therefore	  feared	  that	  
successful	  desegregation	  in	  UMT	  camps	  might	  spread.	  	  African	  Americans	  justifiably	  
opposed	  UMT	  if	  camp	  regulations	  upheld	  segregation	  by	  race.	  	  As	  just	  one	  example,	  
World	  Heavyweight	  Champion	  Joe	  Louis	  wrote	  a	  statement	  regarding	  segregated	  
service	  that	  was	  forwarded	  to	  the	  Committee	  on	  Armed	  Services	  in	  the	  Senate	  by	  A.	  
Philip	  Randolph	  and	  Grant	  Reynolds	  of	  the	  Committee	  Against	  Jimcrow	  in	  Military	  
Service	  and	  Training	  in	  1948.	  	  Louis	  bitterly	  criticized	  the	  “would-­‐‑be	  permanent	  
curse”	  of	  segregation	  in	  the	  armed	  forces,	  including	  in	  “Negro	  battalions	  if	  Congress	  
enacts	  universal	  military	  training.”	  	  Louis	  called	  on	  all	  African	  Americans	  to	  inform	  
Congress	  that	  they	  would	  no	  longer	  tolerate	  this	  second-­‐‑class	  status.36	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As	  further	  evidence	  of	  the	  strange	  bedfellows	  made	  by	  UMT,	  Senator	  Taft	  
actually	  conspired	  with	  civil	  rights	  leader	  A.	  Philip	  Randolph	  to	  prevent	  passage	  of	  
the	  1948	  UMT	  bill	  by	  promising	  to	  support	  amendments	  to	  the	  bill	  that	  banned	  
segregation.	  	  Since	  Southerners	  tended	  to	  support	  UMT,	  this	  seemed	  a	  “sure	  way	  to	  
kill	  UMT”	  by	  “forc[ing]	  its	  supporters	  to	  take	  a	  stand	  on	  race.”	  	  Both	  Randolph	  and	  
Taft	  came	  to	  oppose	  UMT	  from	  very	  different	  philosophical	  premises.	  	  Taft’s	  
conservative	  opposition	  to	  government	  coercion	  induced	  him	  to	  seek	  to	  block	  
passage	  of	  UMT	  by	  Congress.	  	  Randolph,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  was	  a	  socialist.	  	  His	  goal	  
was	  to	  obstruct	  Congressional	  action	  on	  universal	  military	  training	  unless	  Congress	  
agreed	  to	  desegregate	  trainees	  during	  their	  service.	  	  During	  testimony	  before	  the	  
Senate	  Armed	  Services	  Committee,	  Randolph	  claimed,	  “Negroes	  are	  in	  no	  mood	  to	  
shoulder	  a	  gun	  for	  democracy	  abroad	  so	  long	  as	  they	  are	  denied	  democracy	  here	  at	  
home.”	  	  Randolph	  threatened	  to	  encourage	  blacks	  to	  refuse	  induction	  calls	  unless	  
the	  military,	  including	  UMT,	  was	  desegregated.	  	  Senator	  Wayne	  Morse	  called	  such	  
action	  “treason”	  but	  Randolph	  defended	  his	  position	  by	  appealing	  to	  a	  “higher	  law	  
than	  the	  law	  which	  applies	  the	  act	  of	  treason	  to	  [African	  Americans]	  when	  we	  are	  
attempting	  to	  win	  democracy	  in	  this	  country.”	  	  One	  may	  speculate	  that	  Randolph’s	  
personal	  views	  may	  have	  been	  different,	  but	  his	  public	  position	  was	  to	  support,	  or	  at	  
least	  not	  oppose,	  UMT	  and	  selective	  service	  if	  they	  were	  desegregated.	  	  Thus,	  both	  
Taft	  and	  Randolph	  found	  themselves	  united	  in	  opposition	  to	  UMT	  in	  early	  1948,	  
albeit	  for	  very	  different	  reasons.37	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After	  Truman’s	  executive	  order,	  many	  white	  Southerners	  opposed	  UMT	  in	  
order	  to	  stop	  further	  integration.	  	  By	  their	  calculus,	  subjecting	  a	  small	  subset	  of	  
whites	  to	  service	  in	  the	  desegregated	  military	  through	  the	  draft	  was	  preferable	  to	  
forcing	  all	  white	  men	  into	  a	  desegregated	  UMT	  program.	  	  Indeed,	  it	  seemed	  clear	  to	  
most	  Southerners	  that	  Congress	  would	  desegregate	  any	  UMT	  program	  passed	  after	  
July	  1948,	  following	  the	  course	  of	  the	  regular	  military.	  	  This	  was	  the	  case	  even	  
though	  several	  prominent	  military	  leaders	  were	  vocal	  in	  opposition	  to	  Truman’s	  
order,	  including	  General	  Dwight	  D.	  Eisenhower	  and	  George	  C.	  Marshall,	  who	  was	  
then	  serving	  as	  Secretary	  of	  State.	  	  After	  several	  years	  of	  halting	  progress	  in	  
desegregation,	  the	  Korean	  War	  finally	  directed	  the	  regular	  military	  to	  fully	  integrate	  
African	  American	  troops.38	  	  One	  justification	  for	  desegregation	  of	  the	  military	  that	  
would	  likely	  appeal	  to	  traditional	  conservatives	  concerned	  with	  national	  defense	  
was	  given	  by	  Truman	  K.	  Gibson,	  a	  member	  of	  the	  President’s	  Advisory	  Commission	  
on	  Universal	  Training,	  which	  had	  published	  its	  report	  recommending	  UMT	  in	  1947.	  	  
Gibson	  argued	  that	  the	  United	  States	  faced	  the	  choice	  of	  “survival	  or	  extinction”	  in	  
the	  case	  of	  “all-­‐‑out	  warfare”	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  	  The	  country	  must	  end	  
segregation	  because	  it	  blocked	  the	  “full	  and	  free	  use”	  of	  African	  Americans	  for	  use	  in	  
this	  contest.	  	  Gibson	  explicitly	  stated	  that	  he	  made	  this	  recommendation	  “not	  
because	  of	  any	  social	  considerations	  or	  any	  considerations	  other	  than	  the	  defense	  of	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this	  country.”	  	  He	  proposed	  that	  Congress	  specifically	  include	  an	  antidiscrimination	  
clause	  in	  the	  1948	  UMT	  bill	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  United	  States	  extracted	  the	  full	  
amount	  of	  service	  that	  each	  trainee	  could	  offer,	  whether	  white	  or	  black.	  	  	  
Despite	  the	  need	  for	  trained	  citizens	  during	  the	  Cold	  War,	  white	  Southerners	  
in	  Congress	  refused	  to	  support	  a	  desegregated	  UMT	  program.	  	  In	  fact,	  Southern	  
votes	  in	  the	  House	  were	  key	  to	  blocking	  the	  final	  attempt	  at	  UMT	  in	  1952.	  	  Leaders	  
of	  the	  Confederacy	  had	  considered	  arming	  slaves	  in	  late	  1864	  and	  early	  1865	  in	  an	  
attempt	  to	  turn	  the	  tide	  of	  the	  Civil	  War.	  	  Confederate	  Major	  General	  Howell	  Cobb	  
wrote	  to	  Secretary	  of	  War	  James	  Seddon,	  “If	  slaves	  will	  make	  good	  soldiers	  our	  
whole	  theory	  of	  slavery	  is	  wrong.”39	  	  Similarly,	  white	  Southerners	  in	  the	  1940s	  and	  
1950s	  must	  have	  recognized	  that	  successful	  African	  American	  service	  in	  
desegregated	  military	  units	  and	  desegregated	  UMT	  camps	  would	  be	  a	  powerful	  
argument	  against	  segregation.	  	  Most	  white	  Southerners	  were	  not	  willing	  to	  take	  this	  
chance,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  valuable	  service	  black	  troops	  and	  black	  trainees	  could	  render	  
to	  the	  United	  States.	  	  Finally,	  during	  the	  debate	  over	  universal	  military	  training,	  
“conservative	  [and]	  even	  reactionary”	  Southern	  Congressmen—who	  were	  
ideologically	  predisposed	  to	  support	  UMT—united	  with	  the	  pacifist	  and	  
antimilitarist	  left	  as	  well	  as	  the	  libertarian	  right	  to	  block	  adoption	  of	  UMT.	  	  On	  the	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issue	  of	  race	  and	  UMT,	  one	  finds	  once	  again	  that	  a	  diverse	  set	  of	  seemingly	  
contradictory	  motives	  pushed	  disparate	  groups	  together.40	  
After	  a	  final	  failed	  attempt	  at	  adopting	  UMT	  in	  1951-­‐‑1952,	  the	  nation	  settled	  
on	  conscription	  to	  provide	  men	  for	  the	  armed	  forces	  until	  1973.	  	  The	  draft’s	  
successful	  operation	  during	  the	  Korean	  War	  bolstered	  this	  position.	  	  In	  addition,	  
inductions	  took	  a	  relatively	  small	  portion	  of	  total	  manpower	  available,	  so	  that	  those	  
who	  wanted	  to	  escape	  service	  were	  usually	  able	  to	  do	  so.	  	  President	  Eisenhower’s	  
New	  Look	  foreign	  policy	  greatly	  increased	  funding	  for	  the	  Air	  Force	  and	  funding	  for	  
the	  Army	  was	  cut	  as	  a	  result,	  forcing	  the	  Army	  to	  reduce	  manpower	  by	  about	  
500,000	  men.	  	  Because	  of	  this,	  the	  armed	  forces	  drafted	  even	  fewer	  young	  men	  
during	  the	  1950s,	  thus	  reducing	  the	  potential	  for	  dissent.41	  	  	  
The	  peace	  groups	  that	  did	  object	  to	  conscription	  and	  militarism	  did	  so	  on	  the	  
periphery	  of	  American	  thought	  and	  public	  opinion	  during	  the	  1950s.	  	  Pacifist	  groups	  
such	  as	  the	  War	  Resisters	  League	  and	  Catholic	  Worker	  Movement	  operated	  in	  
relative	  obscurity,	  known	  only	  to	  small	  groups	  of	  politically	  or	  religiously	  motivated	  
adherents	  primarily	  in	  large	  cities	  on	  the	  East	  Coast.	  	  For	  the	  most	  part,	  they	  had	  no	  
influence	  on	  public	  policy	  or	  even	  public	  consciousness.	  	  The	  most	  successful	  peace	  
groups	  of	  the	  1950s	  focused	  on	  nuclear	  testing	  and	  the	  arms	  race,	  which	  the	  advent	  
of	  the	  hydrogen	  bomb	  and	  Eisenhower’s	  New	  Look	  defense	  policy	  had	  spurred.	  	  The	  
National	  Committee	  for	  a	  Sane	  Nuclear	  Policy	  (SANE)	  and	  the	  Committee	  for	  Non-­‐‑
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Violent	  Action	  (CNVA)	  both	  organized	  around	  banning	  testing	  as	  well	  as	  ending	  the	  
arms	  race.	  	  Overall,	  however,	  the	  far	  left	  remained	  quiet,	  having	  already	  endured	  
relentless	  attacks	  during	  the	  Red	  Scare	  and	  McCarthy	  witch-­‐‑hunts.	  	  By	  1955,	  the	  
peace	  movement	  was	  foundering.	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  their	  Sixties	  counterparts,	  1950s	  
students	  were	  indeed	  the	  “Silent	  Generation”—silent	  on	  the	  war	  in	  Korea,	  a	  
spiraling	  arms	  race,	  and	  above	  ground	  testing	  of	  nuclear	  weapons.	  	  Of	  more	  interest	  
were	  good	  jobs	  and	  material	  comforts.	  	  The	  next	  generation	  would	  see	  the	  world	  
differently.42	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Chapter	  II	  covers	  libertarian	  thinking	  on	  conscription.	  	  Included	  are	  Chief	  
Justice	  Roger	  Taney’s	  opinion	  on	  conscription	  and	  the	  writings	  of	  libertarian	  
Lysander	  Spooner.	  	  Discussion	  then	  turns	  to	  World	  War	  I	  era	  opposition	  from	  
anarchists	  and	  socialists,	  whose	  arguments	  were	  encapsulated	  in	  the	  1918	  Supreme	  
Court	  decision	  Arver	  et.	  al.,	  v.	  United	  States.	  	  	  Finally,	  the	  chapter	  ends	  with	  a	  
comparison	  of	  the	  differences	  between	  libertarians	  and	  traditional	  conservatives	  
over	  conscription	  in	  the	  post-­‐‑World	  War	  II	  era.	  	  	  
The	  roots	  of	  libertarian	  antimilitarism	  and	  opposition	  to	  conscription	  in	  
America	  go	  back	  very	  far	  indeed.	  	  The	  United	  States	  was	  born	  out	  of	  anti-­‐‑
government	  protests.	  	  Fear	  of	  military	  occupation	  and	  objection	  to	  government-­‐‑
granted	  monopolies	  fueled	  the	  clashes	  with	  the	  British	  government	  that	  led	  to	  the	  
American	  Revolution.	  	  During	  the	  Revolutionary	  War,	  the	  Continental	  Army	  
frequently	  suffered	  from	  a	  lack	  of	  manpower	  because	  Americans	  refused	  to	  submit	  
to	  national	  conscription,	  even	  though	  state	  militias	  frequently	  proved	  to	  be	  
unreliable.	  	  The	  U.S.	  Constitution	  acknowledged	  a	  universal	  requirement	  for	  service	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through	  the	  state	  militia	  system,	  based	  on	  earlier	  colonial	  practice.	  	  However,	  the	  
Constitution	  laid	  out	  a	  complex	  process	  by	  which	  the	  United	  States	  might	  federalize	  
state	  militias	  into	  service.	  	  Even	  though	  it	  was	  more	  inefficient	  than	  a	  direct	  draft,	  
the	  drafters	  of	  the	  Constitution	  included	  this	  feature	  to	  protect	  state	  power	  and	  
prevent	  centralization	  of	  authority	  at	  the	  national	  level.	  	  Based	  on	  the	  Constitution	  
and	  writings	  of	  the	  Framers,	  it	  was	  not	  clear	  that	  the	  federal	  government	  had	  the	  
power	  to	  directly	  conscript	  American	  citizens.1	  	  	  
The	  United	  States	  used	  voluntarism	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  manning	  the	  military	  
until	  the	  Civil	  War,	  including	  in	  the	  War	  of	  1812	  and	  Mexican	  War.	  	  However,	  in	  
April	  1861,	  after	  decades	  of	  conflict	  and	  compromise	  over	  the	  issue	  of	  slavery,	  the	  
Confederate	  army	  fired	  on	  Fort	  Sumter	  and	  initiated	  the	  Civil	  War.	  	  Because	  of	  the	  
war,	  President	  Abraham	  Lincoln	  and	  Congress	  greatly	  expanded	  the	  reach	  and	  
power	  of	  the	  federal	  government.	  	  In	  1863,	  Congress	  adopted	  the	  Enrollment	  Act,	  
which	  instituted	  the	  nation’s	  first	  compulsory	  draft	  into	  the	  national	  army	  without	  
the	  interposition	  of	  the	  states.	  	  There	  were	  protests	  against	  the	  draft,	  most	  famously	  
the	  bloody	  riots	  in	  New	  York	  City	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1863,	  in	  which	  at	  least	  105	  
people	  died.	  	  Disloyal	  Democrats	  (dubbed	  Copperheads	  by	  the	  Republicans)	  also	  
protested	  the	  use	  of	  the	  draft	  because	  they	  believed	  it	  was	  an	  impediment	  to	  ending	  
the	  war.	  	  Chief	  Justice	  Taney	  wrote	  a	  private	  opinion	  on	  the	  constitutionality	  of	  the	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draft	  in	  1863.	  	  Taney	  believed	  the	  federal	  government	  did	  not	  have	  the	  power	  to	  
conscript,	  which	  was	  a	  reflection	  of	  his	  support	  for	  state	  sovereignty.	  	  Taney	  
believed	  that	  the	  draft	  made	  it	  possible	  for	  the	  federal	  government	  to	  destroy	  the	  
state	  militias	  because	  national	  conscription	  occurred	  independently	  of	  the	  state	  
militia	  structure.	  	  Further,	  the	  federal	  government	  could	  even	  use	  the	  draft	  to	  
destroy	  state	  governments,	  Taney	  wrote,	  since	  all	  state	  officers	  were	  eligible	  for	  the	  
draft	  except	  for	  the	  governor	  of	  each	  state.	  	  Taney	  never	  got	  a	  chance	  to	  deliver	  this	  
opinion	  because	  opponents	  of	  conscription	  did	  not	  bring	  a	  case	  to	  the	  Supreme	  
Court.	  	  The	  suspension	  of	  habeas	  corpus,	  passed	  by	  Congress	  and	  signed	  by	  Lincoln	  
in	  March	  1863,	  blocked	  suits	  by	  “soldiers	  or	  seamen	  enrolled	  or	  drafted	  or	  mustered	  
or	  enlisted	  in	  or	  belonging	  to	  the	  land	  or	  naval	  forces	  of	  the	  United	  States	  .	  .	  .	  or	  
otherwise	  amenable	  to	  military	  law.”	  	  Thus,	  the	  opinion	  is	  interesting	  as	  a	  state-­‐‑
rights	  attack	  on	  conscription	  but	  it	  was	  without	  legal	  effect.	  	  Taney’s	  state	  rights	  
arguments	  were	  obviated	  after	  the	  war	  because	  national	  power	  was	  preeminent	  
after	  the	  Union	  Army’s	  victory	  over	  the	  Confederacy	  and	  enshrined	  in	  the	  
Constitution	  by	  the	  ratification	  of	  the	  Fourteenth	  Amendment.2	  	  
The	  abolitionist	  cause	  of	  the	  mid-­‐‑19th	  century	  informed	  and	  influenced	  a	  
small	  libertarian	  movement	  after	  the	  Civil	  War.	  	  Lysander	  Spooner	  was	  an	  
abolitionist	  prior	  to	  the	  war	  and	  was	  one	  of	  the	  foremost	  libertarians	  of	  the	  post-­‐‑
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  University	  
Press,	  1988),	  492-­‐‑94,	  609-­‐‑11;	  Mark	  E.	  Neely,	  Jr.,	  Lincoln	  and	  the	  Triumph	  of	  the	  Nation:	  	  Constitutional	  
Conflict	  in	  the	  American	  Civil	  War	  (Chapel	  Hill:	  	  University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  Press,	  2011),	  190-­‐‑97;	  
Amar,	  The	  Bill	  of	  Rights,	  53-­‐‑59,	  257-­‐‑66;	  Roger	  B.	  Taney,	  “Thoughts	  on	  the	  Conscription	  Law	  of	  the	  
United	  States”	  in	  Martin	  Anderson,	  ed.,	  The	  Military	  Draft:	  	  Selected	  Readings	  on	  Conscription	  
(Stanford,	  California:	  	  Hoover	  Institution	  Press,	  1982),	  207-­‐‑18.	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Civil	  War	  era.	  	  He	  laid	  out	  the	  foundation	  of	  his	  philosophy	  in	  The	  Unconstitutionality	  
of	  Slavery,	  published	  in	  1845.	  	  “[N]atural	  law	  .	  .	  .	  is	  the	  paramount	  law,”	  he	  argued.	  	  
Anything	  that	  contradicted	  natural	  law,	  including	  state	  or	  federal	  laws	  based	  on	  (in	  
Spooner’s	  view)	  an	  incorrect	  interpretation	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Constitution,	  was	  invalid.	  	  
This	  doctrine	  was	  the	  foundation	  of	  Spooner’s	  opposition	  to	  slavery.	  	  Just	  as	  federal	  
law	  allowed	  the	  violation	  of	  the	  natural	  rights	  of	  African	  slaves,	  Spooner	  believed	  
the	  law	  could	  (and	  frequently	  did)	  also	  violate	  the	  natural	  rights	  of	  white	  men.	  	  
Spooner	  specifically	  cited	  conscription	  as	  evidence	  of	  the	  government’s	  violation	  of	  
the	  natural	  rights	  of	  its	  citizens.	  	  The	  government	  conscripts	  a	  man	  and	  “puts	  him	  
before	  the	  cannon’s	  mouth,	  to	  be	  blown	  in	  pieces.”	  	  For	  the	  government,	  this	  man	  is	  
a	  “mere	  weapon	  for	  killing	  other	  men”	  all	  “for	  the	  maintenance	  of	  its	  power.”	  	  
Conscription	  was	  a	  form	  of	  slavery	  and	  a	  violation	  the	  natural	  rights	  of	  draftees	  who	  
were	  both	  put	  in	  harm’s	  way	  and	  forced	  to	  kill	  others	  contrary	  to	  their	  conscience.	  	  
Since	  the	  government	  had	  no	  right	  to	  conscript	  young	  American	  men,	  draftees	  were	  
justified	  in	  carrying	  out	  acts	  of	  resistance	  to	  this	  attack	  on	  their	  rights	  just	  as	  slaves	  
were	  justified	  to	  run	  away	  from	  their	  masters.	  	  Spooner	  even	  opposed	  forcing	  the	  
South	  to	  remain	  with	  the	  Union	  despite	  his	  strident	  opposition	  to	  slavery	  since	  he	  
believed	  the	  Union	  did	  not	  fight	  the	  Civil	  War	  to	  free	  the	  slaves.	  	  Instead,	  it	  was	  to	  
force	  the	  South	  to	  remain	  in	  the	  Union	  against	  their	  will.	  	  Thus,	  the	  “number	  of	  
slaves”	  in	  the	  United	  States	  had	  significantly	  increased	  if	  one	  included	  the	  white	  
Southerners	  forced	  back	  into	  the	  Union	  by	  the	  North	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Northern	  
conscripts	  used	  to	  defeat	  them.	  	  Congress	  had	  ended	  the	  federal	  draft	  by	  the	  time	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Spooner	  published	  his	  ideas	  on	  conscription	  but	  his	  writings	  influenced	  later	  
libertarian	  thinking	  on	  the	  draft.3	  	  
After	  1865,	  the	  United	  States	  did	  not	  resort	  to	  conscription	  again	  until	  World	  
War	  I.	  	  When	  the	  United	  States	  entered	  the	  war	  in	  April	  1917	  President	  Woodrow	  
Wilson	  argued	  for	  a	  “universal	  liability	  to	  service”	  in	  his	  request	  for	  a	  declaration	  of	  
war	  from	  Congress.	  	  Major	  General	  Enoch	  H.	  Crowder,	  who	  had	  previously	  served	  as	  
the	  Judge	  Advocate	  General	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Army,	  wrote	  the	  draft	  law	  used	  during	  World	  
War	  I.	  	  The	  Selective	  Service	  System	  established	  by	  this	  law	  was	  composed	  of	  4,647	  
local	  boards	  with	  members	  appointed	  by	  the	  President.	  	  These	  boards	  then	  selected	  
men	  for	  service.	  	  The	  military	  relied	  almost	  exclusively	  on	  the	  draft	  because	  
Crowder	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Progressive	  managers	  of	  the	  economy	  believed	  voluntarism	  
was	  inefficient.	  	  The	  draft	  allowed	  those	  men	  needed	  factories	  and	  on	  farms	  to	  
remain	  at	  home,	  while	  the	  military	  conscripted	  those	  men	  who	  could	  be	  of	  greater	  
service	  in	  the	  war.	  	  Thus,	  voluntarism	  continued	  in	  the	  Regular	  Army,	  Navy,	  and	  
National	  Guard.	  	  However,	  the	  law	  mandated	  that	  the	  “National	  Army,”	  which	  had	  
been	  authorized	  by	  Congress	  in	  1916,	  must	  exclusively	  use	  conscription.	  	  Historian	  
                                                                                                                          
3	  Lysander	  Spooner,	  The	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  of	  Slavery:	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  and	  Second	  
(Boston:	  	  Bela	  Marsh,	  1847),	  7-­‐‑8,	  15;	  James	  Oakes,	  Freedom	  National:	  	  The	  Destruction	  of	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  in	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  York:	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  Norton	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  Company,	  2013),	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  William	  M.	  Wiecek,	  The	  
Sources	  of	  Antislavery	  Constitutionalism	  in	  America,	  1760-­‐‑1848	  (Ithaca:	  	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  
1977),	  257-­‐‑58;	  Lysander	  Spooner,	  A	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  Address,	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Usurpations	  and	  Crimes	  of	  Lawmakers	  and	  Judges,	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  the	  Consequent	  Poverty,	  Ignorance,	  and	  
Servitude	  of	  the	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  (Boston:	  	  Benj.	  R.	  Tucker,	  Publisher,	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  31-­‐‑32;	  Lysander	  Spooner,	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  (Boston,	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David	  M.	  Kennedy	  estimated	  that	  77	  percent	  of	  U.S.	  manpower	  during	  the	  war	  was	  
drafted	  into	  the	  National	  Army.4	  
In	  spite	  of	  President	  Woodrow	  Wilson’s	  claim	  that	  the	  draft	  was	  simply	  the	  
“selection	  from	  a	  nation	  which	  has	  volunteered	  in	  mass,”	  there	  was	  a	  significant	  
amount	  of	  resistance	  to	  selective	  service	  during	  World	  War	  I.	  	  The	  Wilson	  
administration	  submitted	  the	  draft	  bill	  to	  Congress	  on	  April	  7,	  1917,	  the	  day	  after	  
Congress	  voted	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  declaration	  of	  war	  against	  Germany.	  	  Congress	  
debated	  selective	  service	  extensively	  before	  passing	  the	  law.	  	  Internationalists	  in	  
both	  political	  parties	  favored	  conscription.	  	  Opposition	  came	  from	  areas	  prone	  to	  
isolationist	  sentiment,	  especially	  the	  agrarian	  South	  where	  the	  Democratic	  Party	  
dominated	  and	  Middle	  West	  where	  isolationist	  Republicans	  were	  most	  prevalent.	  	  
These	  representatives	  from	  the	  South	  and	  Middle	  West	  argued	  for	  conscription	  only	  
as	  a	  last	  resort.	  	  They	  also	  made	  sure	  that	  agricultural	  workers	  received	  exemptions	  
from	  the	  draft.	  	  White	  southern	  demagogues	  warned	  that	  the	  draft	  would	  lead	  to	  
mixing	  of	  the	  races	  while	  the	  issue	  divided	  African	  Americans.	  	  The	  civil	  rights	  
pioneer	  W.	  E.	  B.	  Du	  Bois	  believed	  black	  participation	  in	  conscription	  would	  lead	  to	  
recognition	  of	  equal	  rights	  at	  home.	  	  More	  realistically,	  black	  leaders	  like	  newspaper	  
columnist	  James	  Weldon	  Johnson	  argued	  the	  military	  would	  only	  use	  blacks	  for	  
labor,	  not	  combat.	  	  Weighing	  conflicting	  positions	  on	  the	  draft,	  Congress	  debated	  
voluntarism	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  draft	  or	  adherence	  to	  the	  Wilson	  
administration’s	  proposal	  of	  exclusive	  reliance	  on	  conscription.	  	  The	  argument	  that	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  Chambers	  II,	  To	  Raise	  an	  Army,	  74,	  179-­‐‑204.	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swayed	  reluctant	  congressmen	  to	  the	  President’s	  point	  of	  view	  was	  the	  inequity	  that	  
would	  result	  from	  the	  volunteer	  system.	  	  Many	  in	  Congress	  feared	  “slackers”	  would	  
escape	  service	  if	  the	  country	  relied	  on	  volunteers	  or	  even	  used	  voluntarism	  along	  
with	  the	  draft.	  	  Representative	  Sydney	  Anderson,	  Republican	  from	  Minnesota,	  gave	  
voice	  to	  this	  fear	  when	  he	  argued	  the	  “volunteer	  system	  takes	  those	  who	  had	  not	  
ought	  to	  go,	  and	  ...	  exempts	  those	  who	  ought	  to	  go.”	  	  In	  mid-­‐‑May,	  both	  houses	  of	  
Congress	  passed	  a	  bill	  that	  largely	  conformed	  to	  the	  President’s	  plan,	  and	  Wilson	  
signed	  it	  on	  May	  18,	  1917.	  	  Registration	  of	  young	  men	  between	  the	  ages	  of	  21	  and	  
30	  began	  on	  June	  5.5	  	  	  
Resistance	  to	  conscription	  came	  principally	  from	  the	  political	  left	  including	  
anarchists,	  socialists,	  and	  radical	  unions.	  	  Unlike	  during	  the	  Civil	  War	  there	  were	  no	  
riots.	  	  Instead,	  resistance	  took	  the	  form	  of	  speeches,	  pamphlets,	  and	  other	  modes	  of	  
rational	  persuasion.	  	  Many	  of	  these	  arguments	  drew	  on	  the	  earlier	  work	  of	  
libertarians	  such	  as	  Lysander	  Spooner,	  especially	  the	  idea	  that	  conscription	  violated	  
the	  Thirteenth	  Amendment’s	  ban	  on	  “involuntary	  servitude.”	  	  Libertarian	  
conservatives	  during	  the	  Vietnam	  era	  would	  later	  build	  on	  some	  of	  the	  arguments	  
put	  forward	  by	  socialists	  during	  World	  War	  I.6	  	  
The	  left’s	  arguments	  against	  conscription	  during	  World	  War	  I	  were	  
encapsulated	  in	  Arver	  et.	  al.,	  v.	  United	  States,	  arguably	  the	  most	  important	  result	  of	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  Chambers,	  To	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  Sam	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  World	  
War	  I	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  the	  Making	  of	  the	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  (New	  York:	  	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  21-­‐‑
33.	  	  
6	  David	  M.	  Kennedy,	  Over	  Here:	  	  The	  First	  World	  War	  and	  American	  Society	  (New	  York:	  	  Oxford	  
University	  Press,	  1980),	  150,	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the	  draft	  during	  World	  War	  I.	  	  In	  this	  ruling,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  unanimously	  upheld	  
conscription	  by	  the	  federal	  government.	  	  The	  case	  arose	  when	  a	  small	  group	  of	  
socialists	  defied	  the	  call	  to	  register	  for	  the	  draft	  in	  June	  1917.	  	  The	  federal	  district	  
court	  convicted	  them	  of	  resistance	  to	  the	  draft	  and	  they	  appealed	  the	  case	  to	  the	  
Supreme	  Court.	  	  Their	  primary	  argument	  was	  that	  the	  draft	  was	  unconstitutional	  
because	  Congress	  did	  not	  have	  the	  power	  to	  conscript.	  	  The	  Court	  first	  dispensed	  
with	  the	  Constitutional	  issue.	  	  Congress	  has	  the	  power	  to	  declare	  war	  and	  to	  “raise	  
and	  support	  armies”	  according	  to	  Article	  I,	  Section	  8	  of	  the	  Constitution.	  	  This	  
power,	  combined	  with	  the	  “necessary	  and	  proper”	  clause	  in	  Article	  I	  was	  adequate	  
to	  justify	  conscription	  since	  “the	  mind	  cannot	  conceive	  an	  army	  without	  the	  men	  to	  
compose	  it.”	  	  If	  Congress	  could	  only	  register	  volunteers,	  not	  draftees,	  then	  any	  
“governmental	  power	  which	  has	  no	  sanction	  to	  it	  .	  .	  .	  is	  in	  no	  substantial	  sense	  a	  
power.”	  	  The	  Court	  argued	  that	  the	  history	  of	  militia	  service	  in	  England	  and	  the	  
English	  colonies	  in	  America	  demonstrated	  the	  universal	  requirement	  for	  military	  
service	  as	  part	  of	  the	  “reciprocal	  obligation”	  between	  the	  citizen	  and	  the	  
government.	  	  Since	  individual	  states	  were	  “prohibited	  .	  .	  .	  from	  keeping	  troops	  in	  
time	  of	  peace	  or	  engaging	  in	  war”	  by	  Article	  I,	  Section	  10	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Constitution,	  the	  
delegates	  to	  the	  Constitutional	  Convention	  clearly	  meant	  to	  give	  all	  power	  to	  “raise	  
and	  support	  armies”	  to	  Congress	  “and	  leave	  none	  to	  the	  States.”	  	  The	  Constitution	  
thus	  fully	  delegated	  the	  power	  over	  both	  the	  militia	  and	  the	  regular	  army	  to	  
Congress.	  	  The	  states	  merely	  controlled	  “the	  militia	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  such	  control	  
was	  not	  taken	  away”	  by	  Congress.	  	  The	  Court	  closed	  by	  discussing	  two	  of	  the	  
Reconstruction	  Amendments.	  	  The	  Fourteenth	  Amendment	  greatly	  expanded	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federal	  power	  and	  altered	  the	  people’s	  relations	  with	  both	  the	  national	  and	  state	  
governments.	  	  United	  States	  citizenship	  was	  “paramount	  and	  dominant”	  as	  
compared	  to	  citizenship	  in	  the	  individual	  states,	  allowing	  the	  federal	  government	  to	  
act	  on	  citizens	  directly,	  with	  no	  intermediation	  by	  the	  states.	  	  Finally,	  the	  idea	  that	  
the	  Thirteenth	  Amendment’s	  prohibition	  on	  “involuntary	  servitude”	  barred	  federal	  
conscription	  was	  “refuted	  by	  its	  mere	  statement,”	  according	  to	  the	  Court.	  	  This	  
ruling	  still	  stands	  nearly	  100	  years	  after	  the	  Court	  handed	  it	  down.	  	  Thus,	  opponents	  
of	  conscription	  on	  constitutional	  grounds	  must	  contend	  with	  the	  Court’s	  decision.7	  
The	  draft	  ended	  in	  1918	  with	  the	  end	  of	  World	  War	  I	  and	  Congress	  did	  not	  
reauthorize	  it	  until	  1940,	  months	  after	  World	  War	  II	  had	  begun	  but	  over	  a	  year	  
before	  the	  United	  States	  entered	  the	  war.	  	  The	  military	  used	  the	  draft	  initially	  as	  a	  
way	  to	  shore	  up	  U.S.	  defenses	  and	  then	  to	  wage	  the	  war.	  	  As	  has	  been	  discussed,	  the	  
American	  people	  strongly	  supported	  the	  draft	  after	  the	  attack	  on	  Pearl	  Harbor	  and	  
support	  for	  conscription	  continued	  once	  the	  Cold	  War	  began.	  	  The	  modern	  
conservative	  movement	  began	  in	  response	  to	  the	  pronounced	  growth	  in	  state	  power	  
during	  the	  New	  Deal	  and	  World	  War	  II,	  including	  universal	  conscription.	  	  
Libertarian	  conservatives	  pushed	  back	  against	  increasing	  state	  power	  by	  advocating	  
a	  return	  to	  pre-­‐‑New	  Deal	  free	  enterprise	  and	  individualism.	  	  In	  contrast,	  
traditionalists	  and	  militant	  anti-­‐‑Communists	  argued	  for	  directed	  state	  power	  to	  
enforce	  a	  return	  to	  Christian	  morality	  and	  prevent	  the	  spread	  of	  communism.	  	  Until	  
                                                                                                                          
7	  Chambers,	  To	  Raise	  an	  Army,	  219-­‐‑222.	  	  Arver	  v.	  U.S.,	  245	  U.S.	  366	  (1918),	  
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=245&invol=366	  (accessed	  January	  
28,	  2014).	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the	  late	  1960s,	  traditional	  conservatives	  held	  sway	  on	  the	  conscription	  issue.	  	  
Libertarian	  conservatives	  eventually	  convinced	  President	  Richard	  Nixon	  and	  
important	  members	  of	  Congress	  that	  the	  country	  should	  end	  the	  draft,	  primarily	  
because	  of	  the	  upheaval	  surrounding	  conscription	  during	  the	  Vietnam	  War.8	  	  
	  
The	  clash	  between	  traditional	  and	  libertarian	  conservatives	  over	  
conscription	  began	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  postwar	  conservatism.	  	  One	  theme	  many	  
libertarians	  emphasized	  was	  the	  inherent	  pacifism	  of	  pure	  freedom.	  	  Compulsion,	  
libertarians	  argued,	  was	  the	  cause	  of	  war.	  	  The	  writings	  of	  Leonard	  Read	  furnish	  an	  
example	  of	  this	  position.	  	  Read	  was	  a	  Midwestern	  businessman	  who	  became	  
committed	  to	  conservatism	  in	  response	  to	  the	  New	  Deal.	  	  He	  strongly	  opposed	  the	  
growth	  in	  state	  power	  during	  World	  War	  II	  because	  he	  saw	  it	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  
American	  freedom.	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  American	  triumphalism	  after	  World	  War	  II,	  Read	  
wrote	  to	  a	  friend	  that	  if	  he	  had	  been	  the	  president	  who	  dropped	  the	  atomic	  bombs	  
on	  Japan,	  “I	  would	  have	  released	  to	  the	  press	  only	  a	  copy	  of	  my	  prayer	  asking	  
forgiveness.”	  	  Read	  founded	  the	  Foundation	  for	  Economic	  Education	  (FEE)	  in	  1946	  
as	  an	  organization	  committed	  to	  spreading	  the	  gospel	  of	  freedom.	  	  The	  primary	  
method	  FEE	  used	  to	  educate	  the	  public	  on	  economic	  and	  libertarian	  ideas	  was	  the	  
distribution	  of	  thousands	  of	  pieces	  of	  literature,	  many	  written	  by	  Read	  himself.	  	  He	  
wrote	  the	  pamphlet	  Conscience	  on	  the	  Battlefield	  during	  the	  Korean	  War,	  	  a	  fictional	  
dialogue	  between	  an	  American	  soldier	  dying	  in	  Korea	  and	  his	  conscience.	  	  After	  
                                                                                                                          
8	  George	  H.	  Nash,	  The	  Conservative	  Intellectual	  Movement	  in	  America	  Since	  1945	  (Wilmington,	  
Delaware:	  	  Intercollegiate	  Studies	  Institute,	  1996),	  xv-­‐‑xvi,	  118.	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forcing	  the	  soldier	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  numerous	  Korean	  and	  Chinese	  people	  he	  had	  
killed	  during	  the	  war,	  including	  women	  and	  children,	  his	  conscience	  asked,	  “Did	  you	  
kill	  these	  people	  as	  an	  act	  of	  self	  defense?	  ...	  Were	  they	  on	  your	  shores,	  about	  to	  
enslave	  you?”	  	  The	  man	  defended	  his	  actions	  by	  claiming	  he	  was	  following	  the	  
dictates	  of	  American	  foreign	  policy,	  but	  his	  conscience	  would	  have	  none	  of	  it.	  	  Only	  
force,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  draft,	  would	  work	  to	  get	  American	  men	  such	  as	  this	  soldier	  
to	  fight	  in	  a	  war	  in	  which	  their	  country,	  family,	  or	  other	  personal	  interests	  were	  not	  
actually	  threatened.	  	  Such	  coercion	  was	  akin	  to	  communism,	  “the	  very	  disease	  [the	  
soldier]	  claim[ed]	  to	  be	  trying	  to	  destroy.”	  	  Thus,	  American	  coercion	  was	  virtually	  
identical	  to	  Russian	  coercion	  according	  to	  Read,	  and	  the	  results—violence	  and	  
murder—were	  the	  same.9	  	  	  	  
	   For	  libertarians,	  restrictions	  on	  economic	  freedom	  led	  to	  war,	  making	  evils	  
like	  conscription	  seem	  necessary	  to	  statists	  already	  predisposed	  to	  support	  
centralization	  of	  power	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  government.	  	  Ludwig	  von	  Mises,	  an	  
Austrian-­‐‑born	  economist	  and	  one	  of	  the	  founders	  of	  the	  Austrian	  School	  of	  
libertarian	  economics	  argued	  along	  these	  lines.	  	  Mises	  contended	  that	  restrictions	  
on	  human	  freedom	  such	  as	  domestic	  central	  planning,	  impediments	  to	  free	  trade,	  
and	  restrictions	  on	  the	  movement	  of	  people	  between	  nations	  led	  to	  war.	  	  “War	  is	  an	  
offshoot	  of	  aggressive	  nationalism,”	  which	  is	  itself	  the	  “necessary	  derivative	  of	  the	  
[governmental]	  policies	  of	  interventionism	  and	  national	  planning,”	  he	  argued.	  	  Dr.	  
                                                                                                                          
9	  Leonard	  E.	  Read,	  “Conscience	  on	  the	  Battlefield,”	  in	  Edmund	  A.	  Opitz,	  ed.,	  Leviathan	  At	  War	  
(Irvington-­‐‑on-­‐‑Hudson,	  New	  York:	  	  Foundation	  for	  Economic	  Education,	  Inc.,	  1995),	  63-­‐‑78;	  Brian	  
Doherty,	  Radicals	  for	  Capitalism:	  	  A	  Freewheeling	  History	  of	  the	  Modern	  American	  Libertarian	  
Movement	  (New	  York:	  	  Public	  Affairs,	  2007),	  149-­‐‑64.	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Hans	  F.	  Sennholz,	  who	  had	  worked	  as	  an	  economics	  professor	  at	  Grove	  City	  College	  
and	  later	  as	  president	  of	  FEE,	  illustrated	  Mises’	  argument	  with	  a	  concrete	  example	  
from	  the	  mid-­‐‑1950s.	  	  Western	  powers	  enacted	  tariffs	  and	  price	  supports	  for	  home	  
industries	  in	  response	  to	  domestic	  political	  pressure.	  	  The	  developing	  world	  
followed	  suit	  by	  nationalizing	  private	  property	  owned	  by	  Western	  businesses.	  	  The	  
West	  retaliated	  with	  trade	  restrictions	  or	  even	  war,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Egypt	  when	  
President	  Gamal	  Nasser	  nationalized	  the	  Western-­‐‑owned	  Suez	  Canal	  in	  1956	  as	  a	  
means	  to	  further	  “national	  development.”	  	  Finally,	  France	  and	  Britain	  invaded	  Egypt	  
to	  prevent	  Nasser’s	  takeover	  of	  the	  canal.	  	  Thus,	  intervention	  in	  the	  economy,	  which	  
originated	  in	  the	  West,	  led	  to	  war	  between	  nations.	  	  Only	  free	  markets	  could	  ensure	  
“peaceful	  coexistence”	  between	  nations	  and	  make	  conscription	  unnecessary.10	  	  
	   Another	  key	  idea	  in	  the	  writings	  of	  libertarian	  intellectuals	  was	  the	  
superiority	  of	  defense	  by	  free	  people	  over	  compulsion,	  no	  matter	  how	  necessary	  it	  
seemed.	  	  Isabel	  Paterson,	  a	  newspaper	  columnist	  and	  novelist	  based	  in	  New	  York	  
City,	  wrote	  on	  this	  subject	  during	  World	  War	  II.	  	  Her	  1943	  book	  The	  God	  of	  the	  
Machine	  was	  an	  attempt	  to	  explain	  why	  some	  societies	  become	  wealthy	  and	  
powerful	  while	  others	  stagnate	  in	  poverty.	  	  After	  an	  examination	  of	  civilizations	  
throughout	  history,	  Paterson	  concluded	  that	  freedom	  and	  respect	  for	  private	  
property	  were	  the	  keys	  to	  a	  society’s	  success.	  	  Paterson	  opposed	  the	  centralization	  
of	  authority	  that	  the	  Roosevelt	  administration—and	  most	  Americans—believed	  was	  
                                                                                                                          
10	  Doherty,	  74-­‐‑84;	  Ludwig	  von	  Mises,	  Human	  Action:	  	  A	  Treatise	  on	  Economics,	  4th	  ed.	  (San	  
Francisco:	  	  Fox	  &	  Wilkes,	  1996),	  821-­‐‑25;	  Hans	  F.	  Sennholz,	  “Welfare	  States	  at	  War,”	  in	  Opitz,	  ed.,	  
Leviathan	  at	  War,	  48-­‐‑52.	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necessary	  to	  win	  the	  war	  because	  it	  violated	  these	  freedoms.	  	  Any	  nation	  that	  hoped	  
to	  achieve	  “long-­‐‑term	  military	  effectiveness	  [and]	  the	  survival	  of	  a	  nation	  through	  
the	  recurrent	  hazards	  of	  war”	  had	  to	  preserve	  the	  productivity	  of	  private	  enterprise	  
and	  allow	  free	  men	  the	  choice	  to	  fight.11	  	  Leonard	  Read	  also	  addressed	  this	  subject	  
in	  Conscience	  on	  the	  Battlefield.	  	  Toward	  the	  end	  of	  the	  dialogue	  with	  his	  conscience,	  
the	  soldier	  in	  Korea	  argued	  that	  only	  compulsory	  military	  service	  would	  give	  the	  
nation	  the	  unity	  needed	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  communist	  threat.	  	  	  The	  soldier’s	  
conscience	  replied	  that	  forced	  unity	  was	  only	  “mass	  obedience	  to	  a	  master	  will.”	  	  
True	  unity	  and	  strength	  can	  come	  only	  through	  voluntary	  service.	  	  Read	  argued	  that	  
if	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  attacked	  the	  United	  States,	  American	  soldiers	  would	  enjoy	  “an	  
undeniable	  determination”	  based	  on	  defense	  of	  “their	  homeland”	  that	  Russian	  
troops,	  as	  aggressors,	  would	  not	  have.12	  	  
In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  Dr.	  Dean	  Russell,	  an	  economics	  professor	  and	  staff	  member	  
of	  FEE,	  argued	  in	  the	  mid-­‐‑1950s	  that	  the	  American	  military	  (with	  the	  exception	  of	  
the	  U.S.	  Army)	  has	  “always	  worked	  on	  the	  principle	  that	  volunteers	  are	  more	  
effective	  than	  conscripts	  in	  war	  as	  well	  as	  in	  peace.”	  	  Conscripts	  “could	  never	  be	  
relied	  upon	  in	  any	  real	  defense	  emergency.”	  	  It	  would	  therefore	  be	  better	  to	  have	  
fewer	  volunteers	  that	  fight	  valiantly	  than	  unwilling	  conscripts	  that	  may	  or	  may	  not	  
actually	  fight	  in	  the	  face	  of	  battle.	  	  In	  a	  pointed	  comparison,	  Russell	  argued	  that	  even	  
the	  fact	  that	  some	  draftees	  might	  be	  “hard	  workers	  and	  heroes”	  did	  not	  justify	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  Isabel	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  The	  God	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  Transaction	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conscription	  since	  even	  some	  “individual	  slaves	  worked	  hard	  and	  even	  defended	  the	  
system	  which	  held	  them	  in	  bondage.”13	  	  	  
	   Finally,	  and	  apart	  from	  all	  other	  functional	  arguments,	  libertarians	  were	  
implacably	  opposed	  to	  conscription	  on	  ideological	  grounds.	  	  Libertarians	  believed	  
the	  government	  should	  not	  have	  the	  power	  over	  life	  and	  death	  of	  free	  people.	  	  This	  
is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  libertarians	  were	  pacifists.	  	  While	  nations	  who	  equally	  valued	  
freedom	  would	  not	  go	  to	  war	  with	  each	  other,	  free	  nations	  still	  had	  to	  defend	  against	  
statist	  regimes.	  	  However,	  these	  nations	  must	  not	  compromise	  freedom	  to	  defeat	  a	  
collectivist	  enemy.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  only	  moral	  way	  to	  wage	  war,	  according	  to	  
libertarians,	  was	  with	  voluntary	  service.	  	  Libertarian	  publications	  frequently	  
reprinted	  Daniel	  Webster’s	  famous	  speech	  in	  the	  House	  of	  Representatives	  in	  which	  
he	  argued	  against	  national	  conscription	  during	  the	  War	  of	  1812	  to	  support	  this	  
argument.	  	  Webster	  argued	  that	  the	  Constitution	  allowed	  the	  President	  to	  federalize	  
state	  militias	  in	  limited	  circumstances.	  	  He	  criticized	  the	  1814	  draft	  bill	  for	  “raising	  a	  
standing	  army	  out	  of	  the	  Militia	  by	  draft”	  because	  the	  militia	  was	  to	  be	  called	  up	  “not	  
according	  to	  its	  existing	  organization,	  but	  by	  draft	  from	  new	  created	  classes.”	  	  In	  
other	  words,	  the	  bill	  did	  not	  call	  up	  state	  militias	  into	  service	  as	  units,	  as	  called	  for	  
by	  the	  Constitution.	  	  Instead,	  it	  drafted	  men	  out	  of	  those	  units	  directly	  into	  the	  
federal	  army.	  	  Webster	  believed	  this	  was	  such	  an	  expansion	  of	  the	  powers	  of	  
Congress	  that	  if	  it	  were	  allowed,	  “Congress	  ha[d]	  power	  to	  create	  a	  Dictator”	  as	  well.	  	  
Webster	  further	  charged	  that	  the	  armies	  conscripted	  under	  the	  draft	  bill	  would	  be	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used	  for	  “battles	  of	  invasion”	  and	  for	  “purposes	  of	  conquest”	  instead	  of	  for	  defense,	  
as	  was	  intended	  for	  militias	  by	  the	  Constitution.14	  	  Of	  course,	  libertarians	  did	  not	  
give	  a	  full	  accounting	  of	  this	  late-­‐‑1814	  debate.	  	  Important	  drafters	  of	  the	  
Constitution	  disagreed	  with	  Webster	  over	  the	  constitutionality	  of	  the	  draft	  bill.	  	  
James	  Madison,	  for	  example,	  was	  president	  during	  the	  War	  of	  1812,	  and	  through	  
Secretary	  of	  War	  James	  Monroe	  proposed	  the	  conscription	  bill	  to	  Congress	  in	  
September	  1814,	  after	  numerous	  failures	  of	  the	  state	  militias	  during	  the	  war.	  	  
Clearly,	  Madison	  believed	  the	  law	  was	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  powers	  delegated	  to	  
Congress	  by	  the	  Constitution.	  	  Webster’s	  opposition	  to	  conscription	  was	  not	  
representative	  of	  the	  feeling	  of	  Congress	  as	  a	  whole	  either.	  	  There	  was	  enough	  
support	  in	  Congress	  to	  pass	  the	  bill	  in	  spite	  of	  opposition	  from	  the	  northeastern	  
Federalists.	  	  Republican	  Charles	  J.	  Ingersoll	  of	  Pennsylvania	  attacked	  reliance	  on	  the	  
“citizen	  soldier”	  because	  of	  the	  “shocking	  inexpediency”	  and	  inefficiency	  of	  the	  
militia	  system.	  	  He	  warned	  that	  reliance	  on	  state	  militias	  would	  lead	  to	  defeat	  by	  the	  
British.	  	  Congress	  only	  dropped	  the	  conscription	  bill	  in	  December	  1814	  after	  a	  
conference	  committee	  could	  not	  resolve	  differences	  between	  the	  House	  and	  Senate	  
versions.	  	  After	  some	  wrangling	  over	  a	  compromise,	  Senator	  Rufus	  King	  proposed	  
pushing	  the	  bill	  to	  the	  next	  sessions	  through	  an	  “accidental”	  motion,	  in	  Daniel	  
Webster’s	  words,	  that	  passed	  only	  because	  several	  proponents	  of	  conscription	  
“happened	  to	  be	  out”	  of	  the	  Senate	  chambers.	  	  Congress	  debated	  other	  measures	  
after	  the	  postponement	  of	  the	  draft	  bill,	  but	  it	  was	  only	  news	  of	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Ghent	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in	  early	  1815	  that	  finally	  put	  the	  issue	  to	  rest.	  	  If	  the	  war	  had	  gone	  into	  1815,	  
Congress	  likely	  would	  have	  passed	  some	  form	  of	  conscription.	  	  Libertarians’	  
overreliance	  on	  Webster’s	  speech	  and	  tendency	  to	  ignore	  contradictory	  evidence	  
betrays	  the	  fact	  that	  conscription	  divided	  early	  American	  leaders.15	  
Dr.	  Dean	  Russell	  made	  the	  important	  point	  that	  most	  Americans	  would	  
“voluntarily	  defend	  their	  country	  when	  it	  is	  invaded	  or	  when	  they	  think	  that	  there	  is	  
any	  danger	  of	  invasion	  by	  a	  foreign	  foe	  [emphasis	  in	  original].”	  	  However,	  Americans	  
would	  not	  generally	  volunteer	  for	  overseas	  wars	  in	  which	  American	  interests	  were	  
not	  directly	  threatened.	  	  For	  Russell,	  writing	  in	  the	  early	  1950s,	  the	  question	  was:	  	  
“Would	  I	  voluntarily	  sacrifice	  my	  own	  life	  [emphasis	  in	  original]?”	  	  For	  Russell,	  the	  
answer	  was	  a	  “point-­‐‑blank	  ‘No.’”	  	  However,	  if	  the	  United	  States	  withdrew	  “its	  
military	  forces	  from	  the	  various	  foreign	  nations	  all	  over	  the	  world”	  and	  was	  still	  
attacked,	  Russell	  believed	  he	  “would	  (in	  fact,	  will)	  volunteer	  for	  the	  duration.”	  	  The	  
difference	  was	  that	  he	  would	  be	  actually	  defending	  the	  United	  States.	  	  Voluntarism	  
would	  therefore	  check	  U.S.	  adventurism	  around	  the	  world	  because	  men	  would	  not	  
volunteer	  if	  they	  did	  not	  believe	  in	  the	  nation’s	  cause.	  	  Defenders	  of	  conscription	  
during	  the	  Cold	  War	  justified	  it	  with	  the	  argument	  that	  unless	  the	  United	  States	  had	  
plenty	  of	  men	  to	  contain	  communism	  around	  the	  world,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  would	  
“conquer	  the	  United	  States	  and	  enslave	  us	  all	  with	  their	  evil	  philosophy.”	  	  Russell	  
strongly	  disputed	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  could	  establish	  communism	  in	  
the	  United	  States	  against	  the	  will	  of	  the	  American	  people.	  	  Nor	  could	  the	  Soviet	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Union	  “invade	  and	  successfully	  occupy	  the	  United	  States.”	  	  Thus,	  the	  real	  danger	  
from	  the	  U.S.S.R.	  was	  that	  they	  would	  “drop	  hydrogen	  bombs	  on	  our	  cities.”	  	  
However,	  Russian	  leaders	  were	  rational	  and	  would	  not	  “slaughter	  millions	  of	  
Americans	  merely	  for	  the	  fun	  of	  killing	  them.”	  	  The	  only	  reason	  there	  would	  be	  a	  
nuclear	  war	  with	  the	  Soviets	  would	  be	  that	  the	  United	  States	  provoked	  them	  out	  of	  
“fear	  of	  our	  intentions	  or	  retaliation	  to	  our	  acts.”	  	  Leonard	  Read	  of	  FEE	  agreed,	  
writing	  in	  a	  letter,	  “Communism	  or	  socialism	  .	  .	  .	  is	  a	  philosophy	  to	  be	  despised	  and	  
explained	  away.	  	  It	  is	  not	  a	  military	  threat	  to	  be	  feared	  and	  shot	  away	  [emphasis	  in	  
original].”	  	  For	  Russell	  and	  Read	  ending	  conscription	  would	  actually	  make	  the	  
United	  States	  safer	  from	  attack	  because	  it	  would	  not	  have	  the	  military	  manpower	  to	  
goad	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  into	  war	  through	  a	  foolishly	  bellicose	  foreign	  policy.	  	  Even	  if	  
there	  were	  some	  people	  “who	  wouldn’t	  voluntarily	  defend	  themselves	  or	  their	  
countrymen	  under	  any	  circumstances,”	  a	  resort	  to	  conscription	  still	  was	  not	  
justified.	  	  Respecting	  personal	  choice	  based	  on	  conscience	  “is	  merely	  a	  part	  of	  the	  
price	  we	  must	  pay	  to	  keep	  our	  freedom,”	  Russell	  argued.	  	  If	  a	  pacifist	  minority	  was	  
forced	  to	  fight,	  how	  could	  anyone	  object	  to	  restrictions	  on	  their	  own	  freedom	  of	  
choice,	  he	  asked.16	  	  
Frank	  Chodorov	  was	  the	  most	  radical	  of	  the	  libertarians	  who	  wrote	  against	  
conscription.	  	  He	  had	  been	  an	  isolationist	  during	  World	  War	  II	  and	  opposed	  taxation	  
and	  the	  sale	  of	  government	  bonds	  to	  finance	  the	  war.	  	  During	  the	  Cold	  War	  
Chodorov	  charged	  that	  the	  policy	  of	  containment	  was	  in	  truth	  an	  excuse	  to	  further	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extend	  the	  American	  empire	  around	  the	  world.	  	  Chodorov	  noted	  the	  irony	  of	  the	  fact	  
that	  Americans	  had	  seen	  conscription	  as	  “the	  lowest	  form	  of	  involuntary	  servitude”	  
only	  a	  few	  generations	  previous,	  an	  evil	  that	  many	  of	  American	  immigrants	  had	  left	  
Europe	  to	  escape.	  	  Conscription,	  now	  supposedly	  justified	  by	  the	  Cold	  War,	  had	  
become	  the	  “fulfillment	  of	  statism,”	  according	  to	  Chodorov.	  	  He	  compared	  
conscription	  to	  the	  “pagan	  practice	  of	  human	  sacrifice”	  in	  which	  the	  individual	  must	  
“throw	  himself	  into	  the	  sacrificial	  fire”	  so	  that	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  clan	  may	  survive.	  	  
Echoing	  Daniel	  Webster,	  Chodorov	  also	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  drafters	  of	  the	  
Constitution	  designed	  it	  to	  limit	  the	  power	  of	  the	  American	  government.	  	  State	  
power	  was	  originally	  paramount	  under	  the	  system	  set	  up	  by	  the	  Framers	  since	  
“political	  power	  is	  less	  virulent	  the	  nearer	  its	  wielders	  are	  to	  the	  ruled.”	  	  However,	  
the	  federal	  government	  had	  greatly	  expanded	  its	  reach	  over	  the	  intervening	  years,	  
first	  when	  the	  “immunity	  of	  the	  person	  went	  by	  the	  boards	  when	  military	  
conscription	  was	  instituted	  as	  national	  policy,”	  and	  then	  as	  “national	  policy	  was	  
interpreted	  as	  an	  obligation	  to	  use	  these	  troops	  in	  wars	  of	  foreign	  nations.”	  	  
Beginning	  during	  the	  Civil	  War	  and	  culminating	  in	  World	  War	  I	  the	  government	  
exerted	  control	  over	  one’s	  person	  not	  authorized	  either	  morally	  or	  by	  the	  
Constitution.	  	  Chodorov	  also	  pointed	  out	  that	  conscription	  corrupted	  the	  political	  
processes	  that	  it	  was	  supposedly	  designed	  to	  protect.	  	  In	  Rome	  the	  Praetorian	  Guard	  
provided	  a	  “steady	  supply	  of	  emperors”	  that	  promised	  to	  “improve	  their	  economic	  
welfare.”	  	  Chodorov	  compared	  this	  practice	  to	  the	  “emoluments	  and	  special	  
advantages	  the	  modern	  politician	  holds	  out	  to	  conscripts”	  to	  get	  them	  to	  accept	  this	  
infringement	  on	  their	  freedom.	  	  Chodorov	  doubtlessly	  overstated	  his	  case	  here.	  	  One	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cannot	  equate	  the	  intrigue	  that	  accompanied	  the	  selection	  of	  Roman	  emperors	  with	  
the	  election	  of	  an	  American	  president.	  	  Nevertheless,	  it	  is	  certainly	  accurate	  to	  say	  
that	  the	  military	  and	  military	  issues	  hold	  an	  inordinate	  sway	  in	  American	  politics.	  	  
As	  historian	  Michael	  Sherry	  noted,	  “[M]ilitary	  service	  became	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  the	  
presidency	  for	  nearly	  a	  half-­‐‑century	  after	  1945.”17	  	  	  
Like	  libertarianism,	  conservatism	  has	  always	  been	  a	  part	  of	  American	  
political	  life.	  	  Conservatism	  is	  rooted	  in	  the	  idea	  that	  a	  nation	  should	  preserve	  some	  
aspects	  of	  its	  society	  and	  that	  extreme	  change	  is	  unwise	  and	  even	  
counterproductive.	  	  However,	  one	  can	  only	  understand	  the	  conservatism	  of	  a	  
particular	  era	  by	  contrasting	  it	  with	  other	  political	  movements	  of	  the	  period.	  	  For	  
example,	  one	  can	  describe	  the	  generation	  of	  leaders	  that	  brought	  America	  through	  
the	  Revolutionary	  War	  as	  radical,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  bringing	  about	  drastic	  change,	  
when	  compared	  to	  the	  Tory	  Loyalists	  and	  British	  government.	  	  Only	  a	  few	  years	  
later,	  however,	  many	  of	  these	  same	  leaders	  helped	  create	  the	  U.S.	  Constitution.	  	  
When	  viewed	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  farmers	  led	  by	  Daniel	  Shays	  in	  1786	  or	  the	  
Anti-­‐‑federalists	  during	  the	  ratification	  debate	  of	  1787	  and	  1788,	  one	  might	  view	  the	  
Framers	  of	  the	  Constitution	  as	  quite	  conservative.	  	  George	  H.	  Nash,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  
important	  historians	  of	  the	  post-­‐‑World	  War	  II	  conservative	  movement,	  confronted	  
the	  problem	  of	  defining	  conservatism	  by	  confining	  his	  analysis	  to	  a	  specific	  period	  of	  
time	  and	  place.	  	  In	  addition,	  Nash	  used	  the	  term	  “conservative”	  to	  describe	  political	  
                                                                                                                          
17	  Charles	  H.	  Hamilton,	  ed.,	  Fugitive	  Essays:	  	  Selected	  Writings	  of	  Frank	  Chodorov	  
(Indianapolis:	  	  LibertyPress,	  1980),	  39-­‐‑45;	  Frank	  Chodorov,	  The	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  Society:	  	  An	  Essay	  on	  
the	  Economic	  Forces	  That	  Underlie	  Social	  Institutions	  (Auburn,	  Alabama:	  	  The	  Ludwig	  von	  Mises	  
Institute,	  2007),	  83-­‐‑84,	  140-­‐‑42;	  Sherry,	  189.	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actors	  who	  either	  described	  themselves	  or	  were	  described	  by	  their	  contemporaries	  
as	  conservative.	  	  One	  would	  be	  prudent	  to	  follow	  Nash’s	  lead	  in	  exploring	  the	  post-­‐‑
World	  War	  II	  conservative	  movement	  in	  the	  United	  States.18	  
Conservatism	  after	  1945	  arose	  in	  reaction	  to	  the	  expansion	  of	  federal	  power	  
during	  the	  New	  Deal	  and	  World	  War	  II	  as	  well	  as	  the	  incredible	  evils	  of	  the	  Nazi	  
regime	  and	  massive	  destruction	  of	  the	  war.	  	  Traditionalists	  and	  anticommunists	  
rounded	  out	  the	  conservative	  movement	  in	  addition	  to	  libertarians	  in	  the	  postwar	  
era.	  	  Traditionalists	  pushed	  for	  a	  renewal	  of	  long-­‐‑established	  religious	  and	  ethical	  
values	  while	  anticommunists	  made	  the	  case	  for	  an	  activist	  American	  foreign	  policy	  
to	  stop	  the	  spread	  of	  communism	  around	  the	  world.19	  	  	  
Richard	  Weaver	  represented	  the	  revival	  of	  traditional	  conservatism	  after	  
World	  War	  II.	  	  Reflecting	  his	  apprehension	  of	  the	  destructive	  power	  of	  modern	  
science	  and	  industrialism,	  Weaver’s	  doctoral	  dissertation	  in	  1943	  celebrated	  the	  
traditionalism,	  order,	  and	  hierarchy	  of	  the	  American	  South	  in	  the	  antebellum	  era.	  	  
Southerners	  laudably	  tried	  to	  keep	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  Old	  South	  alive,	  according	  to	  
Weaver,	  even	  after	  the	  Confederate	  defeat.	  	  However,	  the	  Union	  victory	  in	  1865	  
paved	  the	  way	  for	  the	  expansion	  of	  democracy	  and	  industrialism	  even	  into	  the	  
South	  which	  increasingly	  threatening	  the	  South’s	  traditional	  hierarchy	  and	  
agricultural	  society.	  	  Weaver	  laid	  out	  the	  baneful	  consequences	  of	  these	  
developments	  in	  Ideas	  Have	  Consequences,	  in	  which	  he	  attacked	  what	  he	  saw	  as	  the	  
                                                                                                                          
18	  Nash,	  xiv-­‐‑xvi,	  172-­‐‑75.	  
19	  Nash,	  xv-­‐‑xvi;	  Ted	  V.	  McAllister,	  Revolt	  Against	  Modernity:	  	  Leo	  Strauss,	  Eric	  Voegelin,	  and	  the	  
Search	  for	  a	  Postliberal	  Order	  (Lawrence:	  	  University	  Press	  of	  Kansas,	  1996),	  5-­‐‑8.	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moral	  relativism	  of	  Western	  society.	  	  Weaver	  believed	  he	  was	  witnessing	  the	  
“dissolution	  of	  the	  West”	  because	  of	  its	  denial	  that	  “there	  is	  a	  source	  of	  truth	  higher	  
than,	  and	  independent	  of,	  man.”	  	  This	  led	  to	  the	  elevation	  of	  “rationalism	  to	  the	  rank	  
of	  a	  philosophy”	  and	  science	  above	  religion.	  	  Mankind’s	  disrespect	  of	  nature,	  
traditional	  order,	  and	  the	  past	  itself	  is	  as	  the	  rebellion	  of	  an	  immature	  and	  ignorant	  
son	  “proceed[ing]	  contemptuously	  against	  [the]	  ancient	  relationship”	  with	  his	  
father.	  	  Only	  the	  renewal	  of	  piety	  and	  the	  rejection	  of	  selfish	  individualism	  can	  
“absolve	  man	  from	  this	  sin.”	  	  As	  with	  many	  other	  issues,	  Weaver	  was	  a	  maverick	  on	  
the	  issue	  of	  conscription	  and	  war.	  	  In	  many	  ways,	  he	  skirted	  the	  divide	  between	  
libertarianism’s	  antiwar	  tenets	  and	  conservatism’s	  defense	  of	  traditional	  order	  and	  
duty.	  	  Weaver	  deemed	  the	  South’s	  army	  during	  the	  Civil	  War	  chivalrous	  in	  spite	  of	  
the	  fact	  that	  the	  Confederacy	  manned	  it	  through	  conscription	  for	  most	  of	  the	  war.	  	  
Weaver	  also	  argued	  that	  the	  South	  was	  a	  “flywheel”	  that	  prevented	  the	  nation	  from	  
getting	  out	  of	  balance.	  	  He	  cited	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  South	  had	  provided	  needed	  votes	  in	  
Congress	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  1940	  conscription	  law	  as	  proof	  of	  this.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  
Weaver	  criticized	  the	  fielding	  of	  mass	  armies	  supposedly	  based	  on	  democratic	  
ideals.	  	  He	  traced	  a	  direct	  line	  from	  the	  rise	  of	  mass	  armies	  to	  the	  introduction	  of	  
total	  warfare,	  first	  by	  the	  Napoleonic	  armies,	  continuing	  in	  the	  Civil	  War,	  and	  finally	  
adopted	  by	  the	  rest	  of	  Europe	  during	  World	  War	  I.	  	  Weaver’s	  focus	  was	  consistently	  
on	  hierarchy	  in	  society	  as	  well	  as	  the	  military,	  not	  conscription	  per	  se.	  	  Thus,	  both	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supporters	  and	  opponents	  of	  conscription	  can	  find	  aspects	  of	  Weaver’s	  ideas	  that	  
supported	  their	  preconceptions.20	  	  	  
Anticommunists	  held	  incredible	  sway	  in	  conservative	  circles	  after	  World	  War	  
II.	  	  Conservatives	  were	  opposed	  to	  appeasement	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  and	  China	  after	  
1949,	  based	  on	  the	  lessons	  they	  took	  from	  the	  1930s.	  	  President	  Truman	  and	  
mainstream	  Democrats	  constructed	  their	  policies	  on	  a	  similar	  interpretation	  of	  
history.	  	  Truman’s	  decision	  to	  contain	  communist	  expansion	  was	  settled	  American	  
foreign	  policy	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  	  Some	  anticommunist	  conservatives,	  
however,	  argued	  that	  rolling	  back	  communist	  gains,	  instead	  of	  mere	  containment,	  
was	  called	  for	  to	  confront	  communism	  around	  the	  world.	  	  Foremost	  among	  
anticommunist	  conservatives	  was	  William	  F.	  Buckley,	  Jr.	  	  As	  a	  young	  man	  recently	  
out	  of	  college,	  Buckley	  published	  God	  and	  Man	  at	  Yale	  in	  which	  he	  attacked	  Yale	  
administrators	  and	  faculty	  for	  denigrating	  Christianity	  and	  the	  free	  market	  in	  their	  
teachings.	  	  The	  book	  inspired	  conservatives	  and	  cast	  Buckley	  as	  an	  iconic	  leader	  of	  
the	  nascent	  movement.	  	  In	  1952,	  Buckley	  wrote	  an	  “appraisal	  of	  the	  Republican	  
Party,”	  with	  recommendations	  for	  the	  party’s	  future.	  	  In	  domestic	  policy,	  Buckley	  
believed	  the	  Republican	  Party	  was	  not	  doing	  enough	  to	  differentiate	  itself	  from	  the	  
Democrats.	  	  He	  argued	  that	  both	  parties	  were	  committed	  to	  the	  “ideology	  of	  the	  
Leviathan	  State.”	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  in	  the	  foreign	  policy	  arena	  Buckley	  believed	  the	  
Republicans	  out	  of	  necessity	  must	  accept	  the	  security	  state,	  including	  a	  military	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  Press,	  1948),	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  University	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  University	  Press,	  1964),	  92-­‐‑100.	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buildup	  of	  both	  men	  and	  weapons	  as	  along	  with	  the	  “attendant	  centralization	  of	  
power	  in	  Washington.”	  	  Only	  a	  “totalitarian	  bureaucracy	  within	  our	  shores”	  was	  
powerful	  enough	  to	  confront	  the	  communist	  threat.	  	  Because	  of	  the	  threat	  the	  Soviet	  
Union	  posed	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  Buckley	  concluded	  that	  this	  compromise	  of	  
conservative	  principles	  was	  necessary	  for	  national	  “survival.”	  	  21	  	  	  	  
In	  1954,	  Buckley	  noted	  the	  “enormous	  fissure”	  within	  the	  conservative	  
movement	  in	  an	  article	  in	  The	  Freeman	  entitled	  “A	  Dilemma	  of	  Conservatives.”	  	  
Without	  providing	  his	  own	  preferred	  solution,	  Buckley	  described	  what	  he	  called	  
“‘containment’	  conservatives,”	  who	  held	  positions	  analogous	  to	  the	  libertarians.	  	  
These	  conservatives,	  Buckley	  explained,	  argued	  that	  the	  only	  way	  to	  defeat	  
communism	  was	  by	  maintaining	  “retaliatory”—not	  offensive—military	  power	  in	  
order	  to	  “repel	  any	  direct	  onslaught.”	  	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  had	  no	  hope	  of	  ruling	  the	  
entire	  world	  if	  the	  United	  States	  maintained	  this	  posture.	  	  The	  containment	  
conservatives,	  Buckley	  explained,	  believed	  the	  true	  danger	  to	  the	  United	  States	  was	  
becoming	  a	  totalitarian	  state	  itself,	  which	  might	  come	  about	  through	  excessive	  
spending	  on	  defense	  and	  allowing	  the	  defense	  industry	  to	  dominate	  the	  American	  
economy.	  	  On	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  debate	  were	  the	  “interventionist	  conservatives.”	  	  
These	  conservatives	  emphasized	  the	  power	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  real	  danger	  
that	  country	  posed	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  	  While	  containment	  conservatives	  believed	  
that	  the	  United	  States	  could	  coexist	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  the	  interventionists	  held	  
that	  there	  would	  soon	  be	  a	  “decisive	  victory	  for	  us	  or	  for	  the	  Communists.”	  	  Even	  the	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draft	  was	  necessary	  even	  though	  “conscription	  entails	  the	  supreme	  denial	  of	  
individual	  freedom.”	  	  Given	  this	  existential	  threat,	  the	  interventionists	  argued	  the	  
United	  States	  must	  “imitate	  the	  Soviet	  Union”	  by	  centralizing	  power	  in	  the	  federal	  
government	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  potential	  of	  totalitarianism.22	  	  	  
Buckley	  founded	  National	  Review	  in	  1955,	  which	  became	  the	  first	  
conservative	  magazine	  with	  wide	  circulation	  and	  influence	  in	  the	  postwar	  era.	  	  
Buckley	  himself	  published	  columns	  in	  nearly	  every	  issue	  of	  National	  Review,	  in	  
which	  he	  and	  other	  writers	  inveighed	  against	  domestic	  liberalism	  and	  the	  spread	  of	  
communist	  influence	  around	  the	  world.	  	  Buckley	  and	  his	  fellow	  authors	  frequently	  
advanced	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  American	  government,	  and	  especially	  leaders	  in	  the	  
Democratic	  Party,	  was	  not	  doing	  enough	  to	  stop	  this	  spread.	  	  While	  libertarians	  
continued	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  national	  security	  state	  was	  unnecessary	  to	  fight	  the	  
Soviet	  Union	  and	  dangerous	  to	  American	  liberties,	  conservatives	  such	  as	  Buckley	  
and	  other	  contributors	  to	  National	  Review	  first	  and	  foremost	  focused	  on	  retarding	  
the	  advance	  of	  communism.	  	  The	  very	  few	  criticisms	  of	  the	  draft	  in	  the	  pages	  of	  
National	  Review	  were	  functional	  not	  ideological.	  	  At	  no	  time	  before	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  
did	  the	  editors	  come	  out	  against	  the	  draft.23	  	  	  
Throughout	  the	  pages	  of	  National	  Review,	  the	  editors	  and	  contributors	  
emphasized	  the	  existential	  threat	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  posed	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  	  
In	  July	  1957,	  the	  editors	  criticized	  the	  refusal	  of	  the	  so-­‐‑called	  “experts”	  to	  truly	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understand	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  with	  whom	  the	  United	  States	  was	  “engaged	  in	  a	  war	  of	  
extreme	  proportions	  and	  unfathomable	  death.”	  	  In	  this	  situation,	  the	  United	  States	  
could	  not	  win	  unless	  the	  American	  people	  were	  “willing	  to	  fight	  and	  to	  die,”	  which	  
the	  editors	  did	  not	  believe	  to	  be	  the	  case	  for	  the	  United	  States	  at	  the	  time.	  	  Frank	  S.	  
Meyer,	  writing	  in	  early	  1958,	  claimed	  that	  the	  Soviets	  were	  intent	  on	  “the	  
destruction	  of	  Western	  civilization.”	  	  Only	  true	  conservatives,	  he	  believed,	  were	  
capable	  of	  defending	  the	  United	  States	  against	  this	  onslaught.	  	  Meyer	  also	  described	  
what	  he	  called	  the	  “moral	  dilemma”	  of	  American	  foreign	  policy	  in	  the	  nuclear	  age.	  	  
He	  believed	  the	  destruction	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  a	  “clear	  duty.”	  	  There	  “can	  be	  no	  
retreat	  from	  the	  primary	  duty	  of	  standing	  for	  the	  right,”	  he	  wrote.	  	  Because	  of	  
modern	  weapons,	  the	  United	  States	  faced	  the	  dilemma	  of	  risking	  all-­‐‑out	  war	  with	  
the	  Soviet	  Union	  to	  protect	  freedom	  or	  retreating	  to	  “Fortress	  America”	  to	  defend	  
only	  U.S.	  territory	  as	  well	  as	  American	  allies	  such	  as	  Western	  Europe	  and	  Japan.	  	  
Meyer	  strongly	  criticized	  the	  vacillating	  nature	  of	  American	  foreign	  policy	  between	  
these	  two	  options	  and	  enjoined	  American	  policy	  makers	  to	  choose	  one.	  	  	  
Milada	  Horakova	  wrote	  a	  parable	  about	  “Liberal”	  efforts	  to	  coexist	  with	  Al	  
Capone	  in	  Chicago,	  with	  Capone	  standing	  in	  for	  Soviet	  Premier	  Nikita	  Khrushchev,	  in	  
order	  to	  illustrate	  conservative	  criticisms	  of	  coexistence	  with	  the	  Soviets.	  	  Horakova	  
described	  minor	  acts	  taken	  by	  Capone	  to	  supposedly	  further	  peace	  and	  compared	  
these	  trifles	  to	  the	  large	  concessions	  made	  by	  the	  “Liberals”	  to	  appease	  Capone.	  	  
Capone	  was	  never	  satisfied	  and	  continually	  demanded	  more	  from	  the	  Liberals	  while	  
offering	  little	  in	  return.	  	  Horakova	  wrote	  sarcastically	  that	  those	  people	  Capone	  
ruled	  were	  “certainly	  not	  worth	  fighting	  over.”	  	  Readers	  of	  National	  Review	  could	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scarcely	  have	  missed	  Horakova’s	  message	  and	  its	  arguments	  regarding	  foreign	  
relations	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  	  Horakova	  wrote	  the	  parable	  to	  push	  the	  idea	  that	  
the	  United	  States	  must	  roll	  back	  communist	  advances	  around	  the	  world.	  	  For	  
Horakova	  there	  was	  no	  coexisting	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union.24	  	  	  
In	  1957	  James	  Burnham,	  an	  editor	  at	  National	  Review,	  criticized	  the	  standoff	  
between	  the	  West	  and	  East	  in	  the	  years	  since	  1949.	  	  The	  division	  between	  Eastern	  
and	  Western	  Europe	  and	  the	  “atomic	  stalemate”	  that	  existed	  after	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  
exploded	  its	  own	  weapon	  in	  1949	  typified	  the	  deadlock.	  	  Burnham	  described	  how	  
“liberation”	  of	  the	  communist	  world	  might	  occur,	  either	  by	  direct	  confrontation	  with	  
the	  Soviet	  Union	  or	  through	  “spreading	  and	  mounting	  rebellion”	  in	  the	  countries	  
under	  communist	  rule.	  Burnham	  rejected	  direct	  conflict	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  
because	  of	  the	  danger	  of	  nuclear	  war.	  	  Instead,	  he	  believed	  the	  people	  of	  Eastern	  
Europe,	  especially	  Hungary,	  demonstrated	  the	  way	  forward	  through	  the	  example	  of	  
the	  1956	  rebellion.	  	  The	  United	  States	  could	  put	  pressure	  on	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  to	  pull	  
back	  from	  Eastern	  Europe	  by	  encouraging	  local	  rebellions	  in	  those	  nations.	  	  After	  
Soviet	  withdrawal,	  both	  sides	  should	  work	  to	  neutralize	  and	  demilitarize	  Germany	  
and	  Eastern	  Europe.	  	  For	  Burnham,	  therefore,	  the	  United	  States	  should	  not	  accept	  
the	  status	  quo	  by	  simply	  containing	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  	  	  
In	  spite	  of	  his	  call	  for	  the	  liberation	  of	  Eastern	  Europe,	  some	  of	  Burnham’s	  
fellow	  conservatives	  in	  National	  Review	  criticized	  aspects	  of	  his	  position.	  	  Frank	  S.	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Meyer	  and	  William	  S.	  Schlamm,	  a	  senior	  editor	  at	  National	  Review,	  both	  claimed	  that	  
neutralization	  of	  Germany	  would	  constitute	  a	  U.S.	  retreat	  since	  the	  United	  States	  
then	  garrisoned	  West	  Germany.	  	  Burnham’s	  critics	  argued	  that	  he	  was	  simply	  
following	  President	  Eisenhower’s	  policies	  toward	  the	  communist	  world,	  which	  
Meyer	  believed	  had	  led	  to	  the	  “betrayal”	  of	  nations	  engaged	  in	  rebellions	  against	  the	  
Soviet	  Union,	  Hungary	  chief	  among	  them.	  	  Likewise,	  extreme	  right-­‐‑wing	  ideologue	  
Major	  General	  Charles	  A.	  Willoughby	  argued	  that	  neutralization	  of	  Germany	  was	  a	  
primary	  goal	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  	  In	  the	  event	  of	  an	  invasion	  from	  the	  east,	  a	  
weakened	  Germany	  would	  be	  an	  easy	  target	  for	  the	  communists.	  	  Thus,	  the	  Soviets	  
gained	  more	  from	  the	  neutralization	  of	  Germany	  than	  the	  United	  States	  did.	  	  Meyer	  
further	  charged	  that	  coexistence	  with	  communism	  was	  “immoral.”	  	  The	  dictates	  of	  
morality	  therefore	  obligated	  the	  United	  States	  to	  push	  back	  against	  communism	  
around	  the	  world	  and	  potentially	  even	  inside	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  itself.25	  
In	  reply	  to	  Meyers’	  argument,	  Burnham	  noted	  what	  he	  called	  the	  “changing	  
nature	  of	  war”	  that	  had	  arisen	  because	  of	  the	  advent	  of	  atomic	  weapons.	  	  This	  was	  in	  
the	  context	  of	  President	  Eisenhower’s	  “New	  Look”	  foreign	  policy	  and	  the	  threat	  of	  
massive	  retaliation.	  	  Burnham	  explained	  that	  these	  new	  weapons	  gave	  both	  sides	  
the	  power	  to	  inflict	  “immense	  and	  perhaps	  paralyzing	  damage”	  on	  the	  other.	  	  The	  
old	  goal	  of	  total	  defeat	  of	  the	  enemy	  was	  obsolete	  in	  this	  new	  era	  of	  warfare.	  	  Real	  
                                                                                                                          
25	  James	  Burnham,	  “Liberation:	  	  What	  Next?,”	  National	  Review	  (January	  19,	  1957),	  59-­‐‑62;	  
James	  Burnham,	  “The	  Third	  World	  War:	  	  What	  the	  Hungarians	  Want,”	  National	  Review	  (February	  23,	  
1957),	  185;	  James	  Burnham,	  “The	  Third	  World	  War:	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  and	  Distinctions,”	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  Review	  
(March	  9,	  1957),	  239;	  William	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  Next?,”	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  (January	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  National	  Review	  (February	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fighting	  still	  occurred	  in	  what	  Burnham	  described	  as	  “little	  wars”	  in	  developing	  
nations	  around	  the	  globe.	  	  The	  goal	  of	  these	  “little	  wars”	  was	  to	  counter	  the	  
advances	  of	  the	  enemy	  without	  a	  resort	  to	  atomic	  warfare.	  	  This	  type	  of	  warfare	  
required	  troops,	  Burnham	  acknowledged,	  but	  not	  the	  “short-­‐‑term,	  half-­‐‑trained	  
draftees”	  of	  the	  mid-­‐‑1950s	  U.S.	  Army.	  	  Instead,	  Burnham	  presciently	  argued	  that	  the	  
United	  States	  must	  fight	  guerilla	  wars	  with	  “highly	  trained,	  elaborately	  equipped	  
force.”	  	  Since	  conscripts	  would	  rarely	  become	  the	  “elite	  troops”	  the	  United	  States	  
needed	  for	  “little	  wars,”	  Burnham	  concluded	  that	  a	  smaller	  force	  of	  professionals	  
would	  be	  more	  effective	  than	  conscription.	  	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  recognized	  the	  
difficulties	  of	  using	  a	  conscript	  army	  in	  small	  wars,	  Burnham	  put	  forward	  only	  a	  
functional	  criticism	  of	  the	  draft.	  	  It	  is	  reasonable	  to	  assume	  that	  an	  invasion	  by	  the	  
Soviet	  Union	  of	  Western	  Europe	  without	  the	  use	  of	  atomic	  weapons	  would	  have	  
forced	  Burnham	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  need	  for	  the	  draft	  to	  fill	  the	  ranks	  of	  the	  
military.26	  	  	  
Admiral	  T.	  G.	  W.	  Settle,	  a	  veteran	  of	  the	  Pacific	  war	  against	  Japan,	  took	  up	  the	  
problem	  of	  how	  to	  confront	  the	  Soviet	  nuclear	  threat	  in	  an	  essay	  in	  mid-­‐‑1958.	  	  In	  
contrast	  to	  Burnham,	  Admiral	  Settle	  believed	  that	  “nuclearizing	  [sic]	  enemy	  cities”	  
would	  not	  be	  sufficient	  to	  defeat	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  war.	  	  During	  
World	  War	  II	  the	  Germans	  had	  not	  been	  defeated	  by	  the	  “massive	  offensive	  bombing	  
effort”	  undertaken	  by	  the	  Allies,	  but	  by	  the	  “[m]assive	  ground	  armies”	  unleashed	  on	  
                                                                                                                          
26	  Patterson,	  Grand	  Expectations,	  286-­‐‑91;	  James	  Burnham,	  “The	  Third	  World	  War:	  	  The	  
Changing	  Nature	  of	  War,”	  National	  Review	  (April	  20,	  1957),	  375;	  James	  Burnham,	  “The	  Third	  World	  
War:	  	  Nuclear	  Facts	  and	  Pre-­‐‑nuclear	  Ideas,”	  National	  Review	  (May	  4,	  1957),	  424.	  	  James	  Burnham,	  
“The	  Third	  World	  War:	  	  Some	  Relevant	  Proposals,”	  National	  Review	  (May	  18,	  1957),	  471.	  
65  
  
Germany,	  Settle	  explained.	  	  Furthermore,	  unlike	  Germany	  both	  the	  United	  States	  
and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  had	  “considerable	  defensive	  capability”	  against	  aerial	  bombing.	  	  
Because	  of	  these	  defenses,	  it	  was	  wrong	  to	  think	  that	  Hiroshima	  and	  Nagasaki	  
provided	  instruction	  as	  to	  how	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  would	  react	  in	  case	  of	  an	  atomic	  
attack	  by	  the	  United	  States.	  	  Thus,	  the	  manned	  military	  was	  “still	  the	  basic	  arbiters	  
of	  victory	  in	  major	  wars,”	  according	  to	  Settle.	  	  Settle	  was	  clearly	  interested	  in	  
changing	  the	  funding	  priorities	  of	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration,	  which	  focused	  on	  
the	  Air	  Force	  and	  nuclear	  weapons.	  	  Apart	  from	  the	  interest	  of	  his	  chosen	  branch	  of	  
service	  in	  the	  American	  military,	  Settle	  provides	  an	  important	  conservative	  
counterpoint	  to	  Burnham’s	  argument	  that	  atomic	  weapons	  rendered	  the	  draft	  
obsolete.	  	  Outside	  of	  the	  Air	  Force	  many	  in	  the	  armed	  forces	  believed	  ground	  troops,	  
numerically	  reinforced	  through	  conscription,	  was	  a	  necessary	  component	  of	  U.S.	  
defense	  during	  the	  Cold	  War.27	  	  
Other	  conservative	  writers	  in	  National	  Review	  demonstrated	  the	  “fissure”	  in	  
the	  conservative	  movement	  of	  which	  Buckley	  spoke.	  	  While	  not	  directly	  addressing	  
conscription	  or	  foreign	  policy,	  Russell	  Kirk	  provided	  an	  intellectual	  framework	  with	  
which	  to	  reject	  this	  encroachment	  of	  state	  power.	  	  Kirk	  had	  long	  opposed	  the	  draft,	  
before	  and	  after	  the	  American	  army	  drafted	  him	  during	  World	  War	  II.	  	  He	  called	  the	  
draft	  “slavery”	  in	  one	  private	  letter	  in	  early	  1942.	  	  Toward	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war,	  he	  
feared	  that	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  was	  becoming	  so	  fixated	  on	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  that	  the	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government	  would	  continue	  conscription	  even	  after	  World	  War	  II	  ended.	  	  After	  the	  
war,	  he	  authored	  The	  Conservative	  Mind,	  which	  was	  an	  exposition	  of	  conservative	  
thought	  from	  Edmund	  Burke	  to	  the	  mid-­‐‑twentieth	  century.	  	  This	  work	  made	  Kirk	  an	  
important	  exponent	  of	  postwar	  conservative	  thought.	  	  Kirk	  described	  his	  philosophy	  
of	  limited	  government	  in	  an	  article	  in	  National	  Review	  in	  1957.	  	  Because	  the	  United	  
States	  was	  a	  “republic”	  in	  which	  there	  were	  certain	  bedrock	  principles	  that	  even	  a	  
majority	  of	  voters	  could	  not	  violate,	  the	  Constitution	  guarded	  against	  “temporary	  
and	  irresponsible	  majorities”	  and	  “an	  absolute	  central	  sovereignty.”	  	  This	  system	  
protected	  the	  “private	  rights”	  and	  freedom	  of	  the	  individual.	  	  In	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  essay,	  
Kirk	  concentrated	  on	  how	  the	  Constitution	  upheld	  economic	  rights.	  	  Kirk	  could	  have	  
applied	  these	  arguments	  for	  limited	  government	  power	  to	  conscription,	  but	  he	  did	  
not	  do	  so.	  	  Instead,	  he	  laid	  out	  his	  opposition	  to	  conscription	  in	  private	  letters	  but	  
not	  in	  the	  pages	  of	  National	  Review,	  an	  indication	  of	  the	  widespread	  conservative	  
belief	  that	  conscription	  was	  unfortunately	  necessary	  to	  confront	  the	  Soviet	  threat	  in	  
spite	  of	  its	  infringement	  on	  private	  rights.28	  
In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  William	  Henry	  Chamberlain	  argued	  that	  the	  “good	  society”	  
was	  one	  in	  which	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  government	  are	  strictly	  limited	  in	  order	  to	  
guarantee	  “maximum	  freedom	  for	  the	  individual.”	  	  Chamberlain’s	  case	  for	  freedom	  
could	  also	  provide	  justification	  for	  opposition	  to	  the	  draft.	  	  However,	  like	  Kirk,	  
Chamberlain	  focused	  on	  economic	  freedom.	  	  Chamberlain	  quoted	  John	  Locke’s	  
defense	  of	  the	  natural	  rights	  of	  “life,	  liberty	  and	  property”	  but	  then	  focused	  only	  on	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the	  “security	  of	  property,”	  in	  such	  areas	  as	  free	  trade	  and	  taxation.	  	  His	  misquotation	  
of	  Locke,	  for	  whom	  property	  encompassed	  one’s	  “life,	  liberty,	  and	  estate,”	  indicates	  
the	  emphasis	  he	  placed	  on	  property	  in	  its	  modern	  understanding.	  	  Chamberlain	  
understood	  “property”	  as	  only	  physical	  possessions,	  in	  contrast	  to	  Locke’s	  
definition.	  	  Chamberlain	  further	  claimed	  that	  the	  “perils	  to	  liberty”	  came	  from	  
“Soviet	  and	  Chinese	  Communism”	  as	  well	  as	  “societies	  where	  the	  Welfare	  State.”	  	  By	  
his	  silence	  on	  the	  draft	  issue	  Chamberlain	  acquiesced	  to	  the	  belief	  that	  economic	  
freedom	  at	  home	  with	  compulsory	  service	  in	  the	  American	  armed	  forces	  was	  the	  
only	  way	  to	  simultaneously	  combat	  domestic	  liberalism	  and	  foreign	  communism.29	  
By	  the	  late	  1950s,	  the	  draft	  had	  become	  an	  established	  part	  of	  American	  life.	  	  
As	  the	  United	  States	  entered	  the	  1960s,	  the	  country	  had	  not	  endured	  a	  large-­‐‑scale	  
war	  for	  nearly	  a	  decade.	  	  There	  was	  consideration	  of	  an	  all-­‐‑volunteer	  military	  in	  
1958.	  	  However,	  the	  military	  preferred	  the	  guaranteed	  manpower	  of	  the	  draft	  to	  the	  
gamble	  of	  voluntarism.	  	  As	  Assistant	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  Charles	  C.	  Fincucane	  
explained,	  the	  Selective	  Service	  System	  was	  the	  “pillar	  of	  our	  ability	  to	  mobilize	  
manpower	  in	  an	  emergency.”	  	  Criticisms	  of	  the	  draft	  did	  come	  from	  some	  
conservative	  Americans.	  	  Libertarians	  especially	  noted	  the	  draft’s	  violation	  of	  the	  
individual’s	  right	  to	  life.	  	  Traditional	  conservatives	  either	  neglected	  to	  speak	  about	  
conscription	  at	  all	  or	  agreed	  with	  William	  F.	  Buckley,	  Jr.	  that	  the	  draft	  was	  necessary	  
to	  defeat	  communism,	  however	  regrettable	  the	  need	  might	  be.	  	  James	  Burnham,	  one	  
                                                                                                                          
29	  William	  Henry	  Chamberlain,	  “Evolution	  of	  a	  Conservative,”	  National	  Review	  (April	  12,	  
1958),	  349-­‐‑50;	  Ian	  Harris,	  The	  Mind	  of	  John	  Locke:	  	  A	  Study	  of	  Political	  Theory	  in	  Its	  Intellectual	  
Setting,	  rev.	  ed.	  (New	  York:	  	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1998),	  241.	  
68  
  
of	  the	  very	  few	  conservatives	  to	  call	  for	  an	  end	  to	  conscription	  only	  claimed	  that	  a	  
volunteer	  army	  might	  better	  serve	  the	  defensive	  needs	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  	  He	  did	  
not	  offer	  the	  ideological	  arguments	  used	  by	  true	  libertarians	  to	  oppose	  the	  draft.	  	  
More	  important	  was	  the	  fact	  that	  conscription	  remained	  popular	  with	  the	  American	  
public.	  	  The	  draft	  continued	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  the	  patriotic	  triumphalism	  of	  
World	  War	  II.	  	  In	  addition,	  fewer	  Americans	  actually	  had	  to	  serve	  because	  of	  the	  
rising	  number	  of	  young	  men	  as	  well	  as	  the	  reduction	  in	  overall	  calls,	  both	  of	  which	  
allowed	  those	  who	  truly	  desired	  to	  escape	  service	  to	  do	  so.	  	  These	  factors	  would	  
change	  in	  the	  next	  decade.30
	   	  
                                                                                                                          


















	   The	  focus	  of	  Chapter	  III	  is	  the	  draft	  during	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	  	  The	  chapter	  
begins	  with	  an	  examination	  of	  President	  Lyndon	  Johnson’s	  decision	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  
draft	  and	  conservatives’	  general	  support	  for	  the	  war	  and	  the	  draft.	  	  Discussion	  then	  
moves	  to	  growing	  opposition	  to	  the	  war	  from	  the	  left	  and	  softening	  of	  public	  
support	  as	  the	  war	  continued.	  	  Several	  studies	  of	  conscription	  conducted	  during	  
President	  Johnson’s	  tenure	  are	  then	  examined.	  	  We	  then	  look	  at	  libertarians’	  
opposition	  to	  the	  draft	  during	  the	  war	  and	  their	  influence	  on	  President	  Richard	  
Nixon.	  	  The	  chapter	  ends	  with	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  public	  debate	  that	  took	  place	  
between	  1969	  and	  1973	  between	  opponents	  and	  supporters	  of	  the	  draft.	  	  	  
When	  President	  John	  F.	  Kennedy	  took	  office	  in	  January	  1961	  he	  promised	  
that	  Americans	  would	  “pay	  any	  price”	  to	  prevent	  the	  spread	  of	  communism.	  	  At	  the	  
outset	  of	  Kennedy’s	  term	  the	  public	  overwhelmingly	  backed	  the	  President’s	  stance.	  	  
Both	  Kennedy’s	  promise	  and	  the	  public	  support	  he	  received	  reflected	  the	  country’s	  
unity	  regarding	  the	  direction	  of	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy.	  	  Meanwhile,	  draft	  calls	  were	  low	  
and	  did	  not	  rise	  significantly	  until	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	  	  There	  was	  the	  
70  
  
ever-­‐‑present	  threat	  of	  nuclear	  war,	  most	  significantly	  during	  the	  1961	  Berlin	  
confrontation	  and	  Cuban	  Missile	  Crisis	  in	  1962.	  	  Both	  of	  these	  incidents	  hinted	  at	  the	  
costs	  of	  a	  direct	  war	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  	  Americans	  again	  strongly	  supported	  
Kennedy’s	  actions	  during	  these	  crises.	  	  In	  the	  face	  of	  a	  threat	  of	  nuclear	  attack	  on	  the	  
United	  States,	  however,	  there	  was	  little	  the	  American	  people	  could	  actually	  do	  apart	  
from	  praying	  for	  peace.	  	  In	  areas	  of	  the	  world	  not	  deemed	  vital	  to	  U.S.	  interests,	  
including	  Laos	  and	  South	  Vietnam,	  Kennedy	  chose	  to	  avoid	  direct	  action	  by	  
American	  combat	  troops.1	  
	   When	  President	  Lyndon	  Johnson	  took	  office	  after	  Kennedy’s	  assassination	  in	  
November	  1963,	  the	  United	  States	  had	  roughly	  16,000	  advisors	  in	  Vietnam	  and	  the	  
new	  administration	  faced	  the	  choice	  of	  whether	  to	  escalate	  or	  withdraw.	  	  The	  
American	  people	  were	  much	  more	  ambivalent	  about	  military	  action	  in	  Vietnam	  than	  
they	  had	  been	  about	  Berlin	  or	  Cuba.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  United	  States	  now	  faced	  an	  
insurgency	  movement	  in	  South	  Vietnam	  supported	  with	  money	  and	  material—but	  
not	  combat	  troops—from	  the	  U.S.S.R.	  	  Vietnam	  was	  very	  far	  from	  American	  shores	  
and	  the	  Communist	  challenge	  seemed	  a	  much	  less	  direct	  threat.	  	  France’s	  colonial	  
ambitions	  and	  subsequent	  military	  failure	  in	  Vietnam	  a	  decade	  earlier	  also	  induced	  
many	  Americans	  to	  take	  a	  cautionary	  stance.	  	  Finally,	  the	  Ngo	  Dinh	  Diem	  
government	  was	  autocratic	  and	  unpopular	  with	  the	  Vietnamese	  people.	  	  Diem’s	  
                                                                                                                          
1	  George	  Gallup,	  “Kennedy	  Starts	  Term	  With	  Confidence	  Vote:	  Gallup	  Poll	  Shows	  Nearly	  9-­‐‑to-­‐‑
1	  Ratio	  of	  Favorable	  Opinion	  of	  Conduct	  to	  Date,”	  Los	  Angeles	  Times,	  January	  25,	  1961;	  	  George	  Gallup,	  
“Public	  Would	  Support	  Fight	  If	  Berlin	  Blocked,”	  Hartford	  Courant,	  September	  15,	  1961;	  	  George	  
Gallup,	  “Americans	  Support	  Kennedy	  on	  Blockade,”	  Los	  Angeles	  Times,	  October	  24,	  1962;	  	  Flynn,	  The	  
Draft,	  1940-­‐‑1973,	  165,	  168;	  Patterson,	  Grand	  Expectations,	  497-­‐‑509;	  	  Fredrik	  Logevall,	  Choosing	  War:	  	  
The	  Lost	  Chance	  for	  Peace	  and	  the	  Escalation	  of	  War	  in	  Vietnam	  (Berkeley:	  	  University	  of	  California	  
Press,	  1999),	  23-­‐‑24.	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assassination	  in	  early	  November	  1963	  ushered	  in	  a	  series	  of	  weak	  and	  unstable	  
governments	  that	  many	  Americans	  deemed	  unworthy	  of	  support.	  	  On	  the	  other	  
hand,	  many	  Americans	  still	  supported	  actions	  in	  Vietnam	  that	  entailed	  “minimal	  
cost.”	  	  Despite	  these	  factors,	  Johnson	  committed	  two	  battalions	  of	  U.S.	  Marines	  to	  
Vietnam	  in	  March	  1965,	  a	  decision	  that	  would	  eventually	  wring	  sacrifices	  out	  of	  an	  
additional	  two	  million	  Americans—all	  to	  resist	  the	  spread	  of	  Communism.2	  
Johnson	  chose	  to	  use	  the	  draft	  to	  man	  the	  military—particularly	  the	  U.S.	  
Army—during	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	  	  He	  believed	  that	  using	  the	  reserves,	  as	  President	  
Truman	  had	  done	  during	  the	  Korean	  conflict,	  might	  invite	  scrutiny	  of	  the	  war	  that	  
he	  sought	  to	  avoid.	  	  Drafting	  young	  men	  would	  also	  disrupt	  the	  economy	  less	  than	  
taking	  older	  men	  from	  the	  reserve	  units.	  	  However,	  former	  President	  Eisenhower	  
cautioned	  Johnson	  against	  using	  conscription	  in	  Vietnam	  because	  it	  would	  prove	  to	  
be	  a	  “major	  public-­‐‑relations	  problem”	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  	  Perhaps	  Johnson	  believed	  the	  
United	  States	  could	  quickly	  defeat	  what	  he	  called	  the	  “damn	  little	  pissant	  country”	  of	  
Vietnam	  before	  the	  American	  people	  mobilized	  against	  conscription.	  	  After	  all,	  in	  
mid-­‐‑1965	  the	  United	  States	  had	  quickly	  defeated	  the	  “Castroite	  Communist”	  rebels	  
in	  the	  Dominican	  Republic	  who	  were	  seeking	  to	  return	  reformist	  President	  Juan	  
Bosch	  to	  power.	  	  In	  the	  end,	  defeating	  the	  Vietnamese	  insurgency	  without	  provoking	  
either	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  or	  China,	  proved	  an	  entirely	  different	  proposition	  and	  the	  
                                                                                                                          
2	  John	  Prados,	  Vietnam:	  	  The	  History	  of	  an	  Unwinnable	  War,	  1945-­‐‑1975	  (Lawrence:	  	  University	  
Press	  of	  Kansas,	  2009),	  28-­‐‑33,	  66,	  68-­‐‑80;	  	  Logevall,	  376-­‐‑82;	  	  Lawrence	  M.	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  and	  William	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Strauss,	  Chance	  and	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  The	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  War,	  and	  the	  Vietnam	  Generation	  (New	  York:	  	  
Vintage	  Books,	  1978),	  3-­‐‑6;	  	  Historian	  George	  C.	  Herring	  aptly	  notes	  the	  “flimsiness”	  of	  the	  public’s	  
support	  for	  the	  war	  in	  Vietnam	  in	  George	  C.	  Herring,	  America’s	  Longest	  War:	  	  The	  United	  States	  and	  
Vietnam,	  1950-­‐‑1975,	  3rd	  ed.	  (New	  York:	  	  McGraw-­‐‑Hill,	  Inc.,	  1996),	  157;	  	  George	  Gallup,	  “Viet	  Support	  
Not	  Massive,”	  Los	  Angeles	  Times,	  May	  16,	  1965.	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Asian	  war	  dragged	  on	  for	  another	  eight	  years.	  	  During	  those	  eight	  long	  years,	  the	  
American	  public	  became	  disillusioned	  with	  both	  the	  war	  and	  the	  draft.3	  	  	  
	  
Conservative	  leaders	  supported	  of	  the	  war	  from	  its	  outset	  and	  most	  
demanded	  more	  vigorous	  action	  to	  defeat	  the	  Communists.	  	  Early	  on,	  Eisenhower	  
promised	  his	  support	  for	  Johnson’s	  actions	  in	  Vietnam	  and	  pledged	  not	  to	  make	  the	  
President’s	  handling	  of	  the	  war	  a	  “partisan	  issue.”	  	  But	  other	  notable	  Republicans	  
chose	  not	  to	  adhere	  to	  Eisenhower’s	  commitment.	  	  Senator	  Barry	  Goldwater	  of	  
Arizona	  had	  pushed	  for	  “victory”	  in	  Vietnam	  at	  whatever	  the	  cost—tactical	  nuclear	  
weapons	  were	  mentioned—during	  his	  failed	  1964	  bid	  for	  the	  presidency.	  	  Many	  
Americans	  recoiled	  at	  the	  consequent	  possibilities	  of	  a	  wider	  war	  with	  China	  or	  the	  
Soviet	  Union	  but,	  despite	  such	  worst	  cases,	  conservatives	  celebrated	  his	  proposal.	  	  
And	  once	  Johnson	  committed	  American	  troops,	  Goldwater	  demanded	  that	  the	  
military	  be	  given	  a	  free	  hand	  to	  win	  the	  war	  without	  interference	  from	  the	  
President.	  	  Former	  Vice	  President	  Richard	  Nixon	  also	  frequently	  criticized	  the	  
administration	  despite	  his	  earlier	  agreement	  with	  Eisenhower	  that	  the	  war	  effort	  
should	  be	  untainted	  by	  politics.	  	  He	  criticized	  Johnson's	  peace	  negotiations	  while	  on	  
a	  tour	  of	  Southeast	  Asia	  in	  September	  1965.	  	  Anything	  less	  than	  a	  full	  withdrawal	  of	  
Communist	  forces	  from	  South	  Vietnam	  was,	  according	  to	  Nixon,	  a	  “defeat	  or	  a	  
retreat”	  for	  the	  United	  States.	  	  He	  also	  promised	  to	  make	  these	  efforts	  at	  peace	  a	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  Flynn,	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  and	  Vietnam:	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“campaign	  issue”	  in	  the	  1966	  midterm	  elections	  and	  1968	  presidential	  election.	  	  For	  
the	  next	  three	  years	  Nixon	  incessantly	  called	  for	  increases	  in	  the	  number	  of	  
American	  troops	  and	  level	  of	  bombing.4	  	  	  
Meanwhile,	  the	  American	  public	  became	  more	  hesitant.	  	  After	  the	  
introduction	  of	  combat	  troops	  and	  as	  the	  administration	  pushed	  deeper	  into	  the	  
conflict,	  Gallup	  polls	  taken	  early	  in	  the	  war	  inferred	  that	  two-­‐‑thirds	  of	  Americans	  
supported	  Johnson’s	  decision	  to	  enter	  the	  war	  but	  a	  six-­‐‑to-­‐‑one	  majority	  also	  favored	  
a	  negotiated	  peace	  through	  the	  United	  Nations.	  	  A	  hypothetical	  congressional	  
candidate	  who	  promised	  to	  work	  for	  a	  compromise	  in	  Vietnam	  garnered	  68	  percent	  
of	  the	  public's	  support.	  	  Pollster	  George	  Gallup	  aptly	  stated	  in	  April	  1966	  that	  there	  
was	  an	  “overwhelming	  feeling	  of	  frustration”	  among	  Americans	  about	  the	  war.	  	  They	  
did	  not	  want	  to	  let	  the	  Communists	  take	  all	  of	  Vietnam,	  but	  most	  Americans	  
opposed	  expansion	  of	  the	  conflict	  and	  especially	  wanted	  to	  avoid	  a	  direct	  
confrontation	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  
These	  same	  polls	  show	  that	  there	  were	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  conservative	  
Americans	  in	  both	  political	  parties	  who	  favored	  stronger	  action	  to	  contain	  
Communism	  in	  Vietnam.	  	  One	  noncommissioned	  officer	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Navy	  spoke	  for	  
many	  conservatives	  in	  and	  out	  of	  the	  military	  when	  he	  wrote	  that	  the	  United	  States	  
                                                                                                                          
4	  Prados,	  102-­‐‑3;	  David	  S.	  Broder,	  “Eisenhower	  Backs	  Stand	  on	  Vietnam,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  
August	  20,	  1965;	  Victor	  Wilson,	  “A-­‐‑Attack	  on	  Viet	  Jungle	  Proposed	  by	  Goldwater,”	  Washington	  Post,	  
May	  25,	  1964;	  “Goldwater	  to	  Johnson:	  	  Let	  Military	  Run	  War,”	  Los	  Angeles	  Times,	  June	  14,	  1965,	  page	  
8.	  	  Qiang	  Zhai,	  China	  &	  the	  Vietnam	  Wars,	  1950-­‐‑1975	  (Chapel	  Hill:	  	  University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  Press,	  
2000),	  131-­‐‑32,	  155-­‐‑56;	  Neil	  Sheehan,	  “Nixon	  Bids	  U.S.	  Press	  for	  Victory,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  September	  
6,	  1965;	  Raymond	  H.	  Anderson,	  “Nixon	  Views	  Vietnam	  War	  As	  Major	  Issue	  in	  '68	  Vote,”	  New	  York	  




had	  the	  responsibility	  to	  prevent	  Communist	  governments	  based	  on	  “tyranny	  and	  
absolute	  dictatorship”	  from	  taking	  power	  around	  the	  world.	  	  Very	  early	  in	  the	  war,	  
an	  April	  1965	  poll	  indicated	  that	  12	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  public	  recommended	  that	  the	  
United	  States	  “step	  up	  military	  activity”	  in	  Vietnam	  and	  19	  percent	  wanted	  full	  U.S.	  
mobilization	  and	  a	  declaration	  of	  war	  against	  Vietnam.	  	  Polls	  conducted	  a	  few	  
months	  later	  showed	  that	  33	  percent	  of	  Americans	  would	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  vote	  for	  
a	  congressional	  candidate	  who	  supported	  sending	  “a	  great	  many	  more	  men”	  to	  
Vietnam	  to	  win	  the	  war	  and	  28	  percent	  supported	  bombing	  North	  Vietnamese	  cities	  
regardless	  of	  the	  costs	  to	  civilians.	  	  The	  Johnson	  administration	  demonstrated	  the	  
influence	  of	  the	  conservative	  “hawks”	  in	  public	  opinion	  polls	  when	  Deputy	  
Presidential	  Press	  Secretary	  Robert	  H.	  Fleming	  claimed	  that	  it	  was	  the	  “relaxation”	  
of	  military	  activity	  in	  Vietnam—not	  escalation—that	  pushed	  Johnson’s	  support	  
down	  among	  Americans.5	  
In	  spite	  of	  general	  support	  for	  Johnson’s	  handling	  of	  Vietnam,	  protests	  
against	  the	  war—and	  the	  draft—began	  in	  March	  1965,	  very	  soon	  after	  direct	  
American	  participation	  began.	  	  College	  campuses	  and	  established	  pacifist	  groups	  
were	  the	  biggest	  contributors	  in	  these	  early	  days,	  and	  their	  activities	  were	  largely	  
                                                                                                                          
5	  “68%	  Favor	  Viet	  Peace	  Bid	  Issue,”	  Washington	  Post,	  September	  23,	  1965;	  George	  Gallup,	  
“U.S.	  Public	  Approves	  of	  Vietnam	  War	  Effort,”	  Los	  Angeles	  Times,	  October	  22,	  1965;	  George	  Gallup,	  
“U.N.	  Role	  in	  Vietnam	  Favored,”	  Los	  Angeles	  Times,	  February	  9,	  1966;	  “War	  Frustrating	  to	  Public,”	  
Washington	  Post,	  April	  3,	  1966;	  “Nation	  Split	  On	  Next	  Step	  In	  Viet-­‐‑Nam,”	  Washington	  Post,	  April	  23,	  
1965.	  	  George	  Gallup,	  “Viet	  Support	  Not	  Massive,”	  Los	  Angeles	  Times,	  May	  16,	  1965;	  James	  E.	  Carlson,	  
“Serviceman	  Speaks	  on	  Vietnam,”	  Los	  Angeles	  Times,	  July	  17,	  1965;	  “Johnson	  Finds	  Letup	  in	  War	  Cuts	  
Public	  Support,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  March	  10,	  1966.	  	  Polls	  can	  present	  a	  challenge	  because	  they	  are	  
simply	  snapshots	  of	  opinion	  at	  a	  given	  moment	  and	  can	  be	  influenced	  by	  biased	  questions,	  poor	  
sampling,	  and	  even	  recent	  events.	  	  Polls	  can	  be	  used	  to	  infer	  trends	  in	  public	  thinking	  on	  important	  
issues,	  and	  are	  especially	  useful	  in	  the	  context	  of	  other,	  verifiable	  events.	  	  This	  is	  the	  way	  I	  have	  used	  
them	  in	  this	  thesis.	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peaceful	  and	  respectful	  of	  governmental	  authority,	  although	  this	  preference	  
disappeared	  in	  years	  to	  come.	  	  For	  now,	  critics	  of	  Johnson’s	  war	  policies	  registered	  
their	  discontent	  through	  letters	  to	  the	  editors	  of	  newspapers	  and	  small	  pickets	  in	  
front	  of	  the	  White	  House.	  	  Students	  and	  professors	  conducted	  “teach-­‐‑ins”	  at	  
universities	  around	  the	  country	  to	  debate	  the	  merits	  of	  the	  war.	  	  But	  there	  were	  also	  
some	  disturbing	  incidents.	  	  On	  March	  16	  1965	  in	  Detroit,	  Michigan,	  an	  82-­‐‑year-­‐‑old	  
woman	  named	  Alice	  Herz	  of	  Women	  Strike	  for	  Peace	  immolated	  herself	  to	  protest	  
the	  bombing	  campaign	  against	  Vietnam.	  	  Johnson	  publicly	  claimed	  to	  ignore	  these	  
protests	  but	  available	  evidence	  indicates	  that	  they	  affected	  policy.	  	  To	  mollify	  the	  
peace	  advocates	  Johnson	  offered	  to	  “meet	  with	  anyone”	  on	  the	  Communist	  side	  for	  
the	  chance	  of	  an	  “honorable	  peace”	  in	  March	  1965.	  	  Then	  in	  April,	  Johnson	  promised	  
“unconditional	  discussions”	  with	  the	  Vietnamese	  to	  end	  the	  fighting	  and	  floated	  the	  
Mekong	  River	  Delta	  Plan	  to	  modernize	  Vietnamese	  infrastructure	  once	  the	  war	  had	  
ended.6	  	  	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  Johnson	  Administration	  and	  conservatives	  outside	  it	  
worked	  to	  undermine	  the	  arguments	  and	  activities	  of	  peace	  advocates.	  	  Johnson’s	  
State	  Department	  sent	  a	  “truth	  team”	  to	  American	  universities	  in	  May	  1965	  to	  
challenge	  the	  teach-­‐‑ins.	  	  National	  Security	  Advisor	  McGeorge	  Bundy	  also	  debated	  
noted	  international	  scholar	  Hans	  Morgenthau	  in	  June,	  over	  the	  opposition	  of	  the	  
President,	  who	  believed	  the	  televised	  debate	  served	  to	  legitimize	  the	  antiwar	  
                                                                                                                          
6	  Melvin	  Small,	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  Rutgers	  University	  Press,	  
1989),	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movement.	  	  Most	  important,	  Johnson’s	  belief	  that	  the	  protest	  movements	  were	  
fueled	  by	  “Russian	  and	  native	  communists”	  influenced	  the	  administration’s	  handling	  
of	  them.	  	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Dean	  Rusk	  implied	  that	  communists	  influenced	  the	  
“highly	  organized	  demonstrations”	  then	  being	  carried	  out	  while	  U.S.	  Ambassador	  to	  
Poland	  John	  Gronouski	  attacked	  antiwar	  speeches	  that	  were	  “prefabricated”	  by	  the	  
Communists	  and	  “followed	  by	  rote”	  by	  the	  protesters.	  	  Johnson	  pushed	  FBI	  Director	  
J.	  Edgar	  Hoover	  to	  find	  connections	  between	  the	  domestic	  protesters	  and	  foreign	  
agents.	  	  However,	  FBI	  investigations	  from	  1965	  through	  the	  end	  of	  Johnson’s	  
presidency	  failed	  to	  find	  the	  influence	  that	  Johnson,	  Hoover,	  Rusk,	  and	  many	  others	  
in	  the	  administration	  believed	  was	  there.	  	  Despite	  this	  lack	  of	  evidence,	  it	  was	  
nevertheless	  easy	  for	  Johnson	  to	  dismiss	  the	  antiwar	  left	  as	  dupes,	  and	  this	  
dismissal	  contributed	  to	  the	  growing	  divide	  between	  Johnson	  and	  the	  American	  
people	  as	  opposition	  to	  the	  war	  grew.7	  
Conservatives	  agreed	  with	  Johnson	  that	  the	  protesters	  were	  anti-­‐‑American	  
and	  Communist-­‐‑inspired.	  	  A	  Gallup	  Poll	  taken	  in	  November	  1965	  inferred	  that	  78	  
percent	  of	  Americans	  believed	  that	  Communists	  wielded	  substantial	  (58	  percent	  
said	  “a	  lot”	  while	  another	  20	  percent	  believed	  there	  was	  “some”)	  influence	  in	  the	  
antiwar	  movement.	  	  A	  conservative	  letter	  writer	  called	  the	  protesters	  “gullible	  fools”	  
and	  cowards	  who	  ignored	  the	  “millions	  and	  millions”	  of	  people	  killed	  by	  Communist	  
governments.	  	  Nixon	  declared	  that	  the	  protests	  encouraged	  those	  governments	  to	  
“prolong”	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  in	  the	  hope	  that	  Americans	  would	  give	  up.	  	  Civilian	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  Janson,	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conservatives	  and	  military	  leaders	  opposed	  the	  protesters’	  repeated	  calls	  for	  peace	  
talks	  because	  they	  believed	  that	  the	  U.S.	  military	  position	  was	  weak	  and	  
negotiations	  would	  lead	  to	  a	  South	  Vietnamese	  coalition	  government	  with	  the	  
Communists,	  which	  they	  interpreted	  as	  a	  defeat.	  	  One	  conservative	  student	  at	  UCLA	  
called	  for	  an	  investigation	  into	  the	  “seditious,	  Peking-­‐‑printed	  propaganda”	  that	  he	  
said	  had	  been	  distributed	  at	  a	  teach-­‐‑in	  the	  week	  before.	  	  Because	  conservatives	  who	  
were	  not	  students	  could	  not	  reach	  the	  teach-­‐‑ins,	  they	  sometimes	  resorted	  to	  scare	  
tactics	  to	  disrupt	  the	  discussions.	  	  During	  a	  teach-­‐‑in	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Michigan	  in	  
March	  1965,	  three	  separate	  bomb	  scares	  were	  called	  in,	  forcing	  the	  police	  to	  
evacuate	  the	  discussants	  each	  time.	  
	  
After	  the	  spring	  of	  1965,	  the	  antiwar	  movement	  moved	  from	  teach-­‐‑ins	  to	  
large-­‐‑scale	  demonstrations.	  	  As	  the	  protests	  ramped	  up	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1965,	  
conservatives	  heckled	  and	  sometimes	  attacked	  protesters,	  especially	  ones	  who	  were	  
especially	  brazen	  in	  their	  dissent.	  	  Other	  conservatives	  held	  counter-­‐‑protests	  to	  
show	  support	  for	  U.S.	  policy	  in	  Vietnam.	  	  In	  New	  York	  a	  group	  of	  700	  Americans,	  
including	  women	  and	  children,	  “cursed,	  shoved	  and	  threatened”	  to	  break	  up	  a	  group	  
of	  200	  protesters.	  	  At	  a	  separate	  incident	  in	  Manhattan,	  four	  men	  were	  arrested	  after	  
throwing	  eggs,	  red	  paint,	  and	  tomatoes	  at	  antiwar	  marchers.	  	  A	  week	  later	  pro-­‐‑war	  
marchers	  held	  a	  “noisy	  demonstration”	  in	  the	  same	  area	  to	  register	  their	  contempt	  
for	  the	  earlier	  protesters.	  	  In	  Chicago,	  an	  “angry	  spectator”	  who	  was	  Jewish	  smashed	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a	  protester’s	  sign	  that	  compared	  orders	  given	  to	  American	  servicemen	  in	  Vietnam	  to	  
those	  given	  by	  the	  infamous	  Nazi	  Adolf	  Eichmann.8	  
One	  of	  the	  antiwar	  radicals’	  goals	  was	  to	  slow	  down	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  
Selective	  Service	  System.	  	  Ironically,	  the	  young	  men	  who	  actively	  resisted	  the	  draft	  
came	  mostly	  from	  upper-­‐‑	  and	  upper	  middle	  class	  backgrounds,	  especially	  students	  
who	  held	  deferments,	  whereas	  the	  lower	  middle	  class	  young	  men	  upon	  whom	  the	  
draft	  fell	  most	  heavily	  generally	  complied	  with	  their	  induction	  calls.	  	  Draft	  resisters	  
had	  a	  variety	  of	  reasons.	  	  Conservatives	  charged	  that	  most	  draft	  resisters	  did	  so	  
primarily	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  service	  in	  Vietnam,	  but	  this	  is	  difficult	  to	  square	  with	  the	  
courage	  they	  demonstrated	  in	  actively	  defending	  an	  unpopular	  point	  of	  view,	  
especially	  at	  the	  war’s	  outset.	  	  Some	  resisters	  claimed	  to	  oppose	  all	  wars,	  or	  
sometimes	  only	  the	  Vietnam	  War,	  on	  moral	  grounds.	  	  Others	  argued	  the	  government	  
did	  not	  have	  the	  power	  to	  compel	  them	  to	  fight	  and	  put	  them	  in	  harm’s	  way	  in	  
Vietnam.	  	  The	  primary	  way	  young	  men	  resisted	  the	  draft	  was	  simply	  by	  doing	  
everything	  they	  could	  to	  avoid	  service.	  	  Other	  “exhibitionists,”	  as	  Director	  of	  
Selective	  Service	  Major	  General	  Lewis	  B.	  Hershey	  described	  them,	  burned	  draft	  
cards,	  picketed,	  and	  sat-­‐‑in	  at	  local	  draft	  boards.	  
                                                                                                                          
8	  Juan	  Real	  H.,	  “Serviceman	  Speaks	  on	  Vietnam,”	  Los	  Angeles	  Times,	  July	  17,	  1965;	  George	  
Gallup,	  “Communists	  in	  Demonstrations,”	  Los	  Angeles	  Times,	  November	  19,	  1965;	  “Demonstrators	  
Prolong	  War,	  Nixon	  Declares,”	  Los	  Angeles	  Times,	  August	  26,	  1965,	  page	  9.	  	  Ted	  Sell,	  “Military	  Sees	  
Vietnam	  Truce	  as	  Giveaway,”	  Los	  Angeles	  Times,	  May	  2,	  1965;	  E.	  W.	  Kenworthy,	  “G.O.P.	  House	  Chief	  in	  
Vietnam	  Plea,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  July	  2,	  1965;	  “Professors	  Hold	  Vietnam	  Protest,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  
March	  25,	  1965;	  Douglas	  Robinson,	  “Violence	  Breaks	  Out	  in	  Several	  Communities—Pickets	  Arrested,”	  
New	  York	  Times,	  October	  17,	  1965;	  William	  Borders,	  “Marchers	  Heckled	  Here—Eggs	  and	  a	  Can	  of	  
Paint	  Are	  Thrown,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  October	  17,	  1965;	  Douglas	  Robinson,	  “Demonstration	  Here	  
Supports	  Administration	  on	  Vietnam	  Policy,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  October	  24,	  1965;	  “Student	  Urges	  
Inquiry	  Into	  UCLA	  ‘Teach-­‐‑in,’”	  Los	  Angeles	  Times,	  November	  16,	  1965.	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In	  response	  to	  early	  draft	  card	  burnings,	  Congress	  passed	  a	  bill	  in	  August	  
1965	  that	  made	  it	  a	  felony	  to	  “destroy,	  mutilate,	  or	  change”	  a	  draft	  card.	  	  Penalties	  
included	  fines	  of	  up	  to	  $10,000	  and	  up	  to	  five	  years	  in	  jail.	  	  Senator	  L.	  Mendel	  Rivers,	  
Democrat	  of	  South	  Carolina,	  sponsored	  the	  bill	  in	  the	  House	  of	  Representatives,	  
while	  archconservative	  Republican	  Senator	  Strom	  Thurmond	  was	  the	  sponsor	  in	  the	  
Senate.	  	  Both	  were	  Southern	  conservatives	  whose	  foreign	  policy	  views	  were	  very	  
much	  in	  line	  with	  Goldwater’s.	  	  Rivers	  demanded	  “total	  victory”	  in	  Vietnam;	  
anything	  less,	  he	  argued,	  was	  “treasonable.”	  	  In	  essence,	  Rivers	  believed	  the	  draft	  
card	  burners	  were	  traitors	  and	  the	  new	  draft	  card	  bill	  put	  them	  “where	  they	  
belong[ed]—in	  jail.”	  	  Thurmond	  echoed	  Goldwater’s	  earlier	  stance	  that	  the	  United	  
States	  should	  use	  “any	  power	  necessary”	  to	  win	  the	  war,	  up	  to	  and	  including	  nuclear	  
weapons;	  the	  prohibition	  on	  draft	  card	  burning	  was	  merely	  another	  of	  the	  steps	  
necessary	  to	  win	  the	  war.	  	  One	  indication	  of	  popular	  sentiment	  behind	  the	  bill	  is	  the	  
overwhelming	  support	  it	  received	  in	  Congress.	  	  The	  House	  passed	  the	  bill	  393	  to	  1	  
and	  the	  Senate	  passed	  it	  by	  a	  voice	  vote.	  	  The	  editors	  of	  the	  Los	  Angeles	  Times	  
reflected	  the	  feelings	  of	  many	  Americans	  in	  an	  editorial	  on	  the	  subject.	  	  They	  called	  
the	  protests	  “despicable	  nonsense”	  which	  made	  manifest	  the	  “sneering	  contempt”	  
that	  the	  protesters	  held	  for	  men	  in	  uniform	  as	  well	  as	  men	  who	  would	  be	  forced	  to	  
serve	  because	  the	  protesters	  refused.	  
Hershey	  believed	  the	  law	  was	  unnecessary.	  	  His	  response	  was	  to	  simply	  
reclassify	  the	  draft	  card	  burners	  as	  1-­‐‑A—available	  for	  military	  service—so	  that	  they	  
could	  immediately	  be	  inducted.	  	  He	  believed	  this	  was	  noncontroversial	  because	  the	  
law	  already	  allowed	  reclassification	  for	  failure	  to	  carry	  one’s	  draft	  card,	  which	  of	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course	  was	  impossible	  if	  the	  young	  man	  in	  question	  had	  burned	  it.	  	  Hershey	  argued	  
that	  reclassification	  was	  used	  only	  for	  those	  who	  impeded	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  draft,	  
not	  for	  protesters	  who	  followed	  the	  law.	  	  His	  critics	  saw	  inductions	  as	  punishment	  
for	  the	  protesters	  having	  exercised	  their	  right	  to	  free	  speech.	  	  Representing	  this	  
point	  of	  view,	  one	  letter	  writer	  called	  this	  practice	  a	  “flagrant	  violation”	  of	  the	  
protesters’	  rights.	  	  The	  local	  police,	  not	  draft	  boards,	  were	  the	  appropriate	  bodies	  to	  
handle	  law-­‐‑breaking	  by	  antiwar	  protesters,	  he	  believed.9	  
Conservatives	  expressed	  their	  disapproval	  of	  the	  draft	  resistance	  movement	  
in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways.	  	  Students	  at	  Georgetown	  University	  formed	  the	  National	  
Student	  Committee	  for	  the	  Defense	  of	  Vietnam	  to	  give	  voice	  to	  the	  “heavy	  majority	  
of	  American	  collegians”	  that	  supported	  the	  war.	  	  At	  draft	  card	  burnings	  
conservatives	  sometimes	  showed	  up	  to	  heckle	  or	  stop	  the	  action.	  	  When	  two	  men	  
tried	  to	  burn	  their	  draft	  cards	  at	  Foley	  Square	  in	  New	  York	  City	  the	  police,	  hecklers,	  
and	  newsmen	  forced	  them	  to	  call	  it	  off	  with	  threats	  and	  by	  crowding	  them.	  	  Pro-­‐‑war	  
conservatives	  then	  chased	  a	  small	  group	  of	  pacifists	  and	  “kicked	  [or]	  elbowed	  
[them]	  in	  the	  ribs	  and	  stomach.”	  	  Two	  days	  later	  25,000	  people	  marched	  down	  Fifth	  
Avenue	  in	  New	  York	  in	  support	  of	  the	  war,	  with	  another	  42,000	  onlookers.	  	  At	  one	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University	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  1985),	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Post,	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point	  in	  the	  march	  “burly	  longshoremen	  and	  veterans”	  attacked	  a	  group	  of	  antiwar	  
counter-­‐‑protesters.	  	  A	  few	  months	  later	  there	  was	  a	  public	  disturbance	  after	  four	  
young	  men	  burned	  their	  draft	  cards	  in	  at	  the	  South	  Boston	  District	  Court	  House.	  	  A	  
group	  of	  50	  to	  75	  “school	  boys”	  stampeded	  toward	  the	  group	  shouting,	  “Kill	  them,	  
shoot	  them,”	  while	  200	  onlookers	  watched.	  	  The	  attackers	  held	  the	  four	  protesters	  
down	  and	  “pummeled”	  them	  until	  Democratic	  State	  Representative	  James	  F.	  Condon	  
called	  them	  off.	  	  In	  a	  news	  article	  about	  the	  incident,	  he	  praised	  the	  “patriotic”	  and	  
working-­‐‑class	  high	  school	  attackers	  for	  their	  support	  of	  the	  draft	  and	  criticized	  the	  
privileged	  protesters,	  at	  least	  one	  of	  which	  was	  a	  Harvard	  student,	  for	  the	  
disturbance.	  	  Americans	  generally	  agreed	  with	  Condon’s	  sentiment	  that	  the	  current	  
system	  made	  it	  too	  easy	  for	  elites	  to	  escape	  the	  draft.	  	  According	  to	  a	  July	  1966	  
Gallup	  poll,	  nearly	  three	  quarters	  (72	  percent)	  of	  Americans	  supported	  Secretary	  of	  
Defense	  Robert	  McNamara’s	  1966	  proposal	  to	  require	  that	  young	  men	  give	  two	  
years	  of	  service	  either	  in	  the	  military	  or	  organization	  such	  as	  the	  Peace	  Corps.	  	  This	  
figure	  infers	  that	  Americans	  at	  this	  time	  did	  not	  want	  to	  end	  the	  draft—they	  wanted	  
to	  make	  it	  universal.10	  
	   In	  spite	  of	  their	  disdain	  for	  draft	  resisters,	  not	  all	  conservatives	  were	  
enamored	  of	  the	  draft.	  	  Barry	  Goldwater	  had	  proposed	  an	  end	  to	  conscription	  in	  
1964	  while	  running	  for	  president.	  	  In	  the	  speech	  to	  kick	  off	  his	  campaign,	  Goldwater	  
called	  for	  the	  “outmoded	  and	  unfair”	  draft	  to	  be	  replaced	  by	  volunteers	  who	  made	  
                                                                                                                          
10	  “Burning	  of	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the	  military	  a	  “career.”	  	  The	  Pentagon	  responded	  the	  following	  day	  with	  a	  statement	  
purporting	  to	  support	  of	  Goldwater’s	  proposal,	  but	  it	  also	  sought	  to	  keep	  the	  draft	  
until	  a	  new	  system	  was	  in	  place.	  	  The	  message	  was	  clear:	  	  politics	  and	  conscription	  
did	  not	  mix.	  	  President	  Johnson	  then	  ordered	  a	  Department	  of	  Defense	  study	  to	  
“defuse”	  Goldwater’s	  proposal.	  	  The	  study	  determined	  that	  a	  volunteer	  army	  might	  
be	  feasible	  if	  force	  levels	  remained	  limited	  and	  soldiers’	  pay	  was	  increased.	  	  
However	  the	  President’s	  decision	  to	  escalate	  the	  war	  in	  Vietnam	  made	  any	  changes	  
to	  conscription	  impossible.	  
	   Conservatives	  also	  abandoned	  their	  attempts	  to	  abolish	  the	  draft	  once	  the	  
war	  in	  Vietnam,	  which	  most	  of	  them	  supported,	  ramped	  up.	  	  A	  Los	  Angeles	  Times	  
editorial	  from	  May	  1965	  noted	  that	  the	  draft	  had	  become	  a	  “permanent	  fixture”	  of	  
American	  life,	  even	  though	  it	  was	  “highly	  inequitable.”	  	  The	  editors	  suggested	  that	  
fixes	  for	  the	  most	  glaring	  inequities	  be	  made	  but	  concluded	  that	  the	  draft	  was	  still	  
“necessary	  to	  national	  security,”	  and	  would	  be	  for	  the	  foreseeable	  future.	  	  William	  F.	  
Buckley	  argued	  that	  a	  “free	  nation”	  should	  rely	  on	  volunteers	  for	  defense	  unless	  the	  
state	  faced	  some	  “peril”	  that	  made	  conscription	  absolutely	  necessary.	  	  He	  suggested	  
that	  the	  United	  States	  explore	  the	  possibility	  of	  ending	  the	  draft,	  but	  only	  when	  the	  
“current	  crisis”	  in	  Vietnam	  was	  over.	  	  This	  was	  a	  significant	  modification	  of	  the	  
position	  he	  took	  in	  the	  early	  1950s,	  already	  discussed,	  when	  he	  had	  argued	  for	  the	  
power	  of	  the	  “Leviathan	  state”	  to	  draft	  young	  men	  to	  win	  the	  Cold	  War.	  	  Now	  he	  saw	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the	  draft	  as	  valid	  only	  if	  the	  nation	  was	  involved	  in	  open	  warfare,	  as	  was	  the	  case	  in	  
Vietnam.11	  	  	  
	  
In	  response	  to	  manpower	  needs	  in	  Vietnam	  and	  mounting	  protests	  against	  
conscription,	  both	  President	  Johnson	  and	  Congress	  commissioned	  studies	  of	  the	  
draft	  in	  1966.	  	  The	  President’s	  National	  Advisory	  Commission	  on	  Selective	  Service	  
(dubbed	  the	  Marshall	  Commission	  after	  its	  chairman,	  Burke	  Marshall)	  was	  charged	  
with	  investigating	  all	  aspects	  of	  the	  draft.	  	  The	  House	  Armed	  Services	  Committee	  
created	  its	  own	  panel,	  led	  by	  retired	  U.S.	  Army	  General	  Mark	  Clark.	  	  Both	  the	  
Marshall	  Commission	  and	  the	  Clark	  Panel	  released	  their	  reports	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  
1967	  and	  both	  determined	  that	  the	  all-­‐‑volunteer	  force	  was	  not	  practicable	  at	  that	  
time.	  	  The	  Marshall	  Commission	  also	  called	  for	  reforms	  of	  the	  existing	  draft	  system,	  
including	  eliminating	  many	  deferments	  and	  moving	  to	  a	  national	  lottery	  to	  
determine	  call-­‐‑ups.	  	  Johnson	  established	  a	  task	  force	  in	  March	  1967	  to	  investigate	  
implementation	  of	  the	  reforms	  suggested	  by	  the	  Marshall	  Commission,	  but	  it	  
recommended	  maintaining	  the	  current	  system	  in	  its	  January	  1968	  report	  to	  the	  
President.	  	  Based	  on	  this,	  Congress	  mostly	  maintained	  the	  status	  quo	  in	  the	  draft	  
reauthorization	  bill	  of	  1967.	  	  This	  blocked	  adoption	  of	  a	  lottery	  system	  unless	  
specifically	  authorized	  by	  Congress	  and	  instituted	  blanket	  student	  deferments	  to	  
                                                                                                                          
11	  “Text	  of	  Kickoff	  Goldwater	  Talk,”	  Los	  Angeles	  Times,	  September	  4,	  1964;	  “Pentagon	  Asserts	  
It	  Welcomes	  Goldwater	  Idea	  That	  Draft	  End,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  September	  4,	  1964;	  Bernard	  Rostker,	  I	  
Want	  You:	  	  The	  Evolution	  of	  the	  All-­‐‑Volunteer	  Force	  (Santa	  Monica,	  California:	  	  Rand	  Corporation,	  
2006),	  29-­‐‑30;	  Flynn,	  The	  Draft,	  189-­‐‑190;	  “Military	  Draft	  a	  Way	  of	  Life,”	  Los	  Angeles	  Times,	  May	  24,	  
1965;	  William	  F.	  Buckley,	  Jr.,	  “Volunteers	  for	  Vietnam?	  	  There	  Are	  Difficulties—,”	  Los	  Angeles	  Times,	  
February	  28,	  1966;	  William	  F.	  Buckley,	  Jr.,	  “The	  Party	  and	  the	  Deep	  Blue	  Sea,”	  Commonweal	  55	  
(January	  24,	  1952),	  391-­‐‑93;	  Buckley,	  Jr.,	  “A	  Dilemma	  of	  Conservatives,”	  51-­‐‑52.	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neutralize	  campus	  opposition.	  	  One	  significant	  reform	  in	  the	  law	  concerned	  draft	  
boards.	  	  Women	  could	  now	  be	  appointed	  to	  draft	  boards	  and	  the	  law	  limited	  the	  age	  
and	  length	  of	  service	  of	  draft	  board	  members.12	  
	   Johnson	  continued	  to	  escalate	  the	  war,	  with	  542,000	  American	  troops	  in	  
Vietnam	  by	  the	  end	  of	  1967	  and	  an	  average	  of	  30,000	  soldiers	  drafted	  every	  month.	  	  
As	  the	  war	  dragged	  on,	  the	  divisions	  between	  “hawks,”	  who	  demanded	  the	  defeat	  of	  
Vietnamese	  Communists,	  and	  antiwar	  “doves,”	  who	  favored	  negotiation	  and	  
withdrawal,	  grew	  wider.	  	  Americans	  were	  more	  divided	  than	  at	  any	  time	  since	  the	  
Civil	  War.	  	  The	  President	  refused	  to	  disengage	  but	  could	  not	  bring	  himself	  to	  wage	  
the	  total	  war	  that	  conservatives	  demanded.	  	  He	  believed	  that	  the	  United	  States	  was	  
waging	  a	  “unique	  war”	  whose	  goal	  was	  merely	  to	  contain—not	  destroy—North	  
Vietnam,	  a	  compromise	  that	  incensed	  both	  hawks	  and	  doves.	  	  Conservative	  William	  
F.	  Buckley	  later	  argued	  that	  the	  United	  States	  would	  have	  been	  better	  off	  
withdrawing	  than	  to	  have	  fought	  a	  war	  in	  Vietnam	  that	  it	  was	  “afraid	  to	  win.”	  	  For	  
their	  part,	  doves	  hounded	  Johnson	  on	  conscription	  and	  the	  war	  throughout	  the	  
remainder	  of	  his	  presidency.13	  
	   	  
                                                                                                                          
12	  Flynn,	  The	  Draft,	  190-­‐‑92,	  195-­‐‑205;	  Rostker,	  30-­‐‑31;	  U.S.	  National	  Advisory	  Committee	  on	  
Selective	  Service,	  In	  Pursuit	  of	  Equity:	  	  Who	  Serves	  When	  Not	  All	  Serve?	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  	  U.S.	  
Government	  Printing	  Office,	  1967),	  3-­‐‑10.	  
13	  Herring,	  America’s	  Longest	  War,	  167,	  200,	  36;	  Small,	  Johnson,	  Nixon,	  and	  the	  Doves,	  22-­‐‑23,	  
92-­‐‑93;	  William	  F.	  Buckley,	  “Let’s	  Learn	  From	  Mistakes	  and	  Do	  Things	  Differently	  in	  Asia	  War,”	  Los	  
Angeles	  Times,	  May	  28,	  1964;	  William	  F.	  Buckley,	  “Vietnam	  ‘Rules’	  Explain	  the	  President’s	  Paralysis,”	  
Los	  Angeles	  Times,	  March	  25,	  1966;	  William	  F.	  Buckley,	  “Buckley	  Says	  U.S.	  Erred	  In	  Not	  Leaving	  
Vietnam,”	  Hartford	  Courant,	  May	  16,	  1975.	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Significant	  conservative	  and	  libertarian	  constituencies	  had	  “fused”	  in	  the	  
1950s	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  William	  F.	  Buckley	  and	  Frank	  S.	  Meyer.	  	  There	  were	  
divisions	  between	  the	  two	  camps,	  but	  they	  agreed	  on	  an	  anticommunist	  foreign	  
policy	  and	  restrictions	  on	  the	  power	  of	  the	  government	  at	  home.	  	  This	  alliance	  began	  
to	  develop	  cracks	  as	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  continued.	  	  Anticommunists	  like	  Buckley	  and	  
fellow	  National	  Review	  authors	  consistently	  argued	  for	  a	  foreign	  policy	  based	  on	  
arresting	  the	  spread	  of	  Communism.	  	  Libertarians,	  in	  contrast,	  placed	  freedom	  
above	  all	  else.	  	  They	  believed	  war	  and	  its	  concomitant,	  conscription,	  were	  
unwarranted	  intrusions	  by	  the	  state	  into	  the	  lives	  of	  young	  men.	  	  The	  philosopher	  
Ayn	  Rand’s	  writings	  are	  one	  example	  of	  this	  libertarian	  strain	  of	  thought.	  	  Rand	  
emigrated	  from	  Russia	  to	  the	  United	  States	  in	  1926	  to	  escape	  communism	  and	  
pursue	  a	  dream	  of	  writing	  movies.	  	  She	  later	  moved	  to	  novels,	  the	  most	  important	  of	  
which	  were	  The	  Fountainhead,	  published	  in	  1943,	  and	  Atlas	  Shrugged,	  published	  in	  
1957.	  	  In	  her	  writings,	  she	  espoused	  a	  philosophy	  she	  called	  “Objectivism,”	  which	  
she	  based	  on	  human	  reason	  and	  Aristotelian	  logic.	  
Like	  earlier	  libertarian	  writers,	  Rand	  argued	  that	  the	  cause	  of	  war	  was	  
statism:	  	  significant	  government	  control	  over	  the	  lives	  of	  its	  citizens.	  	  The	  peace	  
movement	  of	  the	  1960s,	  she	  argued,	  was	  incapable	  of	  achieving	  its	  aims	  as	  long	  as	  it	  
attempted	  to	  cooperate	  with	  foreign	  dictatorships	  and	  support	  increased	  state	  
power	  at	  home.	  	  Only	  complete	  freedom,	  especially	  economic	  freedom,	  could	  bring	  
about	  world	  peace.	  	  Rand’s	  most	  extended	  explanation	  of	  her	  position	  on	  the	  draft	  
was	  made	  in	  a	  speech	  entitled	  “The	  Wreckage	  of	  the	  Consensus,”	  which	  she	  
delivered	  in	  Boston	  in	  April	  1967.	  	  Arguing	  that	  the	  draft	  established	  the	  false	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principle	  that	  a	  “man’s	  life	  belongs	  to	  the	  state,”	  she	  criticized	  conservatives	  because	  
of	  their	  support	  for	  it.	  	  On	  a	  practical	  level,	  she	  said	  volunteers	  were	  more	  motivated	  
and	  effective	  than	  draftees.	  	  In	  addition,	  getting	  rid	  of	  the	  draft	  would	  put	  
constraints	  on	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  because	  the	  government	  would	  then	  have	  to	  
convince—but	  could	  not	  compel—young	  men	  to	  risk	  their	  lives.	  	  In	  spite	  of	  her	  
condemnation	  of	  the	  draft,	  Rand	  did	  not	  sanction	  demonstrations	  or	  overt	  
resistance.	  	  Her	  advice	  to	  young	  men	  touched	  by	  the	  draft	  was	  to	  “consult	  a	  good	  
lawyer.”14	  
No	  one	  better	  exemplifies	  the	  split	  between	  conservatives	  and	  libertarians	  
than	  Murray	  N.	  Rothbard.	  	  He	  became	  a	  supporter	  of	  extreme	  libertarianism	  
(anarcho-­‐‑capitalism)	  and	  isolationism	  around	  1949	  under	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  
Austrian	  economist	  Ludwig	  von	  Mises.	  	  Rothbard	  moved	  in	  and	  out	  of	  the	  major	  
right-­‐‑wing	  circles	  of	  the	  1950s,	  including	  associations	  with	  William	  F.	  Buckley	  and	  
Ayn	  Rand,	  but	  ultimately	  separated	  from	  both	  primarily	  because	  of	  ideological	  
differences	  with	  the	  former	  and	  personal	  disagreements	  with	  the	  latter.	  	  In	  response	  
to	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  and	  what	  he	  saw	  as	  the	  takeover	  of	  the	  right	  by	  anticommunists,	  
Rothbard	  began	  publishing	  the	  magazine	  Left	  and	  Right	  in	  1965	  to	  advocate	  for	  
libertarianism.	  	  The	  title	  itself	  was	  recognition	  that	  contemporary	  political	  divides	  
had	  become	  “misleading	  and	  obsolete”	  because	  both	  ideologies	  contained	  aspects	  of	  
freedom.	  	  Although	  he	  had	  written	  about	  these	  themes	  before,	  he	  expanded	  on	  the	  
                                                                                                                          
14	  Nash,	  161-­‐‑67;	  Jennifer	  Burns,	  Goddess	  of	  the	  Market:	  	  Ayn	  Rand	  and	  the	  American	  Right	  
(New	  York:	  	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2009),	  13-­‐‑19,	  228-­‐‑30;	  Doherty,	  135-­‐‑46,	  225-­‐‑28;	  Ayn	  Rand,	  “The	  
Roots	  of	  War,”	  in	  Capitalism:	  	  The	  Unknown	  Ideal	  (New	  York:	  	  Penguin	  Group,	  1967),	  30-­‐‑39;	  Ayn	  Rand,	  
“The	  Wreckage	  of	  the	  Consensus,”	  in	  Capitalism,	  249-­‐‑66.	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origins	  of	  the	  differences	  between	  conservatives	  and	  libertarians,	  and	  made	  
proposals	  for	  moving	  libertarianism	  forward,	  in	  a	  famous	  1968	  article	  in	  Ramparts.	  	  
Rothbard	  contended	  that	  the	  libertarian	  ideology,	  including	  opposition	  to	  
“militarism	  and	  conscription,”	  had	  been	  consistent	  since	  he	  discovered	  it	  as	  a	  
student	  shortly	  after	  World	  War	  II.	  	  The	  liberals,	  he	  charged,	  pushed	  the	  Cold	  War	  
on	  the	  American	  people	  in	  spite	  of	  opposition	  by	  principled	  conservatives	  such	  as	  
Republican	  Representative	  Howard	  Buffett	  of	  Nebraska,	  who	  argued	  that	  America	  
could	  not	  “police	  the	  world”	  to	  stop	  the	  spread	  of	  Communism.	  	  In	  1950,	  President	  
Truman	  led	  the	  United	  States	  into	  the	  Korean	  War	  supposedly	  to	  stop	  the	  
Communist	  invasion	  from	  the	  North,	  although	  Rothbard	  implied	  that	  the	  United	  
States	  had	  manipulated	  the	  North	  Korean	  government	  into	  invading.	  	  He	  believed	  
the	  right’s	  turn	  away	  from	  freedom	  occurred	  in	  the	  early	  1950s,	  when	  Wisconsin	  
Senator	  Joseph	  McCarthy	  moved	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  Republican	  Party	  from	  libertarian	  
freedom	  and	  isolationism	  to	  communist	  “witch	  hunting.”	  	  This	  move	  brought	  in	  a	  
new	  consituency	  of	  East	  Coast	  Catholics	  who	  did	  not	  appreciate—or	  even	  
opposed—the	  right’s	  traditional	  stance	  on	  liberty.	  	  Rothbard	  singled	  out	  for	  
criticism	  William	  F.	  Buckley	  and	  National	  Review	  for	  spreading	  this	  “blight.”	  	  He	  
harshly	  criticized	  Buckley’s	  stance	  from	  the	  early	  1950s,	  discussed	  above,	  that	  
defeat	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  took	  precedence	  over	  Americans’	  freedom.	  	  What	  
anticommunist	  fanatics	  like	  Buckley	  wanted,	  Rothbard	  believed,	  was	  “nuclear	  
annihilation”	  of	  Communist	  nations,	  even	  if	  they	  would	  not	  openly	  say	  so.	  	  In	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response,	  Rothbard	  used	  the	  language	  of	  the	  earlier	  conservative/libertarian	  
coalition	  to	  call	  for	  a	  new	  “counter-­‐‑fusion”	  of	  the	  libertarian	  right	  and	  New	  Left.15	  	  	  
	   Milton	  Friedman	  was	  another	  important	  proponent	  of	  the	  free-­‐‑market	  and	  
libertarianism.	  	  He	  was	  a	  University	  of	  Chicago	  economist	  best	  known	  for	  his	  work	  
on	  monetary	  policy	  and	  the	  Great	  Depression.	  	  His	  political	  advocacy	  for	  
libertarianism	  primarily	  focused	  on	  economic	  freedom	  and	  privatization	  of	  most	  
governmental	  services.	  	  Friedman	  opposed	  the	  draft,	  but	  his	  criticisms	  primarily	  
rested	  on	  economic	  and	  pragmatic—not	  ideological—grounds.	  	  He	  began	  his	  
criticism	  of	  the	  draft	  well	  before	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  with	  the	  book	  Capitalism	  and	  
Freedom,	  published	  in	  1962.	  	  In	  a	  chapter	  on	  the	  proper	  role	  of	  government	  he	  
argued	  that	  a	  “free	  society”	  should	  not	  permit	  the	  government	  to	  exercise	  the	  power	  
of	  conscription.	  	  Instead,	  using	  a	  line	  of	  reasoning	  he	  would	  return	  to	  many	  times	  in	  
the	  next	  ten	  years,	  Friedman	  argued	  that	  the	  United	  States	  should	  increase	  
servicemen’s	  pay	  to	  a	  level	  that	  would	  attract	  a	  sufficient	  number	  of	  volunteer	  
recruits.	  Only	  a	  total	  war	  might	  make	  conscription	  necessary.	  
As	  the	  war	  in	  Vietnam	  continued,	  Friedman	  expanded	  his	  critique	  of	  the	  
draft.	  	  In	  1967	  he	  published	  “Why	  Not	  a	  Volunteer	  Army”	  in	  the	  libertarian	  magazine	  
New	  Individualist	  Review	  as	  part	  of	  an	  entire	  issue	  devoted	  to	  conscription	  and	  
militarism.	  	  Many	  of	  the	  essays	  in	  this	  issue	  were	  republished	  from	  a	  symposium	  on	  
the	  draft	  held	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Chicago	  in	  late	  1966.	  	  Friedman	  again	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  Murray	  N.	  Rothbard,	  “The	  General	  Line,”	  in	  Left	  and	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  The	  Complete	  Edition	  (Auburn,	  
Alabama:	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  Institute,	  2007),	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  “Confessions	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Liberal,”	  Ramparts,	  June	  15,	  1968,	  47-­‐‑52;	  Doherty,	  243-­‐‑70.	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concentrated	  primarily	  on	  economic	  issues	  while	  other	  authors	  in	  the	  same	  issue	  
tackled	  the	  history	  and	  consequences	  of	  conscription.	  	  He	  resurrected	  many	  
arguments	  that	  libertarian	  critics	  of	  the	  draft	  had	  been	  making	  for	  years:	  	  A	  
volunteer	  army	  would	  be	  more	  effective	  in	  the	  field	  and	  was	  no	  less	  flexible	  than	  a	  
conscript	  army	  in	  meeting	  emergencies.	  	  So,	  too	  would	  an	  end	  to	  conscription	  allow	  
young	  men	  the	  freedom	  to	  pursue	  their	  life	  goals	  without	  the	  draft	  hanging	  over	  
their	  heads.	  	  Friedman	  also	  expanded	  on	  his	  previous	  argument	  that	  the	  military	  
must	  increase	  pay	  and	  improve	  working	  conditions	  to	  attract	  volunteers.	  	  Using	  
basic	  economic	  arguments,	  Friedman	  showed	  that	  conscription	  was	  essentially	  a	  tax	  
on	  draftees,	  since	  they	  were	  paying	  the	  difference	  between	  their	  salary	  under	  the	  
draft	  and	  what	  it	  would	  actually	  take	  to	  convince	  them	  to	  serve	  voluntarily.	  
Walter	  Y.	  Oi,	  an	  economist	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Rochester,	  expanded	  on	  this	  
point.	  	  His	  calculations	  showed	  that	  soldiers	  collectively	  paid	  an	  “implicit	  tax”	  of	  at	  
least	  $826	  million	  a	  year,	  the	  difference	  between	  their	  then	  current	  aggregate	  pay	  
and	  the	  amount	  that	  the	  government	  would	  have	  to	  pay	  them	  to	  maintain	  the	  same	  
force	  level.	  	  The	  pay	  issue	  also	  allowed	  Friedman	  to	  attack	  the	  inequities	  of	  the	  draft	  
in	  a	  novel	  way.	  	  The	  low	  pay	  soldiers	  received	  under	  conscription	  attracted	  only	  the	  
“disadvantaged”	  in	  American	  society.	  	  The	  wealthy	  were	  able	  to	  escape	  conscription	  
through	  deferments	  while	  the	  very	  poor	  were	  mostly	  unfit	  for	  service	  because	  of	  
physical	  or	  mental	  problems.	  	  Thus,	  the	  draft	  hit	  the	  working	  class	  the	  hardest.	  	  An	  
increase	  in	  pay,	  and	  therefore	  status,	  would	  make	  the	  military	  more	  attractive	  to	  
men	  across	  the	  economic	  strata,	  but	  especially	  working	  class	  soldiers	  who	  would	  
see	  their	  pay	  increase	  substantially.	  	  Friedman	  also	  used	  these	  facts	  to	  argue	  that	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African	  Americans	  would	  not	  dominate	  a	  volunteer	  army—a	  relatively	  common	  fear	  
among	  whites	  in	  the	  1960s—since	  young	  men	  of	  all	  races	  would	  benefit	  from	  these	  
proposed	  pay	  hikes.	  
Friedman	  addressed	  two	  other	  important	  issues	  in	  this	  essay.	  	  The	  first	  had	  
to	  do	  with	  how	  to	  maintain	  popular	  control	  of	  the	  military	  and	  the	  decision	  to	  go	  to	  
war.	  	  Friedman	  dismissed	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  “industrial	  complex”	  in	  tandem	  
with	  a	  volunteer	  army	  might	  pose	  a	  specific	  threat	  to	  American	  democratic	  
government.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  prospect	  of	  a	  military	  with	  independent	  
allegiances	  separate	  from	  the	  “broader	  body	  politic”	  presented	  a	  credible	  danger.	  	  
Americans	  must	  beware	  of	  this	  possibility,	  he	  maintained,	  but	  added	  that	  such	  a	  
threat	  would	  exist	  no	  matter	  how	  the	  army	  was	  recruited.	  	  Draftees	  in	  Napoleon’s	  
France	  and	  Francisco	  Franco’s	  Spain	  had	  helped	  push	  those	  two	  dictators	  to	  power,	  
while	  the	  United	  States	  had	  historically	  relied	  on	  a	  volunteer	  army	  and	  enjoyed	  a	  
long	  tradition	  of	  freedom.	  	  Voluntarism	  also	  furthered	  the	  goal	  of	  maintaining	  
popular	  consent	  for	  war	  since	  the	  recruits	  would	  provide	  a	  “continuing	  referendum”	  
on	  the	  conduct	  of	  foreign	  policy.	  	  In	  contrast,	  the	  draft	  allowed	  the	  President	  to	  
“proceed	  fairly	  arbitrarily”	  in	  moving	  toward	  war,	  at	  least	  in	  its	  beginning	  stages.	  	  
Events	  of	  the	  late	  1960s	  were	  to	  prove	  Friedman	  right,	  as	  countless	  protests	  exerted	  
little	  effect	  on	  the	  President’s	  power	  to	  prosecute	  the	  war.	  	  If	  young	  men	  had	  not	  
been	  compelled	  to	  go	  to	  Vietnam,	  the	  well	  of	  recruits	  might	  have	  dried	  up	  and	  forced	  
the	  President	  to	  change	  course.	  	  One	  can	  see	  the	  budding	  alliance	  between	  the	  
libertarian	  right	  and	  New	  Left	  in	  this	  essay.	  	  Richard	  Flacks,	  who	  was	  a	  founding	  
member	  of	  Students	  for	  a	  Democratic	  Society	  (SDS)	  and	  professor	  of	  sociology	  at	  the	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University	  of	  Chicago,	  argued	  along	  the	  same	  lines	  as	  Friedman.	  	  The	  draft,	  Flacks	  
wrote,	  gave	  the	  President	  the	  power	  to	  wage	  war	  without	  “prior	  popular	  consent”	  
and	  facilitated	  the	  militarization	  of	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy.	  	  A	  notable	  difference	  between	  
the	  two	  was	  that	  Flacks	  was	  very	  pessimistic	  about	  the	  prospects	  for	  ending	  the	  
draft	  anytime	  soon.	  	  Friedman	  struck	  a	  more	  hopeful	  tone,	  arguing	  that	  it	  was	  
primarily	  “bureaucratic	  standpattism”	  that	  blocked	  implementation	  of	  reform.16	  	  
	   	  
The	  conference	  on	  the	  draft	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Chicago,	  where	  Friedman,	  Oi,	  
and	  Flacks	  had	  delivered	  their	  papers,	  also	  hosted	  statements	  by	  conservatives	  who	  
favored	  maintaining	  and	  even	  expanding	  the	  government’s	  conscription	  power.	  	  
General	  Hershey	  submitted	  a	  brief	  explanation	  of	  the	  purposes	  and	  operation	  of	  the	  
Selective	  Service	  System	  to	  correct	  “faulty	  assumptions	  and	  misinterpretations”	  
about	  the	  draft	  that	  had	  spread	  during	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	  	  The	  peevish	  tone	  of	  the	  
piece	  was	  struck	  in	  the	  first	  sentence	  when	  he	  commented	  on	  the	  sudden	  interest	  
taken	  by	  “people	  of	  prominence,”	  such	  as	  the	  academics	  assembled	  at	  that	  
conference,	  who	  had	  ignored	  the	  draft	  up	  to	  that	  point.	  	  The	  job	  of	  Selective	  Service,	  
Hershey	  explained,	  was	  to	  provide	  the	  military	  with	  the	  manpower	  it	  needed	  
without	  seriously	  impacting	  the	  economy.	  	  Since	  the	  draft	  was	  “selective,”	  draft	  
boards	  could	  grant	  deferments	  based	  on	  the	  “national	  interest.”	  	  Otherwise,	  all	  fit	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men	  were	  eligible	  for	  the	  “privilege”	  of	  service	  and	  none	  had	  a	  right	  to	  deferment	  
merely	  because	  of	  “personal”	  circumstances.	  
Hershey’s	  paper	  became	  public	  knowledge	  at	  the	  draft	  conference	  in	  
December	  1966.	  	  A	  year	  later	  the	  infamous	  “channeling”	  memorandum	  was	  
published	  in	  the	  left-­‐‑wing	  magazines	  Ramparts	  and	  New	  Left	  Notes.	  	  The	  note	  was	  
written	  to	  draft	  boards	  in	  1965	  and	  instructed	  members	  on	  when	  deferments	  
should	  be	  granted.	  	  The	  author	  of	  the	  memo	  wrote	  that	  the	  “club	  of	  induction”	  had	  
been	  used	  to	  push	  young	  men	  into	  higher	  education	  in	  areas	  that	  were	  vital	  to	  
American	  defense,	  especially	  science	  and	  engineering.	  	  In	  language	  sure	  to	  anger	  
those	  who	  already	  believed	  the	  draft	  was	  unfair,	  the	  memo	  explained	  that	  the	  
“mentally	  qualified	  man”	  could	  better	  serve	  his	  country	  at	  home,	  leaving	  the	  
implication	  that	  young	  men	  drafted	  into	  the	  military	  were	  less	  intelligent	  and	  thus	  
less	  useful	  to	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  
This	  memo	  inflamed	  the	  antiwar	  left,	  but	  it	  was	  consistent	  with	  Hershey's	  
December	  1966	  paper.	  	  In	  fact,	  channeling	  followed	  longstanding	  Selective	  Service	  
practice,	  beginning	  with	  the	  example	  that	  Enoch	  Crowder	  had	  laid	  out	  during	  World	  
War	  I.	  	  However,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  1960s,	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  memo	  caused	  a	  
firestorm	  of	  controversy	  and	  encouraged	  ever-­‐‑greater	  numbers	  of	  young	  people	  to	  
resist	  the	  draft.	  	  The	  channeling	  memo	  was	  important	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  Boston	  
Draft	  Resistance	  Group,	  to	  cite	  one	  example,	  which	  included	  members	  from	  some	  of	  
the	  most	  elite	  universities	  in	  the	  country.	  	  Channeling	  angered	  African	  Americans	  as	  
well.	  	  The	  August	  1968	  issue	  of	  Ebony	  attacked	  the	  practice,	  which	  allegedly	  allowed	  
the	  government	  to	  conscript	  “partially	  out-­‐‑of-­‐‑work	  and	  angry”	  young	  black	  men	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whom	  draft	  boards	  saw	  as	  threats	  to	  social	  order	  and	  the	  “military	  establishment.”	  	  
As	  for	  Hershey,	  he	  had	  become	  the	  "bête	  noire"	  of	  the	  youth	  protesters	  because	  of	  
missteps	  like	  the	  release	  of	  the	  channeling	  memo,	  and	  he	  was	  asked	  to	  step	  down	  
from	  his	  post	  in	  October	  1969.17	  	  	  
The	  military,	  at	  least	  as	  represented	  by	  Colonel	  Samuel	  H.	  Hays,	  also	  favored	  
the	  continuation	  of	  the	  draft.	  	  Hays	  was	  the	  director	  of	  the	  Office	  of	  Military	  
Psychology	  and	  Leadership	  at	  the	  United	  States	  Military	  Academy.	  	  He	  submitted	  a	  
paper	  to	  the	  Chicago	  draft	  conference	  in	  which	  he	  recommended	  tweaking,	  but	  not	  
significantly	  altering,	  Selective	  Service.	  	  Universal	  military	  training	  and	  the	  
volunteer	  army	  would	  be	  too	  expensive,	  while	  a	  lottery	  to	  determine	  inductions	  
would	  likely	  be	  just	  as	  inequitable	  as	  the	  current	  system	  and	  destructive	  of	  morale.	  	  
National	  service	  might	  be	  a	  laudable	  goal	  but	  that	  decision	  should	  be	  made	  
separately	  from	  the	  one	  concerning	  conscription.	  	  One	  reform	  he	  suggested	  was	  to	  
induct	  18-­‐‑	  and	  19-­‐‑year-­‐‑olds	  first.	  	  After	  his	  20th	  birthday	  a	  young	  man	  would	  be	  
exempt	  from	  future	  call-­‐‑ups	  unless	  he	  had	  been	  deferred	  as	  a	  student,	  in	  which	  case	  
he	  would	  be	  obligated	  to	  serve	  after	  he	  graduated.	  	  At	  the	  time	  he	  made	  this	  
proposal	  young	  men	  were	  eligible	  to	  be	  drafted	  through	  age	  26.	  	  Hays	  believed	  it	  
was	  important	  to	  retain	  the	  draft	  because	  it	  gave	  all	  citizens	  the	  opportunity	  to	  
perform	  their	  duty	  through	  service	  in	  the	  military.	  	  The	  United	  States	  should	  not	  
separate	  military	  service	  and	  citizenship,	  since	  distinctions	  between	  soldiers	  and	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civilians	  would	  be	  an	  invitation	  for	  “ultimate	  disaster.”	  	  Hays	  ended	  with	  the	  plea	  to	  
make	  “national	  security”	  the	  primary	  goal	  of	  any	  discussion	  of	  the	  draft.18	  	  	  
At	  the	  opposite	  end	  of	  the	  political	  spectrum	  from	  the	  libertarians,	  Morris	  
Janowitz,	  a	  professor	  of	  sociology	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Chicago,	  advocated	  moving	  to	  
a	  system	  of	  “national	  service.”	  	  One	  of	  the	  most	  valid	  complaints	  about	  the	  draft,	  
Janowitz	  pointed	  out,	  was	  its	  inequity.	  	  There	  were	  simply	  too	  many	  young	  men	  for	  
the	  military	  to	  make	  use	  of	  during	  the	  limited	  war	  in	  Vietnam.	  	  General	  Hershey	  had	  
dismissed	  the	  inequity	  argument,	  with	  characteristic	  curtness,	  when	  he	  said	  that	  the	  
“individual	  desires”	  of	  American	  men	  were	  not	  important	  when	  compared	  to	  the	  
“national	  need”	  for	  manpower.	  	  So,	  too	  have	  some	  historians.	  	  George	  Q.	  Flynn	  later	  
pointed	  out	  that	  it	  was	  impossible	  for	  any	  method	  of	  selective	  conscription	  to	  be	  
meaningfully	  equitable.	  	  Young	  men	  of	  draft	  age	  during	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  doubtless	  
found	  it	  unfair	  that	  they	  were	  eligible,	  while	  older	  or	  younger	  men	  remained	  
untouched	  by	  Selective	  Service.	  	  Men	  called	  up	  but	  unable	  to	  pass	  the	  physical	  or	  
mental	  aptitude	  tests	  were	  not	  inducted.	  	  Among	  those	  who	  were	  taken,	  some	  were	  
put	  in	  combat	  in	  Vietnam	  while	  others	  were	  put	  in	  support	  roles	  in	  Saigon	  or	  placed	  
on	  bases	  in	  Europe,	  far	  way	  from	  the	  fighting.	  
Janowitz	  put	  forward	  the	  idea	  of	  national	  service—either	  in	  the	  military	  or	  a	  
benevolent	  aid	  organization—to	  answer	  what	  he	  saw	  as	  the	  legitimate	  argument	  
regarding	  the	  inequity	  of	  the	  draft.	  	  This	  proposal	  would	  allow	  young	  men	  to	  
volunteer	  in	  new	  federal	  agencies	  created	  around	  policing,	  teaching,	  health,	  and	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other	  national	  needs,	  without	  putting	  themselves	  in	  harm’s	  way	  in	  Vietnam.	  	  
Meanwhile,	  veterans	  would	  have	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  G.I.	  Bill	  and	  perhaps	  enjoy	  
shorter	  lengths	  of	  service	  because	  of	  the	  increased	  risk	  they	  faced.	  	  Like	  Hays,	  
Janowitz	  believed	  the	  vital	  link	  between	  the	  American	  people	  and	  the	  military	  could	  
only	  be	  maintained	  if	  soldiers	  were	  temporarily	  drawn	  from	  and	  frequently	  
replaced	  with	  young	  men	  from	  the	  civilian	  population.	  	  Universal	  service,	  in	  which	  
the	  military	  was	  a	  viable	  option	  for	  many	  young	  men,	  would	  thus	  allow	  civilians	  to	  
maintain	  many	  “points	  of	  interaction	  and	  control”	  of	  the	  military.	  
Universal	  national	  service	  would	  also	  prevent	  what	  Janowitz	  saw	  as	  the	  
inevitable	  formation	  of	  “segregated	  Negro”	  combat	  units	  if	  Selective	  Service	  as	  it	  
then	  operated	  was	  continued.	  	  He	  believed	  this	  problem	  would	  be	  accelerated	  if	  the	  
volunteer	  system	  were	  adopted.	  	  Friedman	  had	  called	  this	  argument	  the	  “reddest	  of	  
red	  herrings”	  and	  argued	  that	  discord	  between	  the	  races	  must	  be	  handled	  as	  a	  
"domestic"	  issue	  rather	  than	  a	  military	  one.	  	  But	  because	  the	  military	  was	  made	  up	  
of	  men	  drawn	  from	  civilian	  society,	  this	  argument	  loses	  most	  of	  its	  traction.	  	  
Friedman	  could	  not	  predict	  the	  future,	  of	  course,	  but	  race	  relations	  in	  the	  military,	  
as	  well	  as	  American	  society,	  were	  to	  get	  worse	  before	  they	  got	  better.	  	  The	  Watts	  
riots	  had	  already	  passed,	  but	  similar	  violent	  conflagrations	  between	  African	  
Americans	  and	  police	  occurred	  nearly	  every	  summer	  throughout	  the	  1960s,	  
culminated	  with	  the	  assassination	  of	  Dr.	  Martin	  Luther	  King	  in	  April	  1968.	  	  The	  
discord	  at	  home	  engendered	  declining	  morale	  and	  camaraderie	  between	  white	  and	  
black	  troops	  in	  the	  military,	  and	  especially	  among	  those	  stationed	  in	  Vietnam.	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Frank	  Borman’s	  report	  to	  President	  Richard	  Nixon	  on	  “race	  relations”	  in	  
Vietnam	  illustrated	  the	  challenges	  the	  military	  faced	  in	  this	  regard.	  	  Borman	  had	  
commanded	  the	  1968	  Apollo	  VIII	  spacecraft	  that	  orbited	  the	  moon	  and	  was	  
therefore	  a	  popular	  public	  figure.	  	  In	  1969	  Nixon	  sent	  him	  on	  a	  tour	  of	  Vietnam	  to	  
boost	  morale	  and	  also	  report	  his	  observations	  on	  race	  issues	  among	  the	  troops.	  	  His	  
report	  stated	  that	  commanders	  were	  alarmed	  at	  the	  spread	  of	  “militant	  black	  
ideology”	  and	  resistance	  to	  authority	  among	  black	  troops.	  	  These	  developments	  
posed	  a	  danger	  to	  the	  “future	  stability”	  of	  the	  American	  armed	  forces,	  he	  argued.	  	  
African	  Americans	  had	  legitimate	  reasons	  to	  feel	  aggrieved	  toward	  a	  racist	  society	  
that	  was	  reforming	  itself	  only	  sluggishly.	  	  Given	  these	  massive	  challenges,	  it	  was	  
simply	  not	  realistic	  for	  Friedman	  to	  pretend	  that	  race	  conflicts	  and	  military	  
manpower	  issues	  could	  be	  separated.19	  
	  
The	  Tet	  Offensive	  of	  January	  and	  February	  1968	  proved	  to	  be	  the	  turning	  
point	  of	  the	  war.	  	  Working	  in	  conjunction,	  the	  North	  Vietnamese	  Army	  (NVA)	  and	  
National	  Liberation	  Front	  (NLF)	  diverted	  American	  forces	  to	  the	  northern	  edge	  of	  
South	  Vietnam	  by	  conducting	  a	  siege	  of	  a	  Marine	  base	  at	  Khe	  Sanh	  in	  late	  1967.	  	  
Then	  during	  the	  Tet	  holiday	  in	  late	  January	  1968,	  Communist	  forces	  caught	  the	  
United	  States	  forces	  off	  guard	  as	  they	  appeared	  in	  cities	  across	  South	  Vietnam.	  	  
Footage	  broadcast	  around	  the	  world	  documented	  bold	  attacks	  on	  the	  presidential	  
palace	  and	  American	  embassy	  in	  Saigon.	  	  Fierce	  fighting	  continued	  for	  over	  a	  month,	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notably	  at	  the	  imperial	  capital	  of	  Hue,	  where	  roughly	  3,000	  South	  Vietnamese	  
government	  officials	  died	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  Communist	  occupiers.	  	  The	  brutal	  fighting	  
at	  Khe	  Sanh	  lasted	  over	  two	  months	  until	  concentrated	  American	  bombing	  in	  mid-­‐‑
February	  drove	  the	  Communists	  out.	  	  Tet	  proved	  costly	  for	  the	  North	  Vietnamese	  
and	  NLF	  forces	  on	  the	  battlefield;	  driven	  back	  after	  heavy	  fighting	  they	  had	  lost	  
somewhere	  between	  67,000	  and	  84,000	  men.	  	  By	  comparison,	  around	  3,500	  
American	  soldiers	  and	  8,000	  Army	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Vietnam	  (ARVN)	  soldiers	  lost	  
their	  lives.	  	  The	  NVA	  and	  NLF	  were	  unable	  to	  hold	  any	  of	  the	  land	  that	  they	  had	  
taken	  during	  the	  offensive,	  nor	  did	  South	  Vietnamese	  people	  flock	  to	  the	  NLF	  cause.	  	  
Clearly,	  few	  saw	  the	  North	  Vietnamese	  as	  their	  would-­‐‑be	  liberators.	  
But	  Tet's	  effect	  on	  American	  public	  opinion	  mattered	  more	  to	  the	  U.S.	  war	  
effort.	  	  Opposition	  to	  the	  war	  solidified	  in	  the	  months	  that	  followed	  and	  public	  
support	  for	  the	  war	  trended	  downward	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  conflict	  although	  one	  must	  
distinguish	  between	  the	  public’s	  opinion	  of	  President	  Johnson’s	  handling	  of	  the	  war	  
and	  the	  war	  itself.	  	  A	  significant	  number	  of	  conservative	  Americans	  before	  and	  after	  
Tet	  were	  critical	  of	  the	  President	  because	  he	  was	  not	  doing	  enough	  to	  win,	  not	  
because	  they	  supported	  withdrawal.	  	  In	  fact,	  one	  poll	  taken	  in	  mid-­‐‑May	  1967	  
showed	  that	  one-­‐‑fourth	  of	  those	  Americans	  polled	  were	  still	  willing	  to	  use	  nuclear	  
weapons	  to	  win	  the	  war.	  	  In	  the	  months	  before	  Tet	  the	  public’s	  disapproval	  of	  
Johnson’s	  handling	  of	  the	  war	  had	  steadily	  increased,	  surpassing	  50	  percent	  by	  the	  
fall	  of	  1967	  even	  though	  most	  Americans	  polled	  continued	  to	  self-­‐‑identify	  as	  
“hawks.”	  	  This	  sentiment	  declined	  as	  1967	  wore	  on	  and,	  by	  October,	  46	  percent	  of	  
the	  American	  public	  called	  the	  war	  a	  “mistake”—nearly	  double	  what	  it	  had	  been	  in	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1965.	  	  Even	  so,	  a	  full	  59	  percent	  said	  they	  believed	  the	  United	  States	  should	  stay	  the	  
course	  in	  Vietnam.	  	  Over	  half	  of	  this	  group	  (55	  percent)	  said	  the	  United	  States	  
should	  escalate	  the	  war	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  majority	  of	  Americans	  (65	  percent)	  
believed	  the	  likely	  outcome	  in	  Vietnam	  was	  a	  negotiated	  settlement	  with	  the	  
communists.	  
The	  year	  following	  Tet	  saw	  marked	  downturns	  in	  both	  the	  public’s	  
assessment	  of	  Johnson’s	  performance	  and	  of	  how	  the	  war	  was	  going.	  	  In	  the	  first	  two	  
weeks	  following	  the	  battle,	  Johnson’s	  approval	  rating	  dropped	  to	  35	  percent.	  	  At	  the	  
same	  time	  the	  percentage	  of	  people	  who	  called	  themselves	  “hawks”	  increased	  from	  
52	  percent	  in	  December	  1967	  to	  61	  percent	  in	  February	  1968,	  while	  the	  number	  of	  
people	  who	  wanted	  to	  continue	  bombing	  North	  Vietnam	  increased	  by	  seven	  points	  
to	  70	  percent.	  	  A	  month	  later	  only	  one-­‐‑third	  of	  those	  surveyed	  said	  they	  believed	  the	  
United	  States	  was	  making	  progress	  in	  the	  war.	  	  By	  mid-­‐‑March	  1968	  over	  two-­‐‑thirds	  
(69	  percent)	  said	  the	  United	  States	  should	  “phase	  out”	  the	  country’s	  involvement	  in	  
the	  war	  by	  training	  the	  ARVN	  and	  turning	  the	  war	  over	  to	  the	  South	  Vietnamese	  
government.	  	  On	  March	  12	  Johnson	  squeaked	  by	  Minnesota	  Senator	  Eugene	  
McCarthy	  in	  the	  New	  Hampshire	  Democratic	  primary,	  a	  terrible	  showing	  for	  a	  
sitting	  president.	  	  McCarthy	  had	  won	  the	  support	  of	  the	  antiwar	  movement	  and	  at	  
the	  time	  his	  victory	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  vindication	  of	  the	  doves’	  position.	  	  Democratic	  
Senator	  Robert	  F.	  Kennedy	  of	  New	  York	  called	  the	  results	  proof	  of	  a	  “strong	  feeling”	  
against	  the	  war.	  	  Later	  studies	  showed	  that	  in	  reality	  McCarthy	  owed	  his	  near-­‐‑
victory	  to	  hawks	  who	  were	  angry	  at	  Johnson’s	  dithering	  in	  Vietnam.	  	  After	  this	  upset	  
the	  President	  shocked	  the	  nation	  on	  March	  31,	  when	  he	  announced	  his	  withdrawal	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from	  the	  1968	  campaign	  so	  that	  he	  could	  devote	  the	  rest	  of	  his	  presidency	  to	  
achieving	  peace.	  
Tet	  was	  also	  the	  point	  at	  which	  the	  United	  States	  began	  the	  long	  process	  of	  
de-­‐‑escalation	  and	  withdrawal	  from	  Vietnam.	  	  Ardent	  hawks	  like	  Democratic	  
Representative	  L.	  Mendel	  Rivers	  of	  South	  Carolina	  publicly	  called	  for	  Johnson	  to	  
remove	  the	  restrictions	  on	  the	  military	  after	  Tet	  and	  push	  for	  a	  complete	  victory.	  	  
However,	  by	  a	  wide	  margin	  the	  American	  public	  continued	  to	  favor	  turning	  the	  war	  
over	  to	  South	  Vietnam.	  	  In	  late	  February	  General	  William	  Westmoreland,	  
commander	  of	  Military	  Assistance	  Command,	  Vietnam	  (MACV),	  asked	  for	  205,000	  
additional	  troops.	  	  In	  response	  Johnson	  ordered	  a	  comprehensive	  review	  of	  
American	  options	  in	  Vietnam,	  which	  was	  to	  be	  headed	  by	  newly	  confirmed	  
Secretary	  of	  Defense	  Clark	  Clifford.	  	  Johnson	  adopted	  Clifford’s	  recommendations	  to	  
turn	  down	  Westmoreland’s	  troop	  request	  and	  begin	  to	  turn	  the	  fighting	  over	  to	  the	  
ARVN.	  	  These	  decisions	  marked	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  “Vietnamization”	  phase	  of	  the	  
war.20	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After	  the	  New	  Hampshire	  primary,	  Eugene	  McCarthy	  continued	  his	  campaign	  
and	  Senator	  Robert	  F.	  Kennedy	  entered	  the	  race	  on	  March	  17,	  two	  weeks	  prior	  to	  
Johnson’s	  withdrawal.	  	  The	  divisions	  in	  the	  Democratic	  Party	  over	  Vietnam	  
continued	  through	  1968.	  	  Martin	  Luther	  King,	  Jr.	  was	  assassinated	  in	  April	  and	  
Robert	  Kennedy	  in	  June,	  after	  winning	  the	  California	  primary.	  	  Both	  had	  spoken	  out	  
forcefully	  for	  an	  end	  to	  the	  war	  through	  negotiations	  with	  North	  Vietnam	  and	  the	  
NLF.	  	  	  McCarthy	  continued	  his	  quest	  for	  the	  nomination	  while	  Hubert	  Humphrey,	  
Johnson’s	  vice	  president,	  entered	  the	  race	  in	  April.	  	  Humphrey	  was	  the	  favorite	  of	  
Johnson	  and	  Democratic	  Party	  insiders,	  and	  many	  Americans	  saw	  him	  as	  likely	  to	  
continue	  Johnson’s	  policies	  in	  Vietnam.	  	  Humphrey	  centered	  his	  campaign	  on	  
ensuring	  the	  support	  of	  establishment	  Democrats	  in	  the	  thirty-­‐‑three	  states	  that	  
chose	  convention	  delegates	  through	  party	  machines.	  	  With	  these	  organizations	  loyal	  
to	  Johnson,	  Humphrey	  was	  virtually	  guaranteed	  their	  votes,	  and	  therefore	  the	  
nomination.	  	  This	  strategy	  allowed	  him	  to	  avoid	  the	  primaries	  in	  the	  other	  
seventeen	  states,	  where	  antiwar	  and	  anti-­‐‑draft	  activists	  could	  spoil	  the	  outcome.	  	  In	  
this	  way,	  Humphrey	  locked	  up	  the	  nomination	  but	  split	  the	  Democratic	  Party	  in	  the	  
process.	  	  The	  riots	  in	  Chicago	  during	  the	  August	  1968	  Democratic	  Convention	  were	  
an	  expression	  of	  the	  anger	  the	  New	  Left	  radicals	  felt	  over	  Humphrey’s	  nomination	  
and	  the	  expectation	  that	  he	  would	  maintain	  the	  war	  effort	  if	  he	  was	  elected.	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Like	  the	  radicals,	  many	  historians	  have	  bemoaned	  this	  neutralization	  and	  
defeat	  of	  true	  peace	  candidates	  in	  1968.	  	  Robert	  Kennedy’s	  murder,	  argues	  historian	  
Tom	  Wells,	  discouraged	  the	  peace	  movement	  and	  made	  many	  on	  the	  left	  question	  
whether	  the	  American	  “power	  structure”	  would	  ever	  allow	  the	  people	  to	  have	  a	  
voice	  in	  the	  decisions	  made	  by	  the	  government.	  	  Stephen	  Ambrose	  believed	  that	  if	  
Kennedy	  had	  lived	  or	  McCarthy	  had	  beaten	  Humphrey,	  the	  1968	  election	  could	  have	  
served	  as	  a	  “clear	  referendum”	  on	  the	  war.	  	  However,	  there	  is	  significant	  evidence	  
that	  had	  Americans	  been	  given	  that	  choice	  in	  1968,	  any	  Democratic	  peace	  candidate	  
would	  likely	  have	  lost	  to	  Richard	  Nixon.	  	  According	  to	  an	  August	  1968	  Gallup	  poll,	  by	  
far	  the	  most	  important	  issue	  for	  Americans	  (at	  52	  percent)	  was	  Vietnam,	  and	  by	  July	  
the	  Republicans	  were	  slightly	  favored	  as	  the	  best	  party	  to	  handle	  the	  war.	  	  The	  next	  
most	  pressing	  issue	  for	  29	  percent	  of	  the	  public	  was	  “crime	  and	  lawlessness,”	  
another	  target	  of	  Republican	  rhetoric.	  	  On	  the	  war,	  only	  a	  minority	  of	  Americans	  
favored	  the	  Kennedy/McCarthy	  promise	  to	  withdraw	  U.S.	  forces	  and	  negotiate	  with	  
the	  Communists.	  	  A	  solid	  majority	  (generally	  around	  two-­‐‑thirds)	  showed	  a	  
consistent	  preference	  for	  “de-­‐‑Americanization,”	  but	  wanted	  the	  United	  States	  to	  
continue	  its	  support	  for	  the	  anticommunist	  South	  Vietnamese	  government.	  
	   The	  wild	  card	  in	  the	  race	  was	  George	  Wallace,	  the	  former	  governor	  of	  
Alabama	  who	  had	  symbolically	  blocked	  an	  entrance	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Alabama	  in	  
1963	  to	  protest	  the	  school’s	  integration.	  	  Wallace	  was	  a	  former	  Democrat	  who	  ran	  
on	  the	  American	  Independent	  Party	  ticket.	  	  His	  running	  mate	  was	  retired	  Air	  Force	  
Chief	  of	  Staff	  Curtis	  LeMay,	  whose	  most	  famous	  contribution	  to	  the	  USAF	  was	  his	  
development	  of	  Strategic	  Air	  Command	  (SAC)	  into	  an	  effective	  force.	  	  This	  pair	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appealed	  to	  at	  least	  one-­‐‑fifth	  of	  Americans	  who	  were	  angry	  with	  one	  or	  more	  of	  the	  
changes	  and	  failures	  of	  the	  1960s—Johnson’s	  inability	  to	  conclude	  the	  war,	  war	  
protesters,	  desegregation,	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  welfare	  state.	  	  Wallace’s	  political	  base	  
was	  of	  course	  in	  the	  South,	  but	  he	  made	  inroads	  with	  blue-­‐‑collar	  workers	  in	  the	  
North	  who	  had	  been	  aligned	  with	  the	  Democratic	  Party	  since	  the	  1930s.	  	  His	  stand	  
on	  the	  war	  appealed	  to	  a	  growing	  segment	  of	  Americans	  across	  the	  country	  that	  was	  
tired	  of	  “limited	  war.”	  	  Wallace	  promised	  to	  let	  the	  military	  fight	  the	  war	  without	  
interference	  from	  the	  civilians.	  	  LeMay	  even	  criticized	  the	  American	  “phobia”	  of	  
nuclear	  weapons	  and	  inferred	  that	  he	  would	  support	  using	  them	  to	  win	  the	  war.	  	  
After	  a	  protester	  lay	  down	  in	  front	  of	  Johnson’s	  limousine	  and	  stopped	  the	  
President’s	  motorcade,	  Wallace	  promised	  to	  run	  over	  the	  first	  protester	  that	  made	  
that	  mistake	  when	  he	  was	  president.	  	  Even	  General	  Hershey	  came	  out	  in	  favor	  of	  
Wallace,	  opining	  that	  he	  was	  the	  candidate	  most	  supportive	  of	  the	  Selective	  Service	  
System	  and	  would	  make	  a	  “good	  president.”	  	  It	  is	  impossible	  to	  tell	  how	  the	  
Southern	  and	  Northern	  working-­‐‑class	  Americans	  who	  chose	  Wallace	  (13.53	  percent	  
of	  the	  electorate)	  would	  have	  voted	  had	  he	  not	  been	  a	  candidate.	  	  Those	  groups	  had	  
typically	  voted	  for	  the	  Democratic	  Party,	  but	  many	  Democrats	  were	  angry	  over	  the	  
direction	  of	  the	  country	  and	  might	  have	  bolted	  the	  party.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  there	  
was	  a	  concerted	  effort	  by	  the	  Republicans	  to	  convince	  voters	  not	  to	  “waste”	  their	  
vote	  on	  a	  third	  party	  candidate,	  an	  indication	  of	  their	  fear	  that	  Wallace	  and	  Nixon	  
were	  drawing	  from	  the	  same	  group	  of	  voters.	  	  What	  is	  clear	  is	  that	  the	  American	  
people	  decisively	  came	  out	  for	  change.	  	  If	  Nixon’s	  43.43	  percent	  of	  the	  electorate	  is	  
combined	  with	  Wallace’s	  total,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  nearly	  57	  percent	  of	  the	  American	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people	  voted	  for	  a	  conservative	  in	  1968.	  	  The	  country	  had	  begun	  a	  major	  political	  
realignment.21	  	  
The	  draft	  was	  an	  issue	  in	  the	  1968	  presidential	  campaign	  that	  all	  three	  
candidates	  had	  to	  tackle.	  	  Hubert	  Humphrey	  stated	  he	  would	  fire	  Director	  Hershey	  
and	  move	  selection	  to	  a	  lottery	  system.	  	  He	  called	  plans	  to	  move	  to	  an	  all-­‐‑volunteer	  
army	  “irresponsible.”	  	  As	  noted	  previously,	  General	  Hershey	  endorsed	  Wallace.	  	  
Apart	  from	  attacks	  on	  draft-­‐‑card	  burners	  and	  the	  promise	  to	  let	  the	  military	  handle	  
the	  war,	  George	  Wallace	  said	  nothing	  about	  conscription	  itself.	  	  Either	  Wallace	  
supported	  conscription	  as	  then	  constituted	  or	  at	  the	  very	  least	  his	  priorities	  lay	  
elsewhere.	  
Only	  candidate	  Richard	  Nixon	  spoke	  out	  against	  the	  draft.	  	  At	  least	  two	  
factors	  motivated	  this	  stand.	  	  First,	  he	  wanted	  to	  neutralize	  the	  antiwar	  radicals,	  
many	  of	  whom	  were	  motivated	  by	  simple	  self-­‐‑interest,	  he	  believed.	  	  If	  the	  draft	  were	  
abolished,	  they	  would	  lose	  a	  major	  issue	  around	  which	  to	  rally	  opposition	  to	  the	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  John	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  York	  Times,	  
April	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  Rick	  Perlstein,	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  and	  the	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  of	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  Scribner,	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  267-­‐‑68,	  271,	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  340-­‐‑41,	  
348-­‐‑49;	  Tom	  Wells,	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  Battle	  Over	  Vietnam	  (Berkeley:	  	  University	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California	  Press,	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  284-­‐‑86;	  Stephen	  E.	  Ambrose,	  Nixon:	  	  The	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  (New	  York:	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  Times,	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  Gallup,	  “Vietnam	  Rated	  as	  Top	  
Issue,”	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  Times,	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  York	  Times,	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11,	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  George	  Gallup,	  “Nixon	  Overtakes	  Both	  Democrats	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  Gallup	  Poll,”	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  Angeles	  Times,	  July	  30,	  
1968;	  Taylor	  Branch,	  Parting	  the	  Waters:	  	  America	  in	  the	  King	  Years,	  1954-­‐‑63	  (New	  York:	  	  Simon	  and	  
Schuster,	  1988),	  821-­‐‑22;	  Rowland	  Evans	  and	  Robert	  Novak,	  “Auto	  Workers’	  Support	  for	  Wallace	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Fortell	  a	  Political	  Revolution,”	  Washington	  Post,	  September	  30,	  1968;	  John	  H.	  Fenton,	  “Wallace	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in	  Massachusetts,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  June	  30,	  1968;	  “Hershey	  Declares	  Wallace	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  Be	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President,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  August	  1,	  1968;	  Barry	  Goldwater,	  “Don’t	  Waste	  a	  Vote	  on	  Wallace,”	  
National	  Review	  20,	  no.	  42,	  October	  22,	  1968:	  1060-­‐‑61;	  John	  Ashbrook,	  “And	  Anyway	  Is	  Wallace	  a	  
Conservative,”	  National	  Review	  20,	  no.	  42,	  October	  22,	  1968:	  1048-­‐‑49;	  “Nixon	  for	  Prez,”	  National	  
Review	  20,	  no.	  44,	  November	  5,	  1968:	  1097-­‐‑98.	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war.	  	  The	  other	  factor	  was	  that	  a	  small	  group	  of	  economists	  and	  libertarian	  
ideologues	  convinced	  Nixon	  that	  an	  all-­‐‑volunteer	  army	  was	  possible.	  	  Principal	  
among	  this	  group	  was	  Martin	  Anderson,	  a	  professor	  of	  business	  at	  Columbia	  
University	  and	  disciple	  of	  Milton	  Friedman	  and	  Ayn	  Rand.	  	  Anderson	  sent	  Nixon	  
several	  memoranda	  in	  1967	  in	  which	  he	  argued	  that	  free	  men	  could	  not	  morally	  be	  
compelled	  to	  fight	  for	  the	  state,	  a	  volunteer	  army	  would	  be	  more	  effective	  in	  the	  
field,	  and	  the	  United	  States	  could	  fit	  higher	  pay	  into	  the	  budget	  to	  attract	  soldiers.	  	  
Convinced	  by	  Andersons’	  arguments,	  Nixon	  announced	  his	  belief	  that	  the	  United	  
States	  should	  move	  to	  professional,	  well-­‐‑trained	  troops	  to	  replace	  draftees	  in	  a	  
speech	  to	  University	  of	  Wisconsin	  students	  in	  November	  1967.	  	  He	  argued	  that	  the	  
draft	  was	  no	  longer	  needed	  because	  of	  the	  types	  of	  wars	  the	  country	  then	  faced—
either	  a	  nuclear	  exchange	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  in	  which	  the	  number	  of	  soldiers	  
would	  be	  irrelevant,	  or	  guerrilla	  wars	  like	  Vietnam,	  where	  a	  professional	  force	  was	  
preferred.	  	  The	  Republicans	  added	  an	  anti-­‐‑draft	  plank	  to	  their	  1968	  platform	  during	  
the	  August	  convention.	  	  After	  receiving	  the	  nomination,	  Nixon	  repeated	  his	  pledge	  in	  
October	  to	  end	  the	  draft	  and	  laid	  out	  a	  comprehensive	  plan	  to	  do	  so	  once	  he	  had	  
ended	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  on	  an	  “honorable”	  basis.22	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Upon	  inauguration,	  Nixon	  adopted	  a	  two-­‐‑track	  strategy	  to	  carry	  out	  his	  
campaign	  promise.	  	  The	  first	  track	  was	  to	  reform	  Selective	  Service.	  	  In	  May	  1969	  he	  
proposed	  to	  Congress	  that	  19-­‐‑year-­‐‑olds	  be	  called	  first	  (instead	  of	  older	  men	  up	  to	  
age	  26)	  and	  that	  they	  only	  be	  subject	  to	  call-­‐‑up	  until	  age	  20—essentially	  what	  
Colonel	  Samuel	  H.	  Hays	  had	  suggested	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Chicago	  conference	  in	  
late	  1966.	  	  Nixon	  also	  asked	  Congress	  to	  move	  the	  Selective	  Service	  to	  a	  lottery,	  
hoping	  that	  this	  move	  would	  neutralize	  the	  Left's	  allegations	  of	  draft	  board	  bias	  
against	  poor	  or	  minority	  candidates.	  	  The	  lottery	  was	  popular	  in	  spite	  of	  important	  
criticisms.	  	  First,	  inequity	  in	  Selective	  Service	  would	  still	  exist	  as	  long	  as	  deferments	  
continued;	  the	  country	  could	  only	  use	  a	  fraction	  of	  the	  men	  who	  reached	  draft	  age	  
every	  year	  no	  matter	  who	  was	  inducted.	  	  In	  1968,	  just	  46	  percent	  of	  men	  who	  
turned	  26	  had	  served	  in	  the	  armed	  forces.	  	  While	  this	  was	  a	  substantial	  portion	  of,	  it	  
was	  nevertheless	  a	  minority	  of	  American	  young	  men,	  reinforcing	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  
draft	  was	  hardly	  universal.	  	  Thus,	  some	  men	  fought	  in	  Vietnam,	  others	  served	  in	  the	  
military	  in	  other	  locations	  or	  capacities,	  and	  the	  majority	  of	  men	  enjoyed	  life	  at	  
home.	  	  Additionally,	  as	  Colonel	  Hays	  had	  argued,	  the	  lottery	  negatively	  affected	  
morale	  because	  many	  men	  called	  to	  serve	  in	  this	  way	  viewed	  themselves	  as	  “losers”	  
in	  a	  game	  of	  chance	  instead	  of	  proud	  soldiers	  called	  on	  to	  defend	  the	  country.	  	  
Finally,	  the	  lottery	  obviated	  the	  primary	  reason	  Selective	  Service	  had	  been	  created	  
in	  the	  first	  place—to	  “select”	  young	  men	  for	  service	  based	  on	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  
country.	  	  Nevertheless,	  Congress	  passed	  revisions	  to	  the	  selective	  service	  law	  in	  
November	  1969	  and	  the	  lottery	  went	  into	  effect	  on	  December	  1,	  1969.	  	  The	  rational	  
system	  that	  Enoch	  Crowder	  had	  established	  in	  1917	  was	  replaced	  by	  chance.	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The	  other	  part	  of	  Nixon’s	  reform	  of	  Selective	  Service	  was	  to	  get	  rid	  of	  
Hershey.	  	  The	  director	  of	  Selective	  Service	  had	  been	  at	  the	  post	  since	  1940.	  	  In	  the	  
words	  of	  historian	  George	  Q.	  Flynn,	  he	  was	  “Mr.	  Selective	  Service”	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  both	  
supporters	  and	  opponents	  of	  the	  draft.	  	  A	  lightning	  rod	  for	  criticism,	  Hershey	  had	  
been	  on	  Nixon’s	  hit	  list	  since	  1969,	  and	  appeasing	  the	  draft's	  opponents	  became	  
increasingly	  important	  after	  that;	  prosecuting	  an	  unpopular	  war	  without	  having	  to	  
fight	  on	  two	  fronts	  was	  difficult	  enough.	  	  Still,	  Nixon	  had	  to	  proceed	  carefully	  lest	  he	  
lose	  the	  support	  of	  veterans	  groups,	  draft	  boards,	  and	  conservatives	  in	  Congress.	  	  
Hershey	  refused	  to	  quit	  voluntarily	  so	  Nixon	  came	  up	  with	  a	  face-­‐‑saving	  
compromise:	  	  On	  October	  10,	  1969,	  he	  brought	  Hershey	  to	  the	  White	  House	  to	  give	  
the	  lieutenant	  general	  a	  fourth	  star	  and	  promoted	  him	  to	  full	  general.	  	  Hershey	  was	  
made	  a	  special	  advisor	  to	  the	  President	  on	  manpower	  and	  stepped	  down	  from	  
Selective	  Service	  effective	  February	  16,	  1970.	  
Available	  evidence	  indicates	  that	  historian	  Melvin	  Small's	  assessment	  is	  
correct:	  	  the	  antiwar	  movement	  reached	  its	  peak	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1969.	  	  During	  the	  
Moratorium	  of	  October	  15,	  many	  Americans	  nationwide	  took	  the	  day	  off	  to	  
contemplate	  the	  war	  and	  engage	  in	  protest.	  	  On	  November	  12,	  Seymour	  Hersh	  broke	  
the	  My	  Lai	  massacre	  story,	  publicizing	  the	  March	  1968	  murder	  of	  several	  hundred	  
unarmed	  Vietnamese	  villagers	  by	  infantrymen	  of	  the	  Americal	  Division.	  	  Then,	  from	  
November	  13	  to	  15,	  the	  antiwar	  movement	  focused	  on	  Washington,	  D.C.	  in	  protests	  
dubbed	  "The	  Mobilization."	  	  Forty	  thousand	  demonstrators	  participated	  in	  the	  
“March	  Against	  Death,”	  during	  which	  the	  names	  of	  all	  Americans	  killed	  in	  Vietnam	  to	  
that	  point	  were	  read;	  there	  were	  at	  least	  250,000	  participants	  in	  the	  main	  protest	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held	  on	  November	  15.	  	  Nixon	  took	  several	  steps	  to	  counter	  the	  antiwar	  protests	  
after	  this	  tumultuous	  fall,	  including	  Vietnamization	  and	  the	  “Silent	  Majority	  speech”	  
in	  which	  he	  excoriated	  the	  protestors	  and	  appealed	  for	  the	  support	  of	  a	  patriotic	  
majority	  of	  Americans—patriotic	  Americans	  who	  supposedly	  supported	  his	  quest	  
for	  an	  "honorable	  peace."	  	  Nixon	  believed	  his	  most	  effective	  tactic	  to	  subdue	  the	  
protests	  was	  his	  draft	  reform.	  	  The	  young	  people	  in	  the	  streets,	  he	  believed,	  were	  
afraid	  of	  “getting	  their	  asses	  shot	  off.”	  	  Despite	  Nixon’s	  views,	  postwar	  studies	  of	  the	  
antiwar	  movement	  have	  shown	  that	  young	  men’s	  draft	  status	  was	  not	  strongly	  
correlated	  to	  their	  opinions	  about	  the	  war.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  he	  was	  probably	  
incorrect	  that	  winding	  down	  the	  draft	  significantly	  contributed	  to	  the	  decline	  of	  the	  
antiwar	  movement.	  	  Instead,	  historians	  of	  the	  era	  have	  argued	  that	  many	  protesters	  
became	  disenchanted	  because	  their	  demands	  seemed	  to	  have	  little	  visible	  effect	  on	  
American	  political	  leaders	  or	  the	  course	  of	  the	  war.23	  
The	  second	  track	  involved	  convincing	  Congress	  and	  the	  American	  public	  that	  
the	  All-­‐‑Volunteer	  Force	  (AVF)	  was	  not	  only	  feasible,	  but	  an	  improvement	  over	  
Selective	  Service.	  	  To	  do	  this,	  Nixon	  announced	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  President’s	  
Commission	  on	  an	  All-­‐‑Volunteer	  Armed	  Force	  in	  March	  1969,	  whose	  charge	  was	  to	  
study	  the	  issue	  and	  make	  recommendations.	  	  Popularly	  known	  as	  the	  Gates	  
                                                                                                                          
23	  Flynn,	  The	  Draft,	  168-­‐‑73,	  197-­‐‑98,	  230-­‐‑31,	  242-­‐‑49;	  Ambrose,	  Nixon,	  Vol.	  2,	  190,	  264-­‐‑65;	  
Rostker,	  67-­‐‑72;	  Ted	  Sell,	  “Draft	  Lottery	  to	  Be	  Conducted	  Today,”	  Los	  Angeles	  Times,	  December	  1,	  1969;	  
Flynn,	  Mr.	  Selective	  Service,	  xiii-­‐‑xv.	  	  Historian	  Melvin	  Small	  noted	  that	  by	  1971	  protesters	  were	  
“burned	  out”	  due	  to	  Nixon’s	  successful	  corralling	  of	  the	  Silent	  Majority	  in	  Johnson,	  Nixon,	  and	  the	  
Doves,	  182-­‐‑93,	  218-­‐‑219.	  	  Tom	  Wells	  wrote	  that	  after	  the	  Moratorium	  some	  activists	  were	  despondent	  
because	  the	  protests	  had	  not	  changed	  official	  policy,	  nor	  had	  they	  budged	  public	  opinion,	  with	  65	  
percent	  supportive	  of	  Nixon’s	  policy	  of	  gradual	  Vietnamization	  instead	  of	  immediate	  withdrawal,	  The	  
War	  Within,	  397-­‐‑398.	  	  Peterson,	  135-­‐‑36.	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Commission	  after	  Chairman	  Thomas	  S.	  Gates,	  who	  had	  been	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  
under	  President	  Eisenhower,	  its	  fifteen	  members	  held	  various	  opinions	  on	  the	  AVF;	  
four	  out	  of	  the	  five	  senior	  staff	  members	  on	  the	  committee	  were	  “anticonscription	  
free-­‐‑market	  economists.”	  	  Historian	  Beth	  Bailey	  has	  shown	  that	  it	  was	  these	  staff	  
members	  who	  pushed	  the	  commission	  to	  focus	  on	  quantifiable	  economic	  data	  
instead	  of	  philosophical	  debate.	  	  The	  commission	  accepted	  the	  idea	  that	  conscripts	  
paid	  a	  hidden	  tax	  in	  time	  and	  money,	  as	  Milton	  Friedman	  (who	  served	  as	  a	  
committee	  member)	  and	  Walter	  Oi	  (who	  was	  a	  staff	  member)	  had	  long	  held.	  	  Alan	  
Greenspan	  was	  another	  free-­‐‑market	  economist	  and	  acolyte	  of	  Ayn	  Rand	  who	  served	  
on	  the	  committee;	  he,	  too,	  played	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  bringing	  other	  members	  over	  to	  
the	  AVF	  side.	  
But	  not	  all	  the	  committee	  members	  agreed	  with	  the	  emphasis	  placed	  on	  
economics.	  	  Crawford	  Greenewalt,	  a	  high-­‐‑ranking	  executive	  at	  the	  DuPont	  
Corporation,	  asserted	  that	  young	  men	  who	  risked	  death	  in	  the	  service	  of	  their	  
country	  were	  not	  performing	  “just	  another	  job.”	  	  Stephen	  Herbits,	  a	  26-­‐‑year-­‐‑old	  law	  
student	  at	  Georgetown	  University	  and	  strong	  proponent	  of	  the	  AVF	  argued	  that	  the	  
primary	  rationale	  for	  ending	  the	  draft	  was	  that	  it	  violated	  a	  conscript's	  freedom—
not	  that	  it	  was	  a	  pay	  cut.	  	  As	  George	  Q.	  Flynn	  noted,	  there	  was	  an	  unseemly	  nature	  to	  
the	  economic	  argument:	  	  American	  citizenship	  conferred	  obligations	  as	  well	  as	  
rights.	  	  He	  saw	  Americans’	  refusal	  to	  defend	  the	  nation	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  social	  fabric	  
of	  American	  society.	  
Nevertheless,	  economic	  arguments	  won	  the	  day	  and	  the	  Gates	  Commission	  
issued	  its	  unanimous	  report	  to	  President	  Nixon	  in	  February	  1970.	  	  In	  it	  the	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commission	  recommended	  adoption	  of	  the	  AVF	  and	  an	  end	  to	  conscription	  by	  July	  1,	  
1971.	  	  Soldiers’	  pay	  should	  be	  significantly	  boosted	  to	  encourage	  volunteering.	  	  The	  
commission	  also	  recommended	  maintaining	  a	  “standby	  draft”	  on	  the	  books	  in	  case	  
of	  emergencies.	  	  In	  March	  1970	  Nixon	  rejected	  the	  commission’s	  recommendation	  
to	  end	  conscription	  in	  1971	  and	  instead	  set	  June	  1973	  as	  the	  goal.	  	  This	  decision	  
came	  after	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  Melvin	  Laird	  lobbied	  for	  the	  extension	  because	  he	  
did	  not	  believe	  the	  military	  would	  be	  ready	  by	  mid-­‐‑1971.	  	  Nixon’s	  message	  to	  
Congress	  in	  April	  1970	  asked	  for	  a	  two-­‐‑year	  extension	  of	  draft	  authority	  beyond	  July	  
1,	  1971,	  a	  pay	  raise	  for	  the	  military,	  and	  a	  reduction	  in	  deferments.	  	  	  On	  September	  
21,	  1971	  Nixon	  signed	  into	  law	  the	  bill	  carrying	  these	  provisions.24	  	  	  
Meanwhile,	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  continued.	  	  There	  is	  substantial	  evidence	  that	  
Nixon	  sabotaged	  Johnson’s	  peace	  negotiations	  with	  the	  Vietnamese	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  
1968	  in	  order	  to	  guarantee	  his	  election	  in	  November.	  	  In	  spite	  of	  his	  campaign	  
promise	  of	  a	  "plan”	  to	  end	  the	  war	  once	  he	  was	  elected,	  fighting	  dragged	  on	  for	  four	  
more	  years	  and,	  although	  the	  peace	  movement	  sputtered	  after	  November	  1968,	  
protests	  continued.	  	  The	  largest	  of	  these	  occurred	  in	  April	  and	  May	  1970,	  in	  
response	  to	  Nixon's	  Cambodian	  "incursion."	  	  The	  destruction	  of	  active	  NVA	  and	  NLF	  
bases	  in	  an	  officially	  neutral	  country	  was	  its	  object,	  but	  many	  on	  the	  American	  left	  
saw	  the	  invasion	  as	  confirmation	  that	  Nixon	  intended	  to	  keep	  U.S.	  troops	  in	  
                                                                                                                          
24	  Beth	  Bailey,	  America’s	  Army:	  	  Making	  the	  All-­‐‑Volunteer	  Force	  (Cambridge:	  	  Belknap	  Press,	  
2009),	  24-­‐‑30;	  Rostker,	  66-­‐‑67,	  76-­‐‑96;	  Flynn,	  The	  Draft,	  196,	  235-­‐‑36,	  238-­‐‑39;	  Robert	  B.	  Semple,	  “Nixon	  
Panel	  Asks	  Volunteer	  Army	  By	  Middle	  of	  ’71,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  February	  22,	  1970.	  	  Throughout	  this	  
thesis	  I	  will	  use	  the	  term	  All-­‐‑Volunteer	  Force	  (AVF)	  to	  describe	  the	  post-­‐‑draft	  U.S.	  military.	  	  Although	  
the	  military	  chose	  to	  discard	  AVF	  because	  of	  its	  political	  connotations,	  it	  continued	  to	  replenish	  
manpower	  through	  voluntarism.	  	  For	  consistency	  and	  clarity,	  I	  will	  use	  the	  appellation	  AVF	  to	  
describe	  the	  American	  military	  after	  conscription	  was	  ended.	  	  See	  Bailey,	  228.	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Southeast	  Asia	  rather	  than	  bring	  them	  home.	  	  Protests	  erupted	  on	  campuses	  and	  in	  
the	  streets	  across	  the	  United	  States.	  	  In	  Ohio,	  Governor	  James	  Rhodes	  ordered	  the	  
National	  Guard	  to	  Kent	  State	  University	  in	  early	  May	  1970	  after	  protesters	  torched	  
the	  ROTC	  building	  on	  campus.	  	  On	  May	  4,	  these	  units	  fired	  on	  over	  a	  thousand	  
protesters	  as	  well	  as	  bystanders,	  killing	  four	  and	  wounding	  nine	  students.	  	  Many	  in	  
Middle	  America	  were	  shocked	  at	  this	  brutality.	  	  Many	  others	  sympathized	  with	  the	  
National	  Guardsmen,	  who	  claimed	  that	  their	  lives	  were	  in	  danger	  and	  they	  had	  fired	  
in	  self-­‐‑defense.	  	  Protests	  intensified	  and	  over	  one-­‐‑third	  of	  campuses	  shut	  down	  for	  
the	  remainder	  of	  the	  school	  year.25	  
As	  the	  war	  continued	  through	  the	  late	  1960s	  and	  early	  1970s,	  Americans’	  
views	  on	  the	  draft	  continued	  to	  evolve.	  	  A	  1967	  poll	  demonstrated	  that	  hawks	  
outnumbered	  doves	  on	  college	  campuses	  by	  a	  16-­‐‑point	  margin.	  	  A	  year	  later,	  
another	  survey	  of	  1,033	  students	  evinced	  much	  more	  conservatism	  than	  the	  popular	  
stereotypes	  suggested.	  	  Only	  20	  percent	  had	  actually	  participated	  in	  a	  protest	  even	  
though	  many	  of	  them	  were	  interested	  in	  politics	  and	  especially	  the	  war	  in	  Vietnam.	  	  
Very	  few	  (one	  student	  in	  eight)	  gave	  strong	  support	  to	  the	  “hippie	  movement”	  and	  
30	  percent	  expressed	  strong	  disapproval.	  	  As	  for	  the	  draft,	  at	  least	  these	  Americans	  
said	  they	  were	  opposed	  to	  a	  volunteer	  military	  by	  a	  two-­‐‑to-­‐‑one	  margin,	  and	  this	  was	  
                                                                                                                          
25	  Nixon	  biographer	  Stephen	  Ambrose	  documented	  that	  Nixon	  made	  contact	  with	  
Vietnamese	  President	  Nguyen	  van	  Thieu	  through	  Mrs.	  Anna	  Chan	  Chennault.	  	  Nixon	  told	  South	  
Vietnamese	  Ambassador	  to	  the	  United	  States	  Bui	  Diem	  that	  his	  administration	  would	  give	  South	  
Vietnam	  a	  better	  deal	  than	  Johnson	  would.	  	  He	  also	  encouraged	  Thieu	  to	  reject	  Johnson’s	  entreaties	  to	  
hold	  peace	  discussions	  before	  the	  election.	  	  Ambrose,	  Nixon,	  vol.	  2,	  208-­‐‑209.	  	  Young,	  The	  Vietnam	  
Wars,	  232-­‐‑34,	  245-­‐‑51,	  275-­‐‑80;	  Prados,	  360-­‐‑68.	  	  “Slain	  Girl	  Just	  Going	  to	  Her	  Class,”	  Los	  Angeles	  Times,	  




two	  months	  before	  Nixon	  publicly	  announced	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Gates	  Commission.	  	  
Nearly	  80	  percent	  favored	  a	  compulsory	  national	  service	  program	  of	  one	  year	  in	  
which	  all	  young	  men	  served	  in	  the	  military	  or	  worked	  in	  a	  non-­‐‑military	  
governmental	  organization.	  	  By	  September	  1969,	  only	  44	  percent	  supported	  
continuing	  the	  draft	  while	  43	  percent	  opposed	  it;	  53	  percent	  of	  young	  people	  in	  
their	  twenties	  and	  65	  percent	  of	  those	  in	  their	  late	  teens	  opposed	  the	  draft.	  	  By	  early	  
1970	  the	  public	  had	  come	  around	  to	  the	  volunteer	  military,	  with	  52	  percent	  in	  favor	  
and	  38	  percent	  opposed.	  	  Even	  when	  one	  takes	  into	  account	  the	  size	  of	  the	  sample,	  
these	  were	  significant	  figures.	  	  John	  Ford,	  who	  served	  on	  the	  professional	  staff	  of	  the	  
House	  Armed	  Services	  Committee,	  aptly	  noted	  that	  Congress	  was	  responding	  to	  a	  
perceived	  “national	  will”	  to	  ending	  the	  draft,	  in	  spite	  of	  many	  doubts.26	  
Conservatives	  and	  libertarians	  both	  shaped	  and	  responded	  to	  these	  
developments.	  	  In	  the	  ensuing	  public	  debate,	  both	  sides	  wooed	  the	  undecided.	  	  
Traditional	  conservatives	  sought	  to	  maintain	  the	  draft	  even	  in	  the	  face	  of	  declining	  
support	  while	  conservative	  libertarians	  united	  with	  the	  radical	  left	  in	  opposition	  to	  
the	  draft.	  	  The	  Constitution	  itself	  was	  the	  most	  important	  area	  of	  disagreement	  
between	  pro-­‐‑	  and	  anti-­‐‑conscription	  advocates.	  	  For	  the	  draft’s	  defenders,	  the	  case	  
was	  relatively	  straightforward.	  	  The	  basis	  for	  the	  constitutionality	  of	  the	  federal	  
conscription	  law	  was	  found	  in	  a	  loose	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Article	  I,	  Section	  8,	  
Clause	  12	  (known	  as	  the	  “Army	  Clause”)	  of	  the	  Constitution	  and	  the	  1918	  Arver	  case,	  
                                                                                                                          
26	  George	  Gallup,	  “Students:	  	  On	  Vietnam,	  LSD,	  the	  Draft,”	  Los	  Angeles	  Times,	  May	  28,	  1967;	  
“Poll	  Finds	  Youths	  Aren’t	  So	  Radical,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  June	  29,	  1968;	  George	  Gallup,	  “Volunteer	  Army	  
Still	  Not	  Favored	  in	  U.S.,”	  Los	  Angeles	  Times,	  January	  26,	  1969;	  “Age	  Groups	  Differ	  on	  Draft	  Question,”	  
New	  York	  Times,	  September	  9,	  1969;	  Rostker,	  96	  note	  68.	  	  
112  
  
discussed	  in	  Chapter	  II.	  	  As	  President	  Abraham	  Lincoln	  had	  explained	  during	  the	  
Civil	  War,	  the	  power	  to	  “raise	  and	  support	  armies”	  was	  given	  “fully,	  completely,	  
[and]	  unconditionally”	  to	  Congress.	  
Lawrence	  Friedman,	  a	  Harvard-­‐‑trained	  lawyer	  and	  professor	  at	  Hofstra	  
University	  School	  of	  Law	  since	  1973,	  put	  forward	  the	  most	  scholarly	  exposition	  of	  
the	  “original	  understanding”	  of	  the	  federal	  government’s	  conscription	  power	  in	  a	  
1969	  article	  in	  the	  Michigan	  Law	  Review.	  	  He	  explained	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  
Constitution	  should	  be	  established	  by	  determining	  “what	  was	  it	  in	  [the]	  minds”	  of	  
the	  Framers	  when	  they	  wrote	  it.	  	  Having	  argued	  that	  one	  could	  ascertain	  this	  
original	  intent	  through	  historical	  study,	  Friedman	  saw	  evidence	  that	  they	  feared	  
professional	  standing	  armies	  and	  valued	  citizen	  participation	  in	  national	  defense	  as	  
the	  appropriate	  counterpoise.	  	  It	  was	  because	  of	  this	  fear	  that	  the	  Constitution	  went	  
into	  an	  unusual	  amount	  of	  detail	  where	  the	  military	  was	  concerned.	  	  On	  Arver,	  
Friedman	  outlined	  the	  “chain	  of	  errors”	  made	  in	  that	  case	  that	  had	  led	  the	  Court	  to	  
unanimously	  uphold	  conscription.	  	  First,	  Congress's	  power	  to	  raise	  armies	  did	  not	  
mean	  it	  could	  conscript	  soldiers	  any	  more	  than	  the	  power	  to	  establish	  Post	  Offices	  
meant	  Congress	  could	  draft	  postal	  workers.	  
Friedman	  then	  argued	  that	  the	  drafters	  of	  the	  Constitution	  believed	  that	  a	  
standing	  army	  was	  a	  serious	  threat	  to	  liberty.	  	  English	  kings	  had	  used	  standing	  
armies	  to	  wage	  ruinous	  foreign	  wars	  and	  limit	  the	  rights	  of	  their	  people.	  	  Militias	  of	  
the	  people	  developed	  in	  England	  in	  order	  to	  place	  a	  check	  on	  the	  king’s	  armies,	  and	  
the	  colonists	  later	  brought	  the	  practice	  to	  America.	  	  Friedman	  does	  not	  provide	  
historical	  examples	  of	  militias	  performing	  this	  public	  service,	  unfortunately.	  	  In	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England,	  the	  men	  who	  followed	  Parliament	  during	  the	  Civil	  War	  waged	  a	  decade-­‐‑
long	  struggle	  against	  the	  arbitrary	  power	  of	  Charles	  I.	  	  In	  Virginia	  in	  the	  late	  
seventeenth	  century,	  Nathaniel	  Bacon	  and	  armed	  men	  on	  the	  frontier	  nearly	  
overthrew	  the	  colonial	  government	  under	  Governor	  William	  Berkeley.	  	  But	  it	  is	  not	  
clear	  that	  these	  examples	  provide	  indisputable	  support	  for	  Friedman’s	  argument.	  	  In	  
both	  cases,	  contemporaries	  as	  well	  as	  historians	  view	  these	  incidents	  as	  destructive	  
misuses	  of	  the	  militia	  against	  established	  order,	  complications	  which	  Friedman	  
glosses	  over.	  	  	  
Nevertheless,	  Friedman	  continued	  by	  describing	  the	  militia	  in	  America.	  	  In	  
the	  colonies,	  the	  militia	  was	  composed	  of	  all	  able-­‐‑bodied	  adult	  men,	  and	  individual	  
colonies	  generally	  only	  required	  actual	  service	  for	  emergencies	  inside	  their	  borders.	  	  
Volunteers	  in	  the	  Continental	  Army	  and	  state	  militias	  fought	  in	  the	  Revolution	  for	  
America.	  	  Washington	  suggested	  conscription	  by	  the	  states,	  which	  they	  avoided	  as	  
much	  as	  possible	  by	  use	  of	  bounties	  and	  other	  inducements	  to	  get	  men	  to	  join	  
voluntarily.	  	  No	  political	  leader	  was	  willing	  to	  allow	  a	  draft	  by	  the	  central	  
government	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  militias	  frequently	  proved	  to	  be	  
untrustworthy.	  	  After	  the	  Revolution,	  states	  continued	  to	  jealously	  guard	  their	  
power	  over	  the	  militia.	  	  In	  this	  context,	  the	  delegates	  to	  the	  Constitutional	  
Convention	  of	  1787	  debated	  how	  to	  best	  man	  the	  military.	  	  Friedman	  placed	  great	  
stock	  in	  Edmund	  Randolph’s	  speech	  of	  May	  29,	  in	  which	  he	  argued	  that	  only	  a	  
“regular	  military	  force”	  would	  be	  sufficient.	  	  He	  noted	  defects	  with	  volunteers	  and	  
with	  the	  militia,	  and	  argued	  that	  a	  state	  draft	  “stretch[ed]	  the	  strings	  of	  government	  
too	  violently	  to	  be	  adopted.”	  	  Unfortunately	  Friedman	  did	  not	  explain	  exactly	  what	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he	  thought	  Randolph	  meant	  by	  that	  statement,	  but	  based	  on	  the	  speech	  he	  reasoned	  
that	  the	  draft	  had	  been	  “rejected	  on	  the	  very	  first	  day”	  of	  the	  Convention.	  
Professor	  of	  political	  science	  Michael	  J.	  Malbin,	  in	  a	  reply	  to	  Friedman,	  wrote	  
that	  Randolph	  had	  only	  said	  that	  volunteers	  or	  the	  militia	  would	  likely	  prove	  
unreliable	  during	  an	  emergency;	  he	  did	  not	  claim	  that	  the	  national	  government	  
should	  be	  prohibited	  from	  drafting	  men	  into	  the	  Army.	  	  But	  there	  was	  a	  defect	  in	  
Malbin’s	  argument:	  	  Randolph	  was	  referring	  to	  the	  states’	  power	  to	  draft	  men	  into	  
their	  own	  militias,	  not	  a	  national	  army.	  	  Malbin	  saw	  this	  distinction	  as	  
inconsequential	  since	  a	  man	  drafted	  into	  the	  militia	  which	  was	  later	  federalized	  
would	  be	  in	  “exactly	  the	  same	  position”	  as	  a	  man	  drafted	  directly	  into	  the	  national	  
army.	  	  Malbin	  is	  correct	  that	  this	  was	  the	  case	  after	  passage	  of	  the	  Militia	  Act	  of	  
1903.	  	  However,	  that	  distinction	  would	  have	  been	  significant	  to	  the	  Constitution's	  
framers,	  who	  saw	  the	  state	  militias	  as	  a	  check	  on	  overreach	  by	  the	  federal	  
government.	  	  In	  Federalist	  46	  Alexander	  Hamilton	  had	  argued	  that	  the	  states,	  with	  
the	  people	  (in	  their	  capacity	  as	  the	  militia),	  were	  more	  than	  adequate	  to	  guard	  
against	  a	  tyrannical	  national	  government	  with	  a	  standing	  army	  on	  its	  side.	  	  If	  there	  
was	  no	  difference	  between	  a	  draft	  by	  the	  states	  and	  one	  by	  the	  federal	  government,	  
as	  Malbin	  contended,	  the	  federal	  government	  could	  simply	  use	  this	  power	  to	  draft	  
the	  state	  militias	  in	  their	  entirety	  and	  destroy	  the	  capacity	  of	  the	  states	  to	  resist	  
encroachments.	  
Friedman	  succeeded	  in	  arguing	  that	  the	  “original	  understanding”	  of	  the	  
drafters	  of	  the	  Constitution	  probably	  restricted	  a	  national	  draft	  like	  the	  one	  
administered	  by	  Enoch	  Crowder	  during	  World	  War	  I.	  	  	  However,	  Friedman’s	  
115  
  
analysis	  has	  two	  weaknesses:	  	  First,	  the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  decision	  in	  Arver	  noted	  
that	  the	  Fourteenth	  Amendment	  had	  expanded	  the	  power	  of	  the	  federal	  government	  
thereby	  changing	  its	  relationship	  with	  the	  American	  people.	  	  Friedman	  did	  not	  
address	  this	  issue	  in	  his	  essay,	  and	  scholars	  still	  debate	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  that	  
amendment	  changed	  the	  nature	  of	  citizenship—and	  thus	  whether	  it	  authorized	  
conscription.	  	  In	  a	  2000	  article,	  constitutional	  law	  scholar	  David	  Yassky	  conceded	  
that	  the	  Constitution	  as	  originally	  written	  did	  not	  allow	  direct	  conscription	  by	  the	  
national	  government.	  	  In	  support	  of	  his	  argument,	  Yassky	  laid	  out	  a	  history	  of	  
conscription	  before	  the	  Civil	  War	  that	  largely	  conformed	  to	  Friedman’s	  narrative.	  	  
But	  the	  war,	  and	  especially	  the	  Fourteenth	  Amendment,	  fundamentally	  altered	  
several	  important	  principles	  upon	  which	  the	  Constitution	  had	  been	  established.	  	  The	  
Framers	  had	  seen	  the	  states	  as	  the	  “bulwarks	  of	  liberty”	  against	  the	  federal	  
government.	  	  Based	  on	  their	  experience	  during	  the	  Civil	  War,	  Congressional	  
Republicans	  after	  1865	  came	  to	  view	  the	  states	  as	  the	  real	  danger	  to	  liberty.	  	  The	  
Fourteenth	  Amendment's	  increase	  in	  federal	  authority	  vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis	  the	  states	  allowed	  
the	  U.S.	  government	  to	  act	  directly	  on	  the	  American	  people,	  thus	  countering	  the	  
threat.	  	  Yassky	  pointed	  to	  the	  text,	  which	  clearly	  makes	  American	  citizenship	  
supreme	  and	  state	  citizenship	  secondary,	  to	  support	  his	  case.	  	  So,	  too,	  did	  previous	  
interpretations	  that	  saw	  citizenship	  both	  as	  a	  conferral	  of	  rights	  and	  a	  source	  of	  
obligations.	  	  Yassky	  inferred	  that	  the	  duty	  to	  provide	  military	  service	  to	  the	  national	  
government	  had	  indeed	  become	  part	  of	  American	  citizenship	  when	  the	  Fourteenth	  
Amendment	  was	  ratified.	  	  Before	  that,	  when	  state	  citizenship	  had	  been	  supreme,	  the	  
individual	  states	  could	  compel	  military	  service	  in	  militias.	  	  It	  now	  followed	  that	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American	  citizens	  owed	  this	  duty	  to	  the	  federal	  government	  as	  well	  and	  that	  
ratification	  was	  a	  “revolution”	  in	  the	  conception	  of	  American	  citizenship	  that	  made	  
the	  draft	  Constitutional.	  	  In	  short,	  the	  Court	  in	  Arver	  had	  been	  correct.	  
Yassky	  also	  pointed	  out	  that	  if	  one	  judges	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  amendment	  by	  
the	  “intent”	  of	  its	  drafters,	  one	  must	  come	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  amendment	  
made	  conscription	  constitutional.	  	  First,	  most	  of	  the	  Congressmen	  who	  had	  voted	  for	  
Lincoln’s	  Enrollment	  Act	  of	  March	  1863	  also	  voted	  to	  ratify	  the	  Fourteenth	  
Amendment,	  a	  clear	  indication	  of	  their	  intentions	  regarding	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  
postwar	  government.	  	  Furthermore,	  if	  Chief	  Justice	  Taney	  had	  found	  the	  draft	  
unconstitutional,	  as	  he	  had	  hoped	  to	  do,	  Yassky	  argued	  that	  the	  Fourteenth	  
Amendment	  would	  have	  included	  specific	  wording	  to	  overturn	  that	  ruling,	  just	  as	  it	  
did	  for	  the	  Dred	  Scott	  decision.	  	  Noted	  legal	  scholar	  Akhil	  Reed	  Amar	  believed	  
Yassky’s	  reasoning	  both	  "clever"	  and	  reasonable.	  	  In	  an	  earlier	  work	  Amar	  had	  
contended	  that	  the	  Arver	  decision	  was	  “unpersuasive.”	  	  Even	  when	  taking	  the	  
Fourteenth	  Amendment's	  radical	  effect	  on	  the	  Bill	  of	  Rights	  into	  account,	  Amar	  
initially	  refused	  to	  concede	  that	  the	  constitutionality	  of	  the	  draft	  had	  been	  altered.	  	  A	  
few	  years	  later,	  however,	  Amar	  acknowledged	  that	  perhaps	  Yassky	  was	  onto	  
something.	  	  Its	  adoption,	  Amar	  argued,	  was	  a	  “visible	  sign”	  that	  the	  relationship	  
between	  the	  national	  army	  and	  the	  state	  militias	  was	  “constitutionally	  redefined”	  by	  
the	  Fourteenth	  Amendment.	  	  This	  change	  of	  mind	  notwithstanding,	  the	  Fourteenth	  
Amendment's	  stance	  on	  conscription	  was	  contested	  ground.	  	  Exactly	  why	  Friedman	  
omitted	  this	  fact	  in	  his	  otherwise	  thorough	  analysis	  cannot	  be	  known.	  	  Possibly	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accidental,	  it	  might	  just	  as	  easily	  be	  a	  purposeful	  effort	  to	  protect	  his	  “original	  
understanding”	  theory	  from	  attack.	  
Friedman's	  second	  stumbling	  block	  is	  the	  standard	  by	  which	  he	  proposed	  to	  
judge	  the	  Constitution	  in	  his	  1969	  essay.	  	  Because	  he	  opposed	  the	  draft	  and	  feared	  
the	  threat	  posed	  by	  a	  large	  military	  that	  it	  enabled,	  he	  argued	  that	  the	  original	  
understanding	  of	  the	  Constitution	  was	  key	  to	  judging	  the	  draft.	  	  This	  narrow	  
interpretation	  of	  the	  Constitution	  denies	  much	  of	  the	  federal	  power	  that	  
conscription's	  proponents	  saw	  in	  Congressional	  interpretations	  of	  the	  Army	  Clause	  
and	  the	  Necessary	  and	  Proper	  Clause.	  	  However,	  on	  a	  law	  Friedman	  supported—the	  
Patient	  Protection	  and	  Affordable	  Care	  Act	  (popularly	  known	  as	  “Obamacare”)—he	  
replaced	  his	  original	  understanding	  standard	  and	  replaced	  it	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  
Constitution	  must	  be	  interpreted	  according	  to	  the	  “economic	  reality	  of	  our	  time,”	  
not	  that	  of	  1787.	  	  If	  Friedman	  had	  used	  this	  more	  permissive	  standard	  in	  judging	  the	  
constitutionality	  of	  the	  draft,	  mere	  determination	  of	  the	  Framers'	  intent	  would	  not	  
have	  sufficed;	  a	  consideration	  of	  contemporary	  defense	  realities	  such	  as	  the	  Cold	  
War	  and	  atomic	  weapons	  would	  have	  been	  needed.	  	  These	  factors	  call	  his	  central	  
conclusion—that	  the	  Vietnam	  War-­‐‑era	  draft	  was	  unconstitutional—into	  question.27	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Contributing	  to	  this	  debate,	  George	  E.	  Reedy	  (in	  1969)	  and	  Harry	  A.	  Marmion	  
(in	  1971)	  each	  published	  book-­‐‑length	  studies	  of	  the	  arguments	  against	  the	  AVF.	  	  
Both	  believed	  that	  a	  volunteer	  military	  would	  be	  filled	  with	  poor	  and	  black	  enlisted	  
soldiers,	  while	  more	  well-­‐‑to-­‐‑do,	  white	  young	  men	  escaped	  service.	  	  Cost	  was	  
another	  factor,	  since	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  voluntary	  enlistment	  and	  re-­‐‑enlistment	  was	  
higher	  pay.	  	  Both	  authors	  raised	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  AVF	  would	  be	  much	  more	  
expensive	  than	  its	  backers	  were	  claiming.	  	  Friedman	  replied	  that	  conscription	  
allowed	  the	  country	  to	  unfairly	  shift	  the	  true	  costs	  of	  the	  AVF	  to	  young	  draftees.	  	  
Expense	  aside,	  simple	  justice	  dictated	  that	  soldiers	  should	  be	  paid	  what	  they	  were	  
worth.	  	  Both	  Reedy	  and	  Marmion	  also	  posited	  that	  an	  end	  to	  conscription	  might	  
isolate	  the	  military	  from	  civilian	  society;	  a	  prospect	  that	  Americans	  customarily	  
feared.	  	  Conversely,	  the	  frequent	  turnover	  of	  two-­‐‑year	  draftees	  kept	  the	  military	  
close	  to	  the	  American	  people.	  	  Just	  as	  serious	  was	  the	  possibility	  that	  an	  all-­‐‑
volunteer	  army	  might	  make	  wars	  more	  likely,	  for	  whatever	  its	  weaknesses,	  the	  draft	  
was	  a	  public	  check	  on	  the	  Commander	  in	  Chief's	  use	  of	  the	  military	  in	  wars	  that	  
lacked	  public	  support.	  	  The	  specter	  of	  a	  military	  disloyal	  to	  American	  democracy	  
was	  an	  old	  one	  that	  talk	  of	  professionalization	  raised	  anew.	  
While	  both	  authors	  primarily	  made	  arguments	  against	  the	  AVF,	  they	  also	  
recommended	  alternatives	  of	  their	  own.	  	  Both	  criticized	  aspects	  of	  the	  Selective	  
Service	  System	  as	  it	  existed	  in	  the	  late	  1960s.	  	  Reedy	  thought	  the	  lottery	  least	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susceptible	  to	  corruption	  by	  favoritism	  and	  personal	  connections,	  as	  he	  had	  in	  
1966-­‐‑7	  when	  he	  served	  on	  the	  Marshall	  Commission.	  	  Marmion	  explained	  several	  
alternatives	  to	  the	  draft	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  All-­‐‑Volunteer	  Force:	  	  ending	  deferments	  
and	  instituting	  a	  lottery,	  universal	  military	  training,	  and	  national	  service	  for	  all	  
young	  men	  that	  would	  include	  a	  nonmilitary	  option.	  	  This	  last	  option	  drew	  most	  of	  
his	  attention,	  leaving	  the	  impression	  that	  Marmion	  supported	  national	  service	  even	  
though	  he	  did	  not	  say	  so.	  	  He	  did	  aptly	  note	  that	  Nixon’s	  Gates	  Commission	  only	  
explored	  two	  of	  the	  four	  possible	  alternatives—either	  maintaining	  the	  draft	  or	  
instituting	  the	  AVF.	  	  This	  narrow	  focus	  on	  the	  AVF	  came	  despite	  the	  clear	  preference	  
of	  the	  American	  people.	  	  It	  is	  true,	  as	  shown	  previously,	  that	  when	  given	  the	  choice	  
between	  the	  draft	  and	  AVF	  polls	  showed	  the	  public	  moving	  toward	  support	  for	  the	  
AVF.	  	  But	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  71	  percent	  of	  Americans	  said	  they	  would	  support	  the	  
choice	  of	  a	  civilian	  service	  system	  for	  draftees.28	  
Predictably,	  General	  Hershey	  opposed	  the	  AVF	  and	  made	  his	  sentiments	  
known	  to	  the	  President	  as	  well	  as	  the	  American	  public.	  	  As	  Nixon	  prepared	  his	  
message	  to	  Congress	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1970	  calling	  for	  implementation	  of	  the	  Gates	  
Commission’s	  recommendations,	  Hershey	  sent	  him	  a	  memo	  arguing	  that	  it	  was	  
simply	  not	  realistic	  to	  expect	  a	  military	  motivated	  by	  pay	  alone	  to	  defend	  the	  nation.	  	  
                                                                                                                          
28	  Harry	  A.	  Marmion,	  The	  Case	  Against	  a	  Volunteer	  Army	  (Chicago:	  	  Quadrangle	  Books,	  1971),	  
11-­‐‑20,	  34,	  37-­‐‑41,	  55,	  57-­‐‑59,	  61,	  67-­‐‑72;	  George	  E.	  Reedy,	  Who	  Will	  Do	  Our	  Fighting	  For	  Us?	  (New	  York:	  	  
The	  World	  Publishing	  Company,	  1969),	  51-­‐‑56,	  83-­‐‑87;	  George	  Gallup,	  “71%	  Favor	  Choice	  for	  Draftees,”	  
Washington	  Post,	  July	  5,	  1970.	  	  Polls	  indicate	  that	  the	  American	  people	  would	  have	  supported	  
national	  service	  over	  the	  AVF.	  	  Since	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  did	  not	  give	  them	  that	  choice,	  it	  is	  
impossible	  to	  tell	  how	  deep	  that	  feeling	  was.	  	  But	  clashes	  after	  the	  war	  between	  draft	  dodgers	  and	  
conservative	  Americans,	  discussed	  below,	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  ideal	  of	  national	  service	  resonated	  
with	  many	  Americans.	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Hershey	  correctly	  noted	  that	  the	  AVF	  originated	  as	  an	  appeasement	  of	  those	  who	  
wanted	  to	  avoid	  the	  "obligations	  of	  military	  service.”	  	  He	  then	  pointed	  out	  the	  
contradiction	  between	  Nixon’s	  promise	  and	  what	  he	  saw	  as	  the	  draft's	  inevitable	  
reinstitution	  in	  a	  few	  years	  once	  the	  volunteer	  system	  had	  failed.	  	  Publicly,	  Hershey	  
said	  that	  the	  United	  States	  could	  move	  to	  the	  AVF	  by	  either	  increasing	  the	  prestige	  
of	  military	  service	  or	  discrediting	  those	  who	  did	  not	  serve.	  	  If	  “our	  girls	  .	  .	  .	  [had]	  
nothing	  to	  do”	  with	  a	  young	  man	  unless	  he	  had	  served	  in	  the	  military,	  Hershey	  
reasoned,	  the	  draft	  might	  not	  look	  so	  bad.	  	  Ultimately,	  he	  believed	  that	  an	  all-­‐‑
volunteer	  army	  would	  work	  only	  if	  war	  itself	  became	  obsolete.29	  
The	  U.S.	  armed	  forces'	  relationship	  with	  the	  draft	  during	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  
was	  a	  complicated	  one;	  especially	  in	  the	  Army,	  which	  relied	  on	  conscription	  to	  a	  
much	  greater	  extent	  than	  the	  other	  services,	  although	  the	  percentage	  of	  draftees	  
between	  1965	  and	  1973	  had	  declined	  since	  Korea,	  from	  52	  to	  40	  per	  cent.	  	  However,	  
draftees	  made	  up	  the	  majority	  of	  enlisted	  combat	  troops	  and	  suffered	  most	  of	  the	  
combat	  deaths	  in	  Vietnam.	  	  Once	  the	  war	  started,	  surveys	  showed	  that	  over	  50	  per	  
cent	  of	  volunteers	  were	  “draft	  motivated,”	  meaning	  that	  they	  volunteered	  so	  that	  
they	  could	  have	  greater	  control	  over	  the	  branch	  of	  service	  or	  type	  of	  job	  they	  would	  
perform,	  options	  that	  were	  not	  always	  available	  to	  draftees.	  	  Thus,	  during	  the	  first	  
few	  years	  of	  the	  war,	  many	  in	  the	  armed	  forces	  feared	  that	  abandoning	  the	  draft	  
would	  lead	  to	  a	  greatly	  reduced	  military.	  	  By	  the	  late	  1960s,	  this	  situation	  had	  
                                                                                                                          
29	  Rostker,	  92;	  Lewis	  B.	  Hershey,	  “Memorandum	  to	  the	  President,”	  April	  10,	  1970;	  Robert	  M.	  
Gettemy,	  “Hershey	  Sees	  Firm	  Peace	  as	  Requisite	  for	  Ending	  Draft,”	  Los	  Angeles	  Times,	  February	  8,	  
1969;	  “Hershey	  Unopposed	  to	  Draft	  Alternatives,”	  Hartford	  Courant,	  March	  5,	  1969;	  “Hershey	  Doubts	  
Volunteer	  Army,”	  Hartford	  Courant,	  April	  14,	  1969.	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changed.	  	  General	  Westmoreland,	  who	  had	  left	  MACV	  and	  became	  Chief	  of	  Staff	  of	  
the	  U.S.	  Army	  in	  mid-­‐‑1968,	  began	  planning	  for	  the	  AVF	  in	  September,	  a	  month	  
before	  Nixon’s	  October	  1968	  speech	  in	  which	  he	  called	  for	  a	  volunteer	  army.	  	  
Westmoreland	  recognized	  that	  the	  draft	  might	  end	  but	  insisted	  that	  draft	  authority	  
be	  continued	  as	  a	  hedge	  against	  emergencies,	  a	  position	  that	  was	  known	  as	  the	  
“zero-­‐‑draft”	  goal.	  	  This	  was	  a	  frequent	  target	  of	  AVF	  partisans	  like	  Martin	  Anderson,	  
who	  contended	  that	  “[c]linging	  to	  a	  standby	  draft”	  was	  an	  excuse	  to	  avoid	  fully	  
implementing	  the	  AVF,	  and	  an	  unusually	  transparent	  one	  at	  that.	  
The	  Army’s	  change	  of	  heart	  came	  partly	  from	  a	  recognition	  that	  a	  many	  in	  the	  
American	  public—especially	  the	  young	  people	  from	  whom	  the	  military	  drew	  its	  
recruits—had	  turned	  against	  the	  draft	  by	  the	  late	  1960s.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  
Army	  was	  dealing	  with	  a	  host	  of	  discipline	  problems	  in	  Vietnam.	  	  Colonel	  Robert	  D.	  
Heinl,	  Jr.	  wrote	  in	  1971	  of	  an	  “approaching	  collapse”	  evidenced	  by	  combat	  refusals	  
and	  the	  “fragging”	  of	  unpopular	  officers.	  	  Drug	  use,	  especially	  heroin	  and	  marijuana,	  
was	  widespread,	  producing	  an	  increase	  in	  thefts	  and	  muggings.	  	  There	  were	  144	  
underground	  newspapers	  published	  around	  U.S.	  military	  bases;	  papers	  that	  Heinl	  
regarded	  as	  seditious	  or	  even	  mutinous.	  	  Bemoaning	  the	  lack	  of	  prosecutions	  during	  
the	  Johnson	  and	  Nixon	  administrations	  for	  such	  activities,	  both	  in	  and	  out	  of	  the	  
armed	  forces,	  he	  nevertheless	  doubted	  that	  federal	  judges	  would	  have	  convicted	  in	  
any	  case.	  	  In	  the	  years	  before	  1971,	  Heinl	  charged	  that	  a	  series	  of	  libertarian-­‐‑leaning	  
federal	  court	  decisions	  had	  hastened	  the	  erosion	  of	  military	  discipline.	  	  He	  also	  
highlighted	  racial	  violence,	  which	  he	  blamed	  mostly	  on	  black	  enlistees.	  	  
Skyrocketing	  desertions	  highlighted	  these	  problems	  in	  all	  but	  the	  Navy	  since	  the	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mid-­‐‑1960s,	  reflecting	  the	  challenges	  faced	  in	  contemporary	  civilian	  society.	  	  Many	  in	  
the	  Army,	  including	  Westmoreland,	  believed	  that	  an	  army	  of	  volunteers	  would	  allow	  
the	  leadership	  to	  reestablish	  professionalism.	  	  It	  was	  for	  this	  reason	  that	  the	  Army	  
worked	  to	  implement	  a	  volunteer	  force	  once	  the	  civilian	  leadership	  moved	  in	  that	  
direction.30	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  Flynn,	  The	  Draft,	  171,	  197;	  Robert	  K.	  Griffith,	  Jr.,	  The	  U.S.	  Army’s	  Transition	  to	  the	  All-­‐‑
Volunteer	  Force,	  1968-­‐‑1974	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  	  U.S.	  Government	  Printing	  Office,	  1997),	  17,	  24-­‐‑26;	  
Rostker,	  147-­‐‑48,	  295-­‐‑96;	  Robert	  D.	  Heinl,	  Jr.,	  “The	  Collapse	  of	  the	  Armed	  Forces,”	  Armed	  Forces	  


















The	  United	  States	  finally	  extricated	  itself	  from	  Vietnam	  in	  early	  1973.	  	  Just	  as	  
in	  1968,	  Nixon	  delayed	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war	  until	  after	  the	  1972	  election	  at	  least	  partly	  
for	  political	  reasons.	  	  In	  the	  four	  years	  that	  Nixon	  claimed	  to	  be	  fighting	  for	  an	  
honorable	  peace,	  over	  15,000	  Americans	  and	  perhaps	  1.2	  million	  Vietnamese	  on	  
both	  sides	  had	  died.	  	  The	  United	  States	  turned	  the	  war	  over	  to	  the	  South	  Vietnamese	  
government	  and	  provided	  massive	  amounts	  of	  aid	  to	  help	  them	  fend	  off	  attacks	  from	  
the	  NLF	  and	  NVA.	  	  In	  spite	  of	  this	  aid,	  the	  Communists	  advanced	  on	  Saigon	  in	  1975	  
and	  defeated	  the	  ARVN,	  forcing	  the	  remaining	  Americans	  to	  flee	  Vietnam.31	  
After	  the	  war,	  bureaucrats	  in	  the	  Nixon	  administration,	  conservative	  
members	  of	  Congress,	  and	  libertarian	  intellectuals	  in	  and	  out	  of	  government	  took	  
credit	  for	  ending	  the	  draft.	  	  Milton	  Friedman	  later	  ranked	  it	  as	  one	  of	  his	  proudest	  
accomplishments.	  	  In	  reality,	  it	  was	  the	  antiwar	  protesters	  who	  forced	  Nixon	  to	  act	  
                                                                                                                          
31	  Historian	  Marilyn	  B.	  Young	  documented	  that	  National	  Security	  Advisor	  Henry	  Kissinger	  
thought	  he	  had	  a	  peace	  agreement	  in	  late	  October	  1972	  but	  Vietnamese	  President	  Nguyen	  Van	  Thieu	  
opposed	  the	  agreement	  and	  Nixon’s	  advisors	  believed	  his	  margin	  of	  victory	  in	  1972	  would	  be	  greater	  
if	  the	  United	  States	  postponed	  the	  peace	  until	  after	  the	  election.	  	  This	  strategy	  kept	  the	  divisive	  war	  in	  
play	  as	  a	  motivating	  factor	  for	  Nixon’s	  silent	  majority.	  	  See	  The	  Vietnam	  Wars,	  275-­‐‑80,	  285-­‐‑99.	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by	  creating	  a	  crisis	  that	  forced	  a	  political	  response.	  	  Only	  then	  could	  free	  market	  
economists	  led	  by	  Friedman	  and	  Alan	  Greenspan,	  and	  libertarians	  led	  by	  Ayn	  Rand	  
and	  Murray	  Rothbard	  influence	  Selective	  Service	  reform.	  	  As	  Friedman	  later	  
explained,	  only	  a	  crisis	  could	  have	  spurred	  a	  significant	  shift	  to	  libertarian	  values.	  	  
Notably,	  he	  saw	  no	  need	  to	  consult	  public	  opinion	  or	  operate	  through	  democratic	  
processes	  when	  effecting	  this	  shift.	  	  Journalist	  Naomi	  Klein	  later	  identified	  the	  
instances	  in	  which	  either	  Friedman	  or	  his	  acolytes	  pushed	  free-­‐‑market	  solutions	  
while	  purposely	  ignoring	  majority	  public	  opinion—that	  the	  AVF	  was	  superior	  to	  the	  
selective	  draft,	  but	  that	  universal	  service	  was	  preferable	  to	  both.	  	  This	  opinion	  held	  
until	  well	  after	  the	  AVF	  had	  been	  put	  into	  place.	  	  Klein	  was	  right	  about	  the	  end	  of	  
conscription	  in	  the	  United	  States.32	  
Perhaps	  more	  surprising,	  the	  draft	  remained	  divisive	  even	  after	  the	  United	  
States	  had	  moved	  to	  an	  all-­‐‑volunteer	  army.	  	  As	  America	  came	  to	  grips	  with	  its	  most	  
recent	  losses,	  its	  citizens	  argued	  about	  the	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  young	  men	  
who	  had	  illegally	  avoided	  conscription.	  	  At	  least	  50,000	  draft	  resisters	  who	  had	  fled	  
to	  Canada	  or	  Europe	  during	  the	  war	  became	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  debate	  over	  amnesty.	  	  
Nixon	  himself	  had	  brought	  up	  the	  issue	  during	  the	  1972	  election.	  	  He	  promised	  in	  
January	  of	  that	  year	  that	  there	  would	  be	  none	  as	  long	  as	  North	  Vietnam	  held	  
American	  prisoners.	  	  Then,	  a	  few	  days	  before	  the	  election,	  he	  ruled	  out	  any	  type	  of	  
amnesty	  for	  what	  he	  and	  many	  others	  termed	  “draft	  dodgers.”	  	  In	  a	  speech	  before	  an	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organization	  for	  families	  of	  prisoners	  of	  war	  (POWs),	  the	  president	  stated	  it	  would	  
be	  immoral	  for	  him	  to	  pardon	  draft	  resisters	  with	  thousands	  of	  Americans	  either	  
killed	  in	  action	  or	  prisoners	  of	  North	  Vietnam.	  	  Having	  mollified	  at	  least	  some	  
protesters	  in	  1968	  with	  his	  proposal	  to	  end	  the	  draft,	  he	  now	  worked	  to	  create	  a	  
“New	  Majority”	  of	  conservatives	  using	  the	  amnesty	  issue	  as	  ammunition.	  	  
Meanwhile,	  Democratic	  candidate	  Senator	  George	  McGovern	  of	  South	  Dakota	  
embraced	  amnesty	  for	  those	  who	  opposed	  the	  war	  on	  principle	  when,	  according	  to	  
[WHAT	  SOURCE?]	  only	  20	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  nation	  supported	  this	  stance.	  	  Results	  of	  
the	  1972	  election	  were	  mixed.	  	  Nixon	  soundly	  defeated	  McGovern	  with	  520	  electoral	  
votes	  to	  McGovern’s	  17,	  and	  61	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  popular	  vote,	  but	  saw	  his	  dream	  of	  a	  
conservative	  majority	  vanish.	  	  The	  Democrats	  retained	  sizeable	  majorities	  in	  both	  
houses,	  meaning	  that	  Americans	  had	  voted	  against	  McGovern	  but	  not	  necessarily	  for	  
Nixon’s	  program.	  
Like	  the	  war	  itself,	  amnesty	  split	  Americans	  into	  warring	  camps.	  	  Most	  
conservatives	  strongly	  opposed	  pardons	  or	  amnesty	  for	  draft	  resisters.	  	  This	  was	  
especially	  true	  of	  veterans’	  organizations	  and	  family	  members	  of	  men	  who	  had	  
served	  during	  the	  war.	  	  Liberals	  were	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  resisters’	  argument	  that	  
the	  war	  was	  immoral	  and	  argued	  that	  amnesty	  was	  a	  way	  to	  finally	  end	  the	  war	  at	  
home.	  	  Most	  parents	  of	  draft	  resisters	  hoped	  the	  government	  would	  allow	  their	  sons	  
to	  come	  home,	  although	  there	  is	  evidence	  that	  some	  parents	  effectively	  disowned	  
their	  sons	  for	  active	  draft	  resistance.	  	  Libertarians	  split	  over	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  
conscription	  justified	  fleeing	  the	  country	  to	  avoid	  service.	  	  Ayn	  Rand	  claimed	  she	  did	  
not	  “blame”	  young	  men	  who	  refused	  to	  accept	  conscription	  if	  they	  did	  so	  because	  of	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“genuine	  convictions,”	  but	  they	  still	  would	  have	  to	  accept	  the	  consequences	  of	  their	  
actions.	  	  However,	  she	  criticized	  the	  “bums”	  who	  only	  refused	  to	  fight	  in	  Vietnam	  to	  
advance	  the	  Communist	  cause.	  	  These	  young	  men,	  she	  believed,	  should	  be	  exiled	  to	  
the	  Soviet	  Union	  or	  North	  Vietnam.	  	  In	  contrast,	  Murray	  Rothbard	  supported	  total	  
amnesty	  for	  young	  men	  who	  resisted	  the	  draft	  regardless	  of	  their	  motivations	  and	  
even	  called	  for	  reparations	  to	  be	  paid	  to	  them	  by	  the	  government	  officials	  who	  had	  
sustained	  the	  draft	  during	  the	  war.	  
The	  terms	  of	  various	  amnesty	  proposals	  complicated	  the	  issue	  further.	  	  
Resisters	  and	  their	  families	  trended	  toward	  complete	  and	  unconditional	  amnesty,	  
while	  conservatives	  tried	  to	  block	  any	  form	  of	  forgiveness.	  	  Moderates	  argued	  that	  
resisters	  should	  pay	  some	  type	  of	  penalty—typically	  community	  service—before	  
amnesty	  could	  be	  granted.	  	  President	  Gerald	  Ford	  then	  tangled	  the	  question	  of	  
amnesty	  by	  pardoning	  Nixon	  for	  his	  role	  in	  the	  Watergate	  crimes	  in	  September	  
1974.	  	  Most	  Americans	  were	  outraged	  over	  Nixon’s	  pardon,	  regardless	  of	  their	  
opinion	  on	  amnesty	  for	  draft	  resisters.	  	  The	  commander	  in	  chief	  of	  the	  Veterans	  of	  
Foreign	  Wars	  (VFW)	  argued	  that	  neither	  Nixon	  nor	  the	  draft	  evaders	  should	  be	  
given	  amnesty	  in	  order	  to	  uphold	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  	  Many	  letter	  writers	  contrasted	  
Nixon’s	  behavior,	  which	  one	  called	  “sick	  self-­‐‑centered	  power-­‐‑grabbing	  ambition,”	  
with	  that	  of	  draft	  dodgers,	  asking	  why	  Nixon	  deserved	  a	  pardon	  for	  crimes	  that	  were	  
much	  worse	  while	  resisters	  did	  not.	  
Ironically,	  Ford’s	  work	  on	  Nixon’s	  pardon	  delayed	  his	  action	  on	  amnesty	  for	  
draft	  resisters;	  it	  was	  a	  few	  days	  after	  Nixon’s	  pardon	  that	  Ford	  finally	  announced	  
his	  plan.	  	  He	  called	  it	  "clemency,”	  consciously	  avoiding	  the	  more	  politically	  charged	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synonym.	  	  Draft	  resisters	  could	  now	  have	  charges	  dismissed	  by	  performing	  twenty-­‐‑
four	  months	  of	  community	  service.	  	  But	  President	  Ford	  was	  behind	  the	  curve;	  
resisters	  were	  already	  getting	  better	  deals	  in	  courts	  or	  by	  surrendering	  to	  Army	  
bases	  known	  for	  leniency.	  	  Perhaps	  350,000	  people	  were	  eligible	  for	  Ford’s	  
clemency	  program	  but	  only	  six	  per	  cent	  took	  advantage	  of	  it.	  	  The	  amnesty	  debate	  
continued	  into	  the	  presidential	  election	  of	  1976,	  when	  Democratic	  presidential	  
candidate	  Jimmy	  Carter	  promised	  to	  issue	  “blanket	  pardons”	  to	  draft	  resisters	  
immediately	  upon	  taking	  office.	  	  He	  told	  those	  people	  who	  had	  “defect[ed]”	  to	  return	  
to	  the	  United	  States.	  	  Not	  surprisingly,	  conservatives	  decried	  Carter’s	  pledge;	  less	  
understandable	  was	  his	  decision	  to	  deliver	  it	  at	  a	  VFW	  convention.	  	  General	  
Westmoreland	  responded	  with	  an	  opinion	  piece	  in	  which	  he	  argued	  that	  pardons	  
for	  draft	  resisters	  would	  degrade	  the	  nation’s	  “moral	  fiber”	  as	  well	  as	  weaken	  the	  
American	  military.	  	  The	  plan	  went	  forward	  in	  spite	  of	  conservative	  opposition,	  albeit	  
with	  the	  caveat	  that	  it	  did	  not	  include	  thousands	  of	  veterans	  who	  had	  been	  
discharged	  or	  convicted	  for	  desertion.	  	  Ultimately,	  only	  nine	  per	  cent	  of	  those	  
eligible	  applied	  for	  amnesty	  under	  Carter’s	  plan	  anyway.	  	  By	  the	  late	  1970s,	  enough	  
time	  had	  passed	  that	  many	  resisters	  had	  either	  learned	  to	  cope	  with	  their	  legal	  
disabilities	  or	  come	  to	  regard	  application	  process	  as	  a	  bigger	  hassle.	  	  As	  for	  the	  
thousands	  of	  young	  men	  who	  had	  fled	  the	  country,	  some	  returned,	  but	  others	  had	  
established	  lives	  and	  elected	  to	  remain	  elsewhere.33	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Several	  times	  in	  the	  forty	  years	  since	  the	  All-­‐‑Volunteer	  Force's	  1973	  
inception,	  U.S.	  presidents	  have	  raised	  the	  conscription	  issue.	  	  In	  response	  to	  the	  
Soviet	  invasion	  of	  Afghanistan	  in	  1979,	  President	  Carter	  successfully	  supported	  
legislation	  to	  renew	  registrations—but	  not	  inductions—with	  the	  Selective	  Service.	  	  
Republican	  nominee	  Ronald	  Reagan	  criticized	  Carter’s	  actions	  but	  continued	  
registration	  once	  in	  office.	  	  Reagan’s	  massive	  defense	  buildup	  allowed	  the	  military	  to	  
increase	  pay,	  while	  the	  economic	  recession	  of	  the	  early	  1980s	  made	  military	  service	  
attractive	  to	  a	  greater	  number	  of	  young	  men.	  	  The	  combination	  of	  these	  factors	  may	  
have	  saved	  the	  AVF,	  which	  Eliot	  Cohen	  still	  called	  “fragile”	  in	  1985.	  	  During	  the	  
Persian	  Gulf	  War	  of	  1990-­‐‑1991	  some	  commentators	  argued	  that	  the	  United	  States	  
might	  need	  to	  return	  to	  the	  draft	  because	  minorities	  were	  overrepresented	  in,	  and	  
upper	  classes	  absent	  from,	  the	  AVF.	  	  Similarly,	  as	  the	  Iraq	  War	  spiraled	  out	  of	  
control	  in	  the	  mid-­‐‑2000s,	  some	  Americans	  believed	  that	  President	  George	  W.	  Bush	  
might	  reinstitute	  the	  draft	  to	  fight	  the	  so-­‐‑called	  “War	  on	  Terror.”	  	  The	  anemic	  
recruitment	  numbers	  at	  the	  height	  of	  the	  war	  increased	  this	  fear	  and	  led	  to	  the	  
Army’s	  “stop-­‐‑loss”	  policy	  in	  2004,	  in	  which	  thousands	  soldiers	  who	  were	  about	  to	  be	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  war	  and	  conscription.	  	  	  
Cortright,	  David.	  	  Soldiers	  in	  Revolt:	  	  The	  American	  Military	  Today.	  	  Garden	  City,	  NY:	  	  
Anchor	  Press,	  1975.	  	  	  
Written	  immediately	  after	  Vietnam	  and	  the	  imposition	  of	  the	  all-­‐‑volunteer	  
army.	  	  Demonstrates	  the	  corrosive	  effect	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  on	  soldier	  morale	  
fighting	  effectiveness.	  	  	  
Davis	  Jr.,	  James	  W.,	  and	  Kenneth	  M.	  Dolbeare.	  	  Little	  Groups	  of	  Neighbors:	  	  The	  
Selective	  Service	  System.	  	  Chicago:	  	  Markham	  Publishing	  Company,	  1968.	  	  	  
A	  critical	  examination	  of	  the	  draft	  during	  the	  war.	  	  The	  authors	  examine	  the	  
operation	  of	  the	  draft	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  how	  Selective	  Service	  chose	  young	  men	  to	  
serve.	  	  Useful	  for	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  draft	  written	  as	  it	  continued	  to	  operate	  and	  
send	  men	  to	  Vietnam.	  	  	  
Ehrlichman,	  John.	  	  Witness	  to	  Power:	  	  The	  Nixon	  Years.	  	  New	  York:	  	  Simon	  and	  
Schuster,	  1982.	  	  	  
Ehrlichman	  was	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  advisors	  and	  confidantes	  to	  Nixon	  
during	  his	  presidency.	  	  Ehrlichman	  focues	  mostly	  on	  domestic	  affairs,	  and	  his	  
account,	  written	  after	  Watergate,	  contains	  some	  self-­‐‑justification,	  but	  useful	  as	  a	  
primary	  source	  for	  what	  happened	  in	  the	  Nixon	  White	  House	  in	  many	  important	  
areas.	  	  	  
Eisenhower,	  Dwight	  D.	  	  Public	  Papers	  of	  the	  Presidents	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  Dwight	  D.	  
Eisenhower,	  1956:	  	  Containing	  the	  Public	  Messages,	  Speeches,	  and	  Statements	  
of	  the	  President,	  January	  1	  to	  December	  31,	  1956.	  	  Washington,	  D.C.:	  	  Office	  of	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the	  Federal	  Register,	  National	  Archives	  and	  Records	  Service,	  General	  Services	  
Administration,	  U.S.	  Government	  Printing	  Office,	  1958.	  
Compilation	  of	  Eisenhower’s	  speeches	  and	  statements	  from	  1956.	  	  Used	  for	  a	  
statement	  in	  opposition	  to	  Adlai	  Stevenson’s	  1956	  proposal	  to	  end	  the	  draft.	  	  	  
Falk,	  Richard	  A.	  	  The	  Vietnam	  War	  and	  International	  Law.	  	  3	  vols.	  	  Princeton:	  	  
Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1969-­‐‑1972.	  	  	  
A	  collection	  of	  evaluations	  of	  the	  legality	  of	  the	  Vietnam	  War,	  collected	  by	  a	  
critic	  of	  the	  war.	  	  Important	  for	  evaluating	  the	  claims	  made	  by	  draft	  resisters	  
regarding	  the	  illegality	  and	  of	  the	  war	  according	  to	  international	  law	  and	  the	  United	  
States	  Constitution.	  	  	  
Ferber,	  Michael,	  and	  Staughton	  Lynd.	  	  The	  Resistance.	  	  Boston:	  	  Beacon	  Press,	  1971.	  	  
An	  account	  of	  the	  draft	  resistance	  movement	  called	  the	  Resistance	  from	  an	  
extremely	  sympathetic	  point	  of	  view,	  written	  by	  veterans	  of	  the	  New	  Left.	  	  Useful	  for	  
the	  accounts	  of	  draft	  resisters	  and	  justifications	  for	  draft	  resistance.	  	  	  
Friedman,	  Milton.	  	  Capitalism	  and	  Freedom.	  	  Chicago:	  	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  
2002.	  	  	  
Friedman	  first	  published	  this	  book	  in	  1962	  in	  which	  he	  laid	  out	  his	  economic	  
ideas.	  	  Useful	  to	  show	  how	  Friedman’s	  belief	  in	  free	  market	  capitalism	  helped	  
influence	  his	  arguments	  about	  the	  draft	  and	  the	  “tax”	  on	  conscripts.	  	  	  
Friedman,	  Milton.	  	  “The	  Case	  for	  Abolishing	  the	  Draft	  –	  and	  Substituting	  for	  It	  an	  All-­‐‑
Volunteer	  Army,”	  New	  York	  Times	  Magazine,	  May	  14,	  1967,	  23,	  114-­‐‑119.	  	  	  
One	  of	  the	  many	  articles	  Friedman	  wrote	  against	  the	  draft	  in	  the	  name	  of	  
freedom,	  as	  defined	  from	  Friedman’s	  libertarian	  perspective.	  	  
Friedman,	  Milton	  and	  Rose	  D.	  Friedman.	  	  Two	  Lucky	  People:	  	  Memoirs.	  	  Chicago:	  	  
University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1999.	  
Friedman	  published	  his	  memoirs	  with	  his	  wife	  a	  few	  years	  before	  his	  death.	  	  
Used	  as	  the	  source	  of	  his	  recollections	  about	  ending	  the	  draft.	  	  	  
Fulbright,	  J.	  William.	  	  The	  Arrogance	  of	  Power.	  	  New	  York:	  	  Vintage	  Books,	  1966.	  	  	  
Senator	  Fulbright’s	  attack	  on	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  early	  on,	  during	  the	  Johnson	  
administration,	  after	  hearings	  held	  by	  Fulbright	  in	  the	  Senate.	  	  Important	  for	  
demonstrating	  doubts	  about	  the	  justification	  of	  the	  war	  at	  the	  highest	  levels,	  well	  
before	  1968.	  	  	  
Haldeman,	  H.	  R.	  	  The	  Haldeman	  Diaries:	  	  Inside	  the	  Nixon	  White	  House.	  	  New	  York:	  	  
Berkley	  Book,	  1994.	  
134  
  
Haldeman	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  a	  key	  advisor	  to	  Nixon	  during	  most	  of	  his	  presidency,	  and	  
therefore	  provides	  an	  insider’s	  account	  of	  the	  actions	  Nixon	  took	  while	  president.	  	  
He	  wrote	  it	  during	  his	  service,	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  according	  to	  Stephen	  Ambrose	  he	  sanitized	  
it	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  publication.	  	  	  	  
Heath,	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  Louis,	  ed.	  	  Mutiny	  Does	  Not	  Happen	  Lightly:	  	  The	  Literature	  of	  the	  American	  
Resistance	  to	  the	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  War.	  	  Metuchen,	  NJ:	  	  The	  Scarecrow	  Press,	  1976.	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  a	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  of	  antiwar	  literature	  from	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  
era.	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  for	  showing	  the	  arguments	  made	  against	  the	  war,	  and	  in	  many	  cases	  
against	  the	  draft	  itself	  as	  well.	  	  	  
Heinl,	  Robert	  D.,	  Jr.	  	  “The	  Collapse	  of	  the	  Armed	  Forces.”	  	  Armed	  Forces	  Journal	  (June	  
7,	  1971),	  pages	  30-­‐‑37.	  
Heinl	  was	  a	  colonel	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Army.	  	  He	  witnessed	  and	  documented	  the	  
many	  problems	  the	  Vietnam-­‐‑era	  army	  faced.	  	  Used	  to	  show	  that	  an	  army	  based	  on	  
conscription	  waging	  an	  unpopular	  and	  very	  difficult	  war	  was	  literally	  falling	  apart.	  	  
The	  Army	  sought	  to	  use	  the	  AVF	  to	  rebuild	  itself.	  	  	  
Herring,	  George	  C.,	  ed.	  	  The	  Pentagon	  Papers,	  Abridged	  Edition.	  	  New	  York:	  	  McGraw	  
Hill,	  Inc.,	  1993.	  	  	  
Herring’s	  version	  of	  the	  Pentagon	  Papers	  in	  abridged	  format.	  	  Useful	  to	  show	  
one	  of	  several	  reasons	  for	  disillusionment	  with	  the	  war,	  and	  by	  extension	  the	  draft,	  
when	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  and	  other	  news	  outlets	  published	  them	  in	  1971.	  	  	  
Just,	  Ward.	  	  Reporting	  Vietnam:	  	  American	  Journalism,	  1959-­‐‑1975.	  	  New	  York:	  	  The	  
Library	  of	  America,	  2000.	  	  	  
Contains	  a	  compilation	  of	  news	  reporting	  on	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  from	  the	  
period	  when	  under	  1,000	  advisors	  were	  in	  the	  country	  to	  1975,	  when	  Saigon	  fell	  to	  
the	  communists.	  	  Useful	  for	  the	  possible	  influence	  of	  news	  reporting	  on	  public	  
opinion	  at	  home.	  	  	  
Kalb,	  Deborah,	  Gerhard	  Peters,	  and,	  John	  T.	  Wolley,	  eds.	  	  State	  of	  the	  Union:	  	  
Presidential	  Rhetoric	  from	  Woodrow	  Wilson	  to	  George	  W.	  Bush.	  	  Washington,	  
D.C.:	  	  CQ	  Press,	  2007.	  
Compilation	  of	  state	  of	  the	  union	  and	  inaugural	  addresses	  for	  presidents	  over	  
the	  last	  100	  years.	  	  Used	  for	  Roosevelt’s	  final	  state	  of	  the	  union	  in	  1945	  when	  he	  
called	  for	  UMT.	  	  	  
Kissinger,	  Henry.	  	  White	  House	  Years.	  	  Boston:	  	  Little,	  Brown	  and	  Company,	  1979.	  	  	  
Kissinger’s	  account	  of	  his	  time	  as	  National	  Security	  Advisor	  and	  Secretary	  of	  
State	  for	  Nixon.	  	  Ambrose	  has	  noted	  that	  Kissinger’s	  account	  is	  extremely	  self-­‐‑
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serving,	  but	  still	  useful	  as	  an	  account	  of	  the	  many	  decisions	  Nixon	  made	  during	  the	  
war.	  	  	  
McNamara,	  Robert	  S.	  with	  Brian	  VanDeMark.	  	  In	  Retrospect:	  	  The	  Tragedy	  and	  
Lessons	  of	  Vietnam.	  	  New	  York:	  	  Random	  House,	  1995.	  	  	  
McNamara’s	  account	  of	  the	  mistakes	  made	  in	  the	  Johnson	  administration	  that	  
got	  the	  US	  into	  the	  Vietnam	  War,	  from	  a	  strong	  defender	  of	  the	  war	  who	  turned	  
against	  it	  by	  late	  1967.	  	  	  
Marmion,	  Harry	  A.	  	  The	  Case	  Against	  a	  Volunteer	  Army.	  	  Chicago:	  	  Quadrangle	  Books,	  
1971.	  	  	  
An	  argument	  against	  the	  AVF	  as	  it	  the	  Nixon	  administration	  implemented	  it.	  	  
Marmion	  was	  a	  college	  president	  during	  this	  time.	  	  This	  was	  his	  direct	  response	  to	  
proponents	  of	  the	  AVF.	  	  It	  is	  useful	  for	  the	  perspective	  of	  a	  traditionalist	  who	  
believed	  young	  men	  had	  a	  duty	  to	  the	  country	  as	  well	  as	  someone	  who	  feared	  the	  
AVF	  might	  become	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  country.	  	  	  
Marshall,	  George	  C.	  	  “The	  Obligation	  to	  Serve.”	  	  Army	  Information	  Digest	  Vol.	  6	  No.	  4	  
(April	  1951).	  
Marshall	  provides	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  traditional	  conservatives	  who	  believed	  
that	  Americans	  owed	  service	  to	  their	  country.	  	  Strong	  argument	  against	  libertarian	  
arguments	  against	  UMT	  and	  conscription	  by	  an	  important	  public	  figure.	  	  	  
Melman,	  Seymour,	  ed.	  	  In	  the	  Name	  of	  America.	  	  Annandale,	  VA:	  	  The	  Turnprike	  
Press,	  1968.	  	  	  
A	  critical	  look	  at	  alleged	  US	  war	  crimes	  in	  Vietnam,	  by	  a	  strident	  critic	  of	  the	  
war.	  	  Useful	  for	  justifications	  for	  resisting	  the	  draft	  based	  on	  the	  claimed	  illegality	  of	  
the	  war.	  	  	  
Mises,	  Ludwig	  von.	  	  Human	  Action:	  	  A	  Treatise	  on	  Economics,	  4th	  ed.	  	  San	  Francisco:	  	  
Fox	  &	  Wilkes,	  1996.	  	  	  
Mises	  was	  an	  Austrian	  economist	  who	  laid	  the	  foundation	  of	  free-­‐‑market	  
economics	  and	  limited	  government	  intervention	  with	  this	  work.	  	  Mises	  focused	  on	  
economics,	  but	  also	  explained	  how	  government	  intervention	  in	  the	  economy	  caused	  
war	  between	  nations,	  wars	  which	  made	  evils	  like	  conscription	  necessary.	  	  	  
New	  Individualist	  Review.	  	  April	  1961	  to	  Winter	  1968.	  	  	  
This	  was	  a	  libertarian	  magazine	  published	  in	  the	  1960s.	  	  The	  entire	  Spring	  
1967	  issue	  was	  devoted	  to	  various	  essays	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  draft.	  	  Useful	  for	  
libertarian	  ideology	  in	  general	  as	  well	  as	  these	  specific	  essays	  regarding	  
conscription.	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  Richard.	  	  The	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  of	  Richard	  Nixon.	  	  2	  vols.	  	  New	  York:	  	  Warner	  Books,	  
1978.	  	  	  
Although	  written	  after	  the	  war	  and	  after	  Nixon’s	  resignation,	  Nixon	  gives	  his	  
account	  of	  the	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  of	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Nixon,	  Richard.	  	  No	  More	  Vietnams.	  	  New	  York:	  	  Arbor	  House	  Publishing	  Company,	  
1985.	  	  	  
Nixon’s	  biased	  but	  important	  analysis	  about	  what	  went	  wrong	  in	  Vietnam,	  
including	  a	  defense	  of	  how	  the	  US	  essentially	  would	  have	  won	  the	  war	  if	  not	  for	  a	  
weak-­‐‑kneed	  Congress.	  	  	  
O’Sullivan,	  John,	  and	  Alan	  M.	  Meckler,	  eds.	  	  The	  Draft	  and	  Its	  Enemies:	  	  A	  
Documentary	  History.	  	  Urbana:	  	  University	  of	  Illinois	  Press,	  1974.	  	  
Includes	  primary	  source	  documents	  from	  sources	  opposed	  to	  conscription	  in	  
the	  United	  States	  over	  the	  country’s	  history,	  including	  during	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	  	  
Useful	  for	  those	  documents	  specifically	  related	  to	  the	  war,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  
demonstration	  of	  the	  long	  history	  of	  anti-­‐‑conscription	  thought	  and	  action	  in	  the	  
United	  States.	  	  	  
Opitz,	  Edmund	  A.,	  ed.	  	  Leviathan	  At	  War.	  	  Irvington-­‐‑on-­‐‑Hudson,	  New	  York:	  	  
Foundation	  for	  Economic	  Education,	  Inc.,	  1995.	  	  	  
Brings	  together	  important	  libertarian	  essays	  on	  libertarianism,	  conscription,	  
and	  war.	  	  Used	  for	  Leonard	  Read’s	  essay	  in	  which	  he	  argues	  that	  the	  Korean	  War	  
amounted	  to	  state-­‐‑sanctioned	  murder	  by	  the	  U.S.	  government.	  	  Only	  defense	  made	  
violence	  permissible.	  	  	  
Paterson,	  Isabel.	  	  The	  God	  of	  the	  Machine.	  	  New	  Brunswick,	  New	  Jersey:	  	  Transaction	  
Publishers,	  2009.	  	  	  
Paterson	  wrote	  this	  book	  during	  World	  War	  II.	  	  	  She	  claimed	  to	  have	  
investigated	  societies	  throughout	  history	  and	  used	  her	  interpretations	  of	  them	  to	  
argue	  that	  nations	  with	  freedom	  at	  their	  foundation	  were	  more	  stable	  and	  stronger	  
than	  authoritarian	  ones.	  	  She	  went	  in	  to	  her	  study	  of	  past	  civilizations	  with	  an	  
ideological	  bent,	  and	  her	  understanding	  of	  them	  is	  suspect.	  	  	  	  
Porter,	  Gareth,	  ed.	  	  Vietnam:	  	  A	  History	  in	  Documents.	  	  New	  York:	  	  Meridian,	  1981.	  	  	  
A	  large	  collection	  of	  primary	  source	  documents	  on	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  from	  
both	  sides	  of	  the	  conflict.	  	  Useful	  for	  documents	  on	  how	  both	  sides	  fought	  the	  war	  
and	  the	  enemy	  viewed	  the	  United	  States.	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President’s	  Commission	  on	  the	  All-­‐‑Volunteer	  Armed	  Force.	  	  The	  Report	  of	  the	  
President’s	  Commission	  on	  an	  All-­‐‑Volunteer	  Armed	  Force.	  	  Washington,	  DC:	  	  
U.S.	  Government	  Printing	  Office,	  1970.	  	  	  
The	  report	  of	  the	  Gates	  Commission,	  which	  argued	  for	  an	  all-­‐‑volunteer	  force	  
to	  replace	  conscription.	  	  Dominated	  by	  economists	  but	  influenced	  Nixon	  to	  abandon	  
the	  draft	  and	  try	  the	  experiment	  of	  voluntarism.	  	  	  
Ramparts	  Magazine.	  	  May	  1,	  1962	  to	  August	  1,	  1975.	  	  	  	  
This	  magazine	  was	  an	  outlet	  for	  left	  wing	  and	  anti-­‐‑Vietnam	  writers	  in	  the	  late	  
1960s	  and	  early	  1970s.	  	  Useful	  for	  its	  publication	  of	  documents	  on	  the	  Selective	  
Service	  System	  as	  well	  as	  articles	  by	  libertarians	  like	  Murray	  N.	  Rothbard,	  
demonstrating	  the	  common	  cause	  the	  two	  groups	  found	  over	  Vietnam	  and	  the	  draft.	  	  	  
Rand,	  Ayn.	  	  Capitalism:	  	  The	  Unknown	  Ideal.	  	  New	  York:	  	  Penguin	  Group,	  1967.	  	  	  
Rand	  explains	  her	  philosophy	  on	  free	  market	  capitalism.	  	  Most	  importantly,	  
she	  explains	  how	  government	  encroachment	  into	  the	  market	  economy	  leads	  to	  war,	  
why	  she	  opposed	  the	  Vietnam	  War,	  and	  why	  she	  opposed	  the	  draft.	  	  	  
George	  E.	  Reedy.	  	  Who	  Will	  Do	  Our	  Fighting	  For	  Us?	  	  New	  York:	  	  The	  World	  
Publishing	  Company,	  1969.	  
Reedy	  served	  on	  the	  Marshall	  Commission	  and	  had	  previously	  worked	  as	  
Lyndon	  Johnson’s	  press	  secretary.	  	  This	  book	  raised	  the	  fears	  that	  the	  AVF	  would	  
separate	  itself	  from	  American	  society	  and	  become	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  nation.	  	  Reedy	  
pushed	  for	  a	  lottery,	  which	  was	  the	  same	  recommendation	  the	  Marshall	  Commission	  
had	  made.	  	  	  
Rothbard,	  Murray	  N.	  	  Left	  and	  Right:	  	  The	  Complete	  Edition.	  	  Auburn,	  Alabama:	  	  
Ludwig	  von	  Mises	  Institute,	  2007.	  	  	  
Left	  and	  Right	  was	  a	  magazine	  published	  in	  from	  1965	  to	  1968	  in	  which	  
Rothbard	  and	  other	  libertarian	  authors	  wrote.	  	  Important	  articles	  were	  written	  on	  
the	  war,	  the	  draft,	  and	  the	  split	  between	  libertarians	  and	  conservatives.	  	  	  
Schell,	  Jonathan.	  	  The	  Real	  War:	  	  The	  Classic	  Reporting	  on	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	  	  Boston:	  	  
Da	  Capo	  Press,	  1988.	  	  	  
A	  reprint	  of	  reporting	  done	  by	  Schell,	  an	  opponent	  of	  the	  war,	  written	  during	  
the	  war,	  including	  firsthand	  accounts	  of	  the	  devastating	  effects	  of	  US	  actions	  on	  the	  
ground	  and	  from	  the	  air.	  	  Important	  for	  the	  probable	  effects	  of	  this	  reporting	  on	  
those	  choosing	  whether	  and	  how	  to	  resist	  conscription	  while	  the	  United	  States	  still	  
waged	  the	  war.	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Schlissel,	  Lillian,	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  Conscience	  in	  America:	  	  A	  Documentary	  History	  of	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Objection	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  America,	  1757-­‐‑1967.	  	  New	  York:	  	  E.	  P.	  Dutton	  &	  Co.,	  1968.	  	  	  
An	  edited	  history	  of	  documents	  related	  to	  conscientious	  objection,	  placing	  
this	  form	  of	  resistance	  to	  war	  in	  historical	  perspective.	  	  Written	  during	  the	  Vietnam	  
War,	  so	  obviously	  influenced	  by	  that	  war.	  	  Useful	  for	  placing	  this	  form	  of	  resistance	  
in	  historical	  context.	  	  	  
Sevy,	  Grace,	  ed.	  	  The	  American	  Experience	  in	  Vietnam:	  	  A	  Reader.	  	  Norman:	  	  
University	  of	  Oklahoma	  Press,	  1989.	  	  
Sevy	  compiles	  primary	  sources	  on	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	  	  Used	  specifically	  for	  
James	  Fallows	  essay,	  “What	  Did	  You	  Do	  in	  the	  Class	  War,	  Daddy?,”	  in	  which	  Fallows	  
shared	  his	  perception	  of	  the	  class	  inequities	  of	  the	  draft.	  	  	  
Spooner,	  Lysander.	  	  A	  Letter	  to	  Grover	  Cleveland,	  on	  His	  False	  Inaugural	  Address,	  the	  
Usurpations	  and	  Crimes	  of	  Lawmakers	  and	  Judges,	  and	  the	  Consequent	  Poverty,	  
Ignorance,	  and	  Servitude	  of	  the	  People.	  	  Boston:	  	  Benj.	  R.	  Tucker,	  Publisher,	  
1886.	  	  	  
Spooner,	  Lysander.	  	  No	  Treason.	  	  No.	  1.	  	  Boston,	  1867.	  
Spooner,	  Lysander.	  	  The	  Unconstitutionality	  of	  Slavery:	  	  Including	  Parts	  First	  and	  
Second.	  	  Boston:	  	  Bela	  Marsh,	  1847.	  	  	  
Spooner	  was	  an	  abolitionist	  and	  later	  libertarian	  thinker.	  	  He	  linked	  the	  
compulsion	  of	  slavery	  to	  most	  other	  government	  compulsion,	  including	  
conscription.	  	  In	  these	  essays,	  he	  laid	  out	  his	  thinking	  on	  the	  draft.	  	  Since	  it	  was	  a	  
violation	  of	  man’s	  natural	  rights,	  it	  was	  void.	  	  	  
Stone,	  I.	  F.	  	  In	  a	  Time	  of	  Torment,	  1961-­‐‑1967.	  	  Boston:	  	  Little,	  Brown	  and	  Company,	  
1967.	  	  	  
Collection	  of	  articles	  written	  by	  alternative	  journalist	  I.	  F.	  Stone	  during	  the	  
buildup	  of	  Vietnam.	  	  Useful	  for	  the	  critiques	  of	  US	  policy	  in	  that	  country	  and	  possible	  
effects	  of	  this	  reporting	  on	  Stone’s	  readers.	  	  	  
Stone,	  I.	  F.	  	  Polemics	  and	  Prophecies,	  1967-­‐‑1970.	  	  Boston:	  	  Little,	  Brown	  and	  
Company,	  1970.	  	  	  
Collection	  of	  articles	  written	  by	  alternative	  journalist	  I.	  F.	  Stone	  during	  the	  
height	  and	  beginning	  of	  the	  Vietnamization	  phase	  of	  the	  war.	  	  Useful	  for	  the	  
critiques	  of	  US	  policy	  in	  that	  country	  and	  possible	  effects	  of	  this	  reporting	  on	  Stone’s	  
readers.	  	  	  
Suri,	  Jeremi	  Suri.	  	  American	  Foreign	  Relations	  Since	  1898.	  	  Malden,	  MA:	  	  Wiley-­‐‑
Blackwell	  Publishing,	  2010.	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Suri	  provides	  a	  good	  compilation	  of	  documents	  on	  US	  foreign	  policy	  over	  the	  
last	  100	  years.	  	  Used	  specifically	  for	  documents	  related	  to	  US-­‐‑Soviet	  relations	  after	  
the	  Cold	  War.	  	  	  
Robert	  A.	  Taft.	  	  A	  Foreign	  Policy	  for	  Americans.	  	  Garden	  City,	  New	  York:	  	  Doubleday	  &	  
Company,	  1951.	  	  
Taft	  laid	  out	  his	  vision	  for	  a	  foreign	  policy	  centered	  on	  the	  legislative	  branch	  
and	  one	  that	  kept	  America’s	  interests	  first.	  	  He	  was	  in	  favor	  of	  fighting	  communism,	  
but	  he	  thought	  that	  fight	  was	  to	  be	  through	  ideological	  and	  economic	  warfare	  more	  
than	  military	  war.	  	  This	  is	  a	  useful	  statement	  of	  how	  his	  views	  fit	  into	  postwar	  
military	  issues	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  UMT	  and	  the	  draft.	  	  	  
Tax,	  Sol.	  	  The	  Draft:	  	  A	  Handbook	  of	  Facts	  and	  Alternatives.	  	  Chicago:	  	  The	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of	  Chicago	  Press,	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Wide-­‐‑ranging	  collection	  of	  papers	  on	  the	  draft	  and	  a	  transcript	  of	  a	  
discussion	  on	  the	  draft	  held	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Chicago	  in	  late	  1966.	  	  Useful	  for	  the	  
wide	  variety	  of	  perspectives	  on	  the	  draft,	  focusing	  primary	  on	  reasons	  the	  United	  
States	  should	  end	  the	  draft,	  although	  General	  Hershey	  and	  other	  pro-­‐‑draft	  writers	  
did	  submit	  essays.	  	  	  
Taylor,	  Telford.	  	  Nuremberg	  and	  Vietnam:	  	  An	  American	  Tragedy.	  	  New	  York:	  	  The	  
New	  York	  Times	  Company,	  1970.	  	  	  
Taylor	  was	  a	  prosecutor	  of	  Nazi	  war	  criminals	  during	  the	  Nuremberg	  Trials.	  	  
In	  the	  book	  Taylor	  uses	  the	  principles	  established	  at	  Nuremberg	  to	  evaluate	  US	  
conduct	  of	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	  	  Taylor	  views	  much	  of	  the	  evidence	  of	  US	  war	  crimes	  in	  
Vietnam	  as	  ambiguous,	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  the	  legal	  standing	  of	  objectors	  to	  the	  war	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  tenuous.	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  Not	  to	  Fight:	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  Objectors	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  War	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  Washington,	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  Brassey’s,	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  of	  interviews	  with	  conscientious	  objectors	  compiled	  well	  after	  the	  
war	  had	  ended.	  	  Reveals	  their	  efforts	  to	  resist	  service	  in	  the	  war	  and	  their	  
justifications	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Johnson’s	  “Marshall	  Commission”	  which	  examined	  the	  draft	  in	  1967.	  	  Ended	  
with	  this	  report	  after	  months	  of	  study,	  which	  recommended	  against	  the	  AVF	  but	  
recommended	  a	  lottery	  and	  elimination	  of	  deferments.	  	  The	  Johnson	  administration	  
ignored	  the	  commission’s	  recommendations	  in	  1967,	  leading	  to	  the	  continuation	  of	  
dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  draft.	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U.S.	  President’s	  Advisory	  Commission	  on	  Universal	  Training.	  	  A	  Program	  for	  
National	  Security:	  	  Report	  of	  the	  President’s	  Advisory	  Commission	  on	  Universal	  
Training.	  	  Washington,	  D.C.:	  	  United	  States	  Government	  Printing	  Office,	  1947.	  
The	  report	  of	  Truman’s	  commission	  on	  UMT	  issued	  in	  1947.	  	  Used	  for	  the	  
detailed	  examination	  of	  UMT	  and	  replies	  to	  various	  arguments	  that	  opponents	  
would	  likely	  make	  against	  it.	  	  	  
U.S.	  Senate.	  	  Universal	  Military	  Training:	  	  Hearings	  Before	  the	  Committee	  on	  Armed	  
Services,	  United	  States	  Senate,	  80th	  Cong.,	  2nd	  sess.,	  March	  23,	  1948.	  	  
Washington,	  D.C.,	  U.S.	  Government	  Printing	  Office,	  1948.	  
The	  Senate	  held	  hearings	  on	  UMT	  in	  1948.	  	  This	  is	  a	  compilation	  of	  the	  
testimony	  given	  during	  the	  hearings.	  	  Useful	  for	  the	  pro	  and	  con	  positions	  taken	  by	  
the	  various	  witnesses,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  interaction	  between	  the	  witnesses	  and	  
Senators.	  	  	  
Walton,	  George.	  	  Let’s	  End	  the	  Draft	  Mess:	  	  A	  Proposal	  for	  a	  Fair	  System	  of	  Universal	  
Service	  for	  All.	  	  New	  York:	  	  David	  McKay	  Company,	  1967.	  	  	  
This	  is	  Walton’s	  argument	  for	  universal	  service,	  which	  would	  answer	  a	  major	  
criticism	  of	  the	  draft,	  namely	  that	  it	  operated	  in	  an	  unfair	  manner,	  since	  all	  would	  
serve.	  	  
Weaver,	  Richard	  M.	  	  Ideas	  Have	  Consequences.	  	  Chicago:	  	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  
1948.	  	  	  
Weaver,	  Richard	  M.	  	  Visions	  of	  Order:	  	  The	  Cultural	  Crisis	  of	  Our	  Time.	  	  Baton	  Rouge:	  	  
Louisiana	  State	  University	  Press,	  1964.	  
Weaver’s	  books	  celebrated	  traditional,	  non-­‐‑materialist	  societies,	  especially	  
the	  antebellum	  South.	  	  He	  studied	  during	  World	  War	  II	  and	  worked	  after	  the	  war	  as	  
a	  professor	  of	  English,	  and	  his	  work	  was	  a	  reaction	  against	  the	  destructive	  forces	  
unleashed	  by	  industrialism	  during	  the	  war.	  	  He	  upheld	  tradition,	  honor,	  and	  duty,	  
but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  criticized	  the	  mass	  armies	  made	  possible	  by	  modern	  society.	  	  
Both	  sides	  of	  the	  conscription	  debate	  could	  find	  aspects	  of	  his	  philosophy	  that	  
supported	  their	  views.	  	  	  
Benjamin	  F.	  Wright,	  ed.	  	  The	  Federalist:	  	  The	  Famous	  Papers	  on	  the	  Principles	  of	  
American	  Government.	  	  New	  York:	  	  Barnes	  &	  Noble	  Books,	  2004.	  
Conservatives	  see	  these	  85	  essays	  as	  authoritative	  interpretations	  of	  the	  
Constitution.	  	  Since	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  Constitution’s	  “army	  clause”	  was	  a	  point	  of	  
contention	  over	  the	  entire	  course	  of	  the	  conscription	  debate.	  	  	  
Wunderlin,	  Clarence	  E.,	  ed.	  	  The	  Papers	  of	  Robert	  A.	  Taft,	  Volume	  3,	  1945-­‐‑1948.	  	  Kent,	  
Ohio:	  	  Kent	  State	  University	  Press,	  2003.	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Compilation	  of	  the	  papers	  of	  Senator	  Taft.	  	  Useful	  for	  his	  views	  on	  foreign	  





Amar,	  Akhil	  Reed.	  	  America’s	  Constitution:	  	  A	  Biography.	  	  New	  York:	  	  Random	  House,	  
2005.	  	  	  
Amar	  is	  a	  noted	  constitutional	  scholar	  and	  provides	  an	  authoritative	  
interpretation	  of	  important	  clauses,	  especially	  the	  “Army	  Clause.”	  	  He	  opens	  up	  to	  
the	  possibility	  of	  conscription	  in	  this	  work,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  1998	  book	  on	  the	  Bill	  
of	  Rights.	  	  	  
-­‐‑-­‐‑-­‐‑-­‐‑-­‐‑.	  	  The	  Bill	  of	  Rights:	  	  Creation	  and	  Reconstruction.	  	  New	  Haven:	  	  Yale	  University	  
Press,	  1998.	  	  	  
A	  clear	  exposition	  of	  the	  Bill	  of	  Rights	  as	  originally	  understood	  by	  the	  
Founders,	  and	  as	  modified	  by	  the	  14th	  Amendment.	  	  Useful	  for	  the	  original	  
understanding	  of	  the	  term	  “militia.”	  	  Amar	  doubts	  that	  conscription	  was	  
constitutional,	  even	  after	  the	  Fourteenth	  Amendment.	  	  	  	  	  
Ambrose,	  Stephen	  E.	  	  Nixon:	  	  The	  Education	  of	  a	  Politician,	  1913-­‐‑1962.	  	  New	  York:	  	  
Simon	  and	  Schuster,	  1987.	  	  	  
-­‐‑-­‐‑-­‐‑-­‐‑-­‐‑.	  	  Nixon:	  	  Ruin	  and	  Recovery,	  1973-­‐‑1990.	  	  New	  York:	  	  Touchstone,	  1991.	  	  	  
-­‐‑-­‐‑-­‐‑-­‐‑-­‐‑.	  	  Nixon:	  	  The	  Triumph	  of	  a	  Politician,	  1962-­‐‑1972.	  	  New	  York:	  Simon	  and	  Schuster,	  
1989.	  	  	  
Definitive	  biography	  of	  Nixon,	  covering	  his	  time	  as	  Vice	  President,	  wilderness	  
years,	  presidency,	  and	  downfall.	  	  I’ll	  use	  this	  to	  get	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  Nixon	  
presidency;	  his	  decisions	  on	  the	  draft,	  Vietnam,	  and	  wage	  and	  price	  controls;	  and	  
the	  move	  to	  the	  all-­‐‑volunteer	  force.	  	  
Anderson,	  Terry	  H.	  	  The	  Movement	  and	  the	  Sixties:	  	  Protest	  in	  America	  From	  
Greensboro	  to	  Wounded	  Knee.	  	  New	  York:	  	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1995.	  	  	  
Overview	  of	  the	  “sixties”	  –	  from	  the	  early	  1960s	  to	  early	  1970s.	  	  Includes	  
information	  on	  anti-­‐‑draft	  and	  anti-­‐‑Vietnam	  protests.	  	  Generally	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  
protest	  movement.	  	  	  
-­‐‑-­‐‑-­‐‑-­‐‑-­‐‑.	  	  The	  Pursuit	  of	  Fairness:	  	  A	  History	  of	  Affirmative	  Action.	  	  New	  York:	  	  Oxford	  
University	  Press,	  2004.	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Anderson’s	  account	  of	  affirmative	  action,	  including	  its	  roots.	  	  Useful	  to	  show	  
Nixon’s	  “liberal”	  or	  statist	  streak,	  undertaken	  for	  political	  gain	  not	  out	  of	  principle,	  
but	  done	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  wishes	  of	  his	  conservative	  constituents.	  	  	  	  
Appy,	  Christian	  G.	  	  Working-­‐‑Class	  War:	  	  American	  Combat	  Soldiers	  and	  Vietnam.	  	  
Chapel	  Hill:	  	  University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  Press,	  1993.	  	  	  
Appy	  argues	  that	  the	  draft	  during	  Selective	  Service	  carried	  out	  the	  draft	  in	  a	  
discriminatory	  manner	  during	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	  	  Flynn	  argues	  against	  this	  notion.	  	  
What	  is	  most	  useful	  to	  me	  is	  the	  perception	  during	  Vietnam	  that	  the	  government	  
administered	  the	  draft	  in	  a	  biased	  manner,	  whether	  it	  actually	  was	  or	  not.	  	  
Bailey,	  Beth.	  	  America’s	  Army:	  	  Making	  the	  All-­‐‑Volunteer	  Force.	  	  Cambridge:	  	  Belknap	  
Press,	  2009.	  	  
Bailey	  outlines	  the	  origins,	  steps,	  and	  challenges	  of	  the	  all-­‐‑volunteer	  force.	  	  
Useful	  overall	  for	  the	  primary	  sources	  she	  cites	  and	  the	  clear	  account	  of	  what	  
occurred,	  including	  a	  critical	  stance	  taken	  regarding	  the	  free-­‐‑market	  and	  libertarian	  
arguments	  put	  forward	  by	  Friedman	  and	  some	  sympathy	  for	  the	  situation	  that	  the	  
AVF	  put	  the	  Army	  in.	  	  	  
Baskir,	  Lawrence	  M.,	  and	  William	  A.	  Strauss.	  	  Chance	  and	  Circumstance:	  	  The	  Draft,	  
the	  War	  and	  the	  Vietnam	  Generation.	  	  New	  York:	  	  Vintage	  Books,	  1978.	  	  	  
Authors	  served	  on	  Gerald	  Ford’s	  board	  established	  to	  decide	  whether	  and	  
how	  to	  grant	  clemency	  to	  those	  who	  resisted	  the	  draft.	  	  They	  argue	  that	  low-­‐‑income	  
white	  males	  were	  the	  most	  likely	  to	  serve	  because	  the	  upper	  class	  and	  lower	  classes	  
escaped	  service	  (college	  and	  other	  deferments,	  and	  unable	  to	  meet	  qualification).	  	  
Useful	  for	  the	  detailed	  explanation	  of	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  draft	  during	  Vietnam,	  with	  
a	  wealth	  of	  statistics.	  	  Note	  that	  Flynn	  takes	  issue	  with	  some	  of	  these	  conclusions,	  
however.	  	  	  
Burns,	  Jennifer.	  	  Goddess	  of	  the	  Market:	  	  Ayn	  Rand	  and	  the	  American	  Right.	  	  New	  
York:	  	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2009.	  	  	  
An	  examination	  of	  Ayn	  Rand’s	  life	  and	  thought,	  as	  well	  as	  her	  influence	  on	  the	  
conservative	  movement	  after	  World	  War	  II.	  	  	  Important	  for	  understanding	  Rand’s	  
Objectivist	  philosophy	  and	  support	  for	  laissez-­‐‑faire,	  as	  well	  as	  her	  thoughts	  on	  the	  
military,	  war,	  and	  conscription.	  	  	  
Berkowitz,	  Edward	  D.	  	  Something	  Happened:	  	  A	  Political	  and	  Cultural	  Overview	  of	  the	  
Seventies.	  	  New	  York:	  	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  2006.	  
An	  overview	  of	  the	  decade	  of	  the	  1970s.	  	  Useful	  primarily	  for	  the	  context	  of	  
the	  end	  of	  the	  war.	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Bilton,	  Michael,	  and	  Kevin	  Sim.	  	  Four	  Hours	  in	  My	  Lai.	  	  New	  York:	  	  Penguin	  Books,	  
1992.	  	  	  
An	  account	  of	  the	  My	  Lai	  Massacre.	  	  Useful	  for	  the	  impact	  of	  this	  horrific	  act	  
on	  US	  public	  opinion	  on	  the	  war	  and	  the	  draft.	  	  	  
Branch,	  Taylor.	  	  Parting	  the	  Waters:	  	  America	  in	  the	  King	  Years,	  1954-­‐‑63.	  	  New	  York:	  	  
Simon	  and	  Schuster,	  1988.	  	  	  
Standard	  overview	  of	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  movement	  in	  the	  1960s.	  	  Used	  to	  show	  
the	  reaction	  in	  the	  white	  South	  to	  the	  success	  of	  the	  movement	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  
conservatism/Republicanism	  in	  the	  South	  after	  1968.	  	  	  
Buzzanco,	  Robert.	  	  Masters	  of	  War:	  	  Military	  Dissent	  and	  Politics	  in	  the	  Vietnam	  Era.	  	  
Cambridge:	  	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1996.	  	  	  
An	  analysis	  of	  military-­‐‑civilian	  relations	  during	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	  	  Most	  
important	  for	  me	  in	  Buzzanco’s	  argument	  that	  the	  military	  leadership	  itself	  had	  
significant	  doubts	  about	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  US	  to	  win	  the	  war	  at	  acceptable	  cost.	  	  	  
Capozzola,	  Christopher.	  	  Uncle	  Sam	  Wants	  You:	  	  World	  War	  I	  and	  the	  Making	  of	  the	  
Modern	  American	  Citizen.	  	  New	  York:	  	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2008.	  
Account	  of	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  federal	  government’s	  power	  during	  World	  War	  I.	  	  
Specifically	  documents	  the	  dual	  nature	  of	  conscription,	  from	  voluntarism	  at	  the	  
beginning	  of	  the	  war	  to	  compulsion	  and	  protest	  at	  the	  end.	  	  	  
Caro,	  Robert	  A.	  	  The	  Years	  of	  Lyndon	  Johnson:	  	  Master	  of	  the	  Senate.	  	  Toronto:	  	  
Vintage	  Books,	  2003).	  
Caro	  gives	  a	  comprehensive	  account	  of	  debates	  in	  Congress	  before	  World	  
War	  II.	  	  Used	  for	  information	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  war	  in	  Vietnam	  from	  someone	  very	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  
communist	  victory	  there.	  	  Useful	  for	  the	  arguments	  made	  by	  the	  extreme	  left	  wing	  of	  
radical	  protesters	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	  	  	  
Krepinevich,	  Jr.,	  Andrew	  F.	  	  The	  Army	  and	  Vietnam.	  	  Baltimore:	  	  Johns	  Hopkins	  
University	  Press,	  1986.	  	  	  
Krepinevich	  argues	  that	  the	  US	  fought	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  in	  a	  conventional	  
manner,	  instead	  of	  using	  the	  techniques	  of	  counterinsurgency.	  	  Useful	  for	  
understanding	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  war	  was	  fought	  and	  possible	  problems	  with	  the	  
overall	  American	  strategy.	  	  	  
Kyvig,	  David	  E.	  	  The	  Age	  of	  Impeachment:	  	  American	  Constitutional	  Culture	  Since	  
1960.	  	  Lawrence,	  KS:	  	  University	  Press	  of	  Kansas,	  2008.	  	  	  
An	  overview	  of	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  use	  of	  impeachment	  by	  the	  opposition	  party.	  	  
Useful	  for	  placing	  the	  illegal	  actions	  and	  resignation	  of	  Nixon	  in	  context	  of	  the	  larger	  
use	  of	  impeachment.	  	  	  
Lesher,	  Stephan.	  	  George	  Wallace:	  	  American	  Populist.	  	  Cambridge,	  Massachusetts:	  	  
Perseus	  Publishing,	  1994.	  	  	  
Biography	  of	  George	  Wallace	  by	  a	  journalist.	  	  Important	  to	  understand	  
Wallace’s	  appeal	  to	  many	  in	  the	  white	  working	  class	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	  into	  the	  
1970s.	  	  Also	  notable	  for	  his	  differences	  with	  the	  libertarian	  right	  and	  defense	  of	  
traditionalism.	  	  	  
Levin,	  Matthew.	  	  Cold	  War	  University:	  	  Madison	  and	  the	  New	  Left	  in	  the	  Sixties.	  	  
Madison:	  	  The	  University	  of	  Wisconsin	  Press,	  2013.	  
Levin	  discusses	  the	  linkage	  of	  the	  federal	  government	  and	  universities	  
(focusing	  on	  the	  University	  of	  Wisconsin	  at	  Madison)	  during	  the	  Cold	  War.	  	  He	  
discusses	  the	  protests	  during	  the	  1960s	  that	  this	  linkage	  gave	  rise	  to.	  	  Useful	  for	  the	  
Cold	  War	  setting	  on	  universities	  as	  well	  as	  understanding	  one	  aspect	  of	  the	  way	  the	  
Cold	  War	  affected	  Americans	  at	  home.	  	  	  
Lind,	  Michael.	  	  Vietnam:	  	  The	  Necessary	  War:	  	  A	  Reinterpretation	  of	  America’s	  Most	  
Disastrous	  Military	  Conflict.	  	  New	  York:	  	  Touchstone,	  1999.	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An	  argument,	  from	  30	  years	  hindsight,	  that	  US	  motivations	  and	  goals	  were	  
correct	  in	  Vietnam.	  	  Useful	  for	  evaluating	  the	  actions	  of	  antiwar	  protesters	  and	  draft	  
resisters.	  	  	  
Little,	  Roger	  W.,	  ed.	  	  Selective	  Service	  and	  American	  Society.	  	  Hartford,	  CT:	  	  
Connecticut	  Printers,	  Inc.,	  1969.	  
Collection	  of	  statements	  on	  the	  draft	  from	  the	  period.	  	  Used	  for	  examination	  
of	  the	  membership	  of	  draft	  boards	  and	  how	  representative	  they	  were.	  	  
Logevall,	  Fredrik.	  	  Choosing	  War:	  	  The	  Lost	  Chance	  for	  Peace	  and	  the	  Escalation	  of	  
War	  in	  Vietnam.	  	  Berkeley:	  	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1999.	  	  	  
Logevall	  argues	  that	  the	  Johnson	  Administration	  purposely	  avoided	  
opportunities	  to	  achieve	  peace	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Vietnam	  from	  late	  
1963	  to	  early	  1965.	  	  Aids	  in	  evaluation	  of	  the	  charges	  made	  by	  opponents	  of	  the	  war	  
regarding	  US	  motives	  in	  Vietnam.	  	  	  
Lowen,	  Rebecca	  S.	  	  Creating	  the	  Cold	  War	  University:	  	  The	  Transformation	  of	  
Stanford.	  	  Berkeley:	  	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1997.	  
Lowen	  links	  the	  universities	  and	  the	  “military-­‐‑industrial	  complex.”	  	  She	  
shows	  how	  universities	  sought	  out	  support	  from	  the	  military	  to	  expand	  funding.	  	  
Important	  to	  show	  the	  symbiotic	  relationship	  between	  the	  universities,	  the	  military,	  
and	  defense	  contractors.	  	  	  
Macleod,	  Jenny,	  ed.	  	  Defeat	  and	  Memory:	  	  Cultural	  Histories	  of	  Military	  Defeat	  in	  the	  
Modern	  Era.	  	  New	  York:	  	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2008.	  	  	  
Macleod	  complied	  essays	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  defeat	  on	  cultures.	  	  Used	  for	  
explanation	  of	  the	  “stab-­‐‑in-­‐‑the-­‐‑back”	  myth	  popular	  among	  conservatives	  after	  
Vietnam,	  similar	  to	  the	  same	  legend	  in	  Germany	  after	  its	  loss	  in	  World	  War	  I.	  	  	  
Mahnken,	  Thomas	  G.	  	  Technology	  and	  the	  American	  Way	  of	  War	  Since	  1945.	  	  New	  
York:	  	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  2008.	  
Discussion	  of	  the	  use	  of	  technology	  and	  the	  U.S.	  military.	  	  Used	  specifically	  for	  
an	  explanation	  of	  early	  thinking	  on	  atomic	  weapons	  and	  their	  relationship	  to	  
manpower	  policies	  during	  the	  early	  Cold	  War.	  	  	  
Matusow,	  Allen	  J.	  	  The	  Unraveling	  of	  America:	  	  A	  History	  of	  Liberalism	  in	  the	  1960s.	  	  
New	  York:	  	  Harper	  &	  Row,	  1984.	  	  	  
Matusow	  charts	  the	  rise	  and	  fall	  of	  liberalism	  during	  the	  1960s,	  from	  its	  
origins	  under	  Kennedy	  to	  the	  election	  of	  1968	  and	  rise	  of	  Nixon.	  	  Useful	  for	  the	  
accounts	  of	  the	  activities	  of	  protesters	  against	  the	  war	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  division	  
over	  the	  war	  on	  the	  Democrats.	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McAllister,	  Ted	  V.	  	  Revolt	  Against	  Modernity:	  	  Leo	  Strauss,	  Eric	  Voegelin,	  and	  the	  
Search	  for	  a	  Postliberal	  Order.	  	  Lawrence:	  	  University	  Press	  of	  Kansas,	  1996.	  
Explanation	  and	  comparison	  of	  two	  traditionalist	  conservative	  philosophers.	  	  
Used	  specifically	  for	  definitions	  and	  comparison	  between	  traditional	  and	  libertarian	  
conservatives.	  	  	  
McCormick,	  Thomas	  J.	  	  America’s	  Half-­‐‑Century:	  	  United	  States	  Foreign	  Policy	  in	  the	  
Cold	  War.	  	  Baltimore:	  	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Press,	  1989.	  	  
McCormick	  focuses	  on	  economic	  causes	  for	  the	  break	  between	  the	  US	  and	  
USSR	  after	  World	  War	  II.	  	  Useful	  for	  an	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  that	  interprets	  
the	  rift	  as	  something	  more	  than	  just	  ideology.	  	  	  
McPherson,	  James.	  	  Battle	  Cry	  of	  Freedom:	  	  The	  Civil	  War	  Era.	  	  New	  York:	  	  Oxford	  
University	  Press,	  1988.	  
Standard	  account	  of	  the	  Civil	  War	  era.	  	  Important	  for	  discussion	  of	  the	  draft	  
during	  the	  Civil	  War,	  as	  well	  as	  Lincoln’s	  defense	  of	  it	  and	  Roger	  Taney’s	  attack	  on	  
the	  draft’s	  constitutionality.	  	  	  
Mettler,	  Suzanne.	  	  Soldiers	  to	  Citizens:	  	  The	  G.I.	  Bill	  and	  the	  Making	  of	  the	  Greatest	  
Generation.	  	  New	  York:	  	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2005.	  	  	  
Mettler	  discussed	  the	  manning	  of	  the	  army	  during	  World	  War	  II	  and	  the	  
return	  of	  the	  soldiers.	  	  Discusses	  the	  GI	  Bill	  and	  its	  effect	  on	  the	  lives	  of	  returning	  
soldiers.	  	  	  
Miller,	  James.	  	  Democracy	  Is	  in	  the	  Streets:	  	  From	  Port	  Huron	  to	  the	  Siege	  of	  Chicago.	  	  
Cambridge,	  MA:	  	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1994.	  	  	  
A	  study	  of	  the	  New	  Left	  movements	  during	  the	  1960s,	  including	  the	  protests	  
led	  against	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  and	  in	  protest	  against	  conscription.	  	  Useful	  for	  the	  
account	  of	  these	  movements.	  	  	  	  
Miscamble,	  Wilson	  D.	  	  George	  F.	  Kennan	  and	  the	  Making	  of	  American	  Foreign	  Policy,	  
1947-­‐‑1950.	  	  Princeton,	  NJ:	  	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1992.	  
Discussion	  of	  early	  Cold	  War	  foreign	  policy	  in	  the	  Truman	  administration	  
and	  the	  influence	  that	  George	  Kennan	  in	  the	  State	  Department	  had.	  	  Useful	  for	  the	  
discussion	  of	  the	  fear	  of	  Soviet	  expansion	  and	  Containment	  policy,	  and	  the	  effects	  
these	  had	  on	  U.S.	  manpower	  policies	  during	  the	  early	  Cold	  War.	  	  	  
Moser,	  Richard.	  	  The	  New	  Winter	  Soldiers:	  	  GI	  and	  Veteran	  Dissent	  During	  the	  Vietnam	  
Era.	  	  New	  Brunswick,	  NJ:	  	  Rutgers	  University	  Press,	  1996.	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An	  account	  of	  antiwar	  protests	  carried	  out	  by	  Vietnam	  veterans	  during	  the	  
war.	  	  Useful	  to	  place	  in	  context	  the	  actions	  of	  other	  antiwar	  protesters	  and	  draft	  
resisters,	  and	  for	  the	  arguments	  made	  by	  these	  veterans	  against	  the	  war	  and	  draft.	  	  	  
Moyer,	  Mark.	  	  Triumph	  Forsaken:	  	  The	  Vietnam	  War,	  1954-­‐‑1965.	  	  New	  York:	  	  
Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2009.	  	  	  
Moyer	  provides	  a	  spirited	  defense	  of	  US	  aims	  in	  the	  Vietnam	  War,	  and	  pins	  
the	  blame	  for	  failure	  on	  Diem’s	  assassination	  in	  1963	  and	  the	  reporters	  of	  the	  time	  
who	  supposedly	  refused	  to	  tell	  the	  truth	  about	  Diem’s	  successes	  in	  South	  Vietnam.	  	  
Useful	  as	  a	  counterpoint	  to	  standard	  histories	  of	  the	  war	  and	  informative	  regarding	  
conservative	  views	  of	  US	  war	  aims.	  	  	  
Nash,	  George	  H.	  	  The	  Conservative	  Intellectual	  Movement	  in	  America	  Since	  1945.	  	  
Wilmington,	  Delaware:	  	  Intercollegiate	  Studies	  Institute,	  1996.	  
Nash	  provides	  an	  important	  account	  of	  the	  rise	  of	  conservatism	  after	  World	  
War	  II.	  	  Concentrates	  on	  traditional	  as	  well	  as	  libertarian	  conservatives.	  	  
Foundational	  for	  understanding	  conservatism,	  including	  participants’	  views	  on	  
Vietnam	  and	  conscription.	  	  	  
Neely	  Jr.,	  Mark	  E.	  	  Lincoln	  and	  the	  Triumph	  of	  the	  Nation:	  	  Constitutional	  Conflict	  in	  
the	  American	  Civil	  War.	  	  Chapel	  Hill:	  	  University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  Press,	  
2011.	  
Important	  discussion	  of	  the	  challenges	  that	  the	  Civil	  War	  posed	  to	  the	  
Constitution.	  	  Specifically	  used	  for	  the	  information	  on	  the	  draft,	  Justice	  Taney’s	  
opposition	  and	  Lincoln’s	  defense,	  and	  Lincoln’s	  suspension	  of	  habeas	  corpus	  to	  block	  
state	  judges	  from	  releasing	  conscripted	  soldiers.	  	  	  
Ojserkis,	  Raymond	  P.	  	  Beginnings	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  Arms	  Race:	  	  The	  Truman	  
Administration	  and	  the	  U.S.	  Arms	  Build-­‐‑Up.	  	  Westport,	  CT:	  	  Praeger	  Publishers,	  
2003.	  
The	  author	  provides	  a	  study	  of	  the	  change	  in	  policy	  that	  Truman	  undertook	  
to	  build	  up	  American	  arms	  to	  face	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  over	  the	  long	  term.	  	  Nuclear	  
weapons,	  worldwide	  bases,	  and	  conscription	  were	  all	  part	  of	  this	  strategy.	  	  Used	  for	  
discussion	  of	  how	  the	  draft	  fit	  into	  Truman’s	  larger	  plan	  for	  the	  Cold	  War.	  	  	  
Olson,	  Keith	  W.	  	  Watergate:	  	  The	  Presidential	  Scandal	  That	  Shook	  America.	  	  
Lawrence,	  KS:	  	  University	  Press	  of	  Kansas,	  2003.	  	  	  
An	  overview	  of	  the	  Watergate	  scandal.	  	  Useful	  for	  the	  context	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  Britain,	  and	  
the	  United	  States	  from	  World	  War	  II	  through	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  (for	  the	  United	  
States).	  	  Useful	  for	  Flynn’s	  comparison	  of	  these	  issues	  in	  the	  context	  of	  other	  
western	  nations.	  	  	  
Freeman,	  Joshua	  B.	  	  “Hardhats:	  	  Construction	  Workers,	  Manliness,	  and	  the	  1970	  Pro-­‐‑
War	  Demonstrations.”	  Journal	  of	  Social	  History	  26,	  no.	  4	  (Summer	  1993):	  	  
725-­‐‑44.	  	  	  
An	  account	  of	  the	  hard-­‐‑hat	  riots	  of	  1970.	  	  Important	  for	  the	  definition	  of	  
traditional	  conservatism	  typified	  by	  the	  riot.	  	  	  	  
Garnier,	  Maurice	  A.	  	  “Some	  Implications	  of	  the	  British	  Experience	  with	  an	  All-­‐‑
Volunteer	  Army.”	  The	  Pacific	  Sociological	  Review	  16,	  no.	  2,	  Military	  Sociology	  
(April	  1973):	  	  177-­‐‑91.	  	  	  
An	  examination	  of	  the	  British	  move	  to	  an	  all-­‐‑volunteer	  army	  and	  lessons	  that	  
the	  United	  States	  would	  want	  to	  take	  from	  this	  experience.	  	  	  
Gartner,	  Scott	  Sigmund,	  and	  Gary	  M.	  Segura.	  	  “Race,	  Casualties,	  and	  Opinion	  in	  the	  
Vietnam	  War.”	  The	  Journal	  of	  Politics	  62,	  no.	  1	  (February	  2000):	  	  115-­‐‑46.	  	  	  
The	  authors	  examine	  how	  the	  perception	  that	  blacks	  and	  the	  poor	  suffered	  
disproportionate	  casualties	  in	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  affected	  public	  views	  of	  the	  war,	  
whether	  or	  not	  these	  perceptions	  were	  actually	  accurate.	  	  	  
Graham,	  Hugh	  Davis.	  	  “The	  Ambiguous	  Legacy	  of	  American	  Presidential	  
Commissions.”	  The	  Public	  Historian	  7,	  no.	  2	  (Spring	  1985):	  	  5-­‐‑25.	  	  	  
An	  examination	  of	  American	  presidential	  commissions.	  	  Useful	  for	  placing	  in	  
context	  Nixon’s	  commission	  on	  the	  draft.	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Hagan,	  John,	  and	  Ilene	  N.	  Bernstein.	  	  “Conflict	  in	  Context:	  	  The	  Sanctioning	  of	  Draft	  
Resisters,	  1963-­‐‑1976.”	  Social	  Problems	  27,	  no.	  1	  (October	  1979):	  	  109-­‐‑22.	  	  	  
An	  examination	  of	  the	  punishments	  meted	  out	  to	  draft	  resisters	  over	  the	  
course	  of	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	  	  Useful	  for	  understanding	  how	  society	  viewed	  draft	  
resisters	  based	  on	  these	  punishments.	  	  	  
Henderson,	  David	  R.	  	  “The	  Role	  of	  Economists	  in	  Ending	  the	  Draft.”	  Econ	  Journal	  
Watch	  2,	  no.	  2	  (2005):	  	  362-­‐‑76.	  	  
Highlights	  the	  importance	  of	  economists	  and	  free-­‐‑market	  economic	  theories	  
in	  ending	  the	  draft.	  	  Important	  to	  show	  the	  narrow	  range	  of	  arguments	  considered	  
by	  officials	  actually	  involved	  in	  bringing	  about	  the	  all-­‐‑volunteer	  military.	  	  	  
Hero,	  Alfred	  O.,	  Jr.	  	  “Negroes	  and	  US	  Foreign	  Policy:	  	  1937-­‐‑1967.”	  The	  Journal	  of	  
Conflict	  Resolution	  13,	  no.	  2	  (June	  1969):	  	  220-­‐‑51.	  	  	  
A	  study	  of	  the	  involvement	  of	  blacks	  and	  US	  foreign	  policy	  over	  the	  course	  of	  
World	  War	  II	  and	  the	  Cold	  War,	  including	  part	  of	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	  	  Important	  for	  
understanding	  how	  blacks	  served	  in	  recent	  US	  wars	  to	  judge	  how	  discrimination	  
affected	  their	  service.	  	  	  
Hummel,	  Jeffrey	  Rogers.	  	  “The	  America	  Militia	  and	  the	  Origin	  of	  Conscription:	  	  A	  
Reassessment.”	  Journal	  of	  Libertarian	  Studies	  15,	  no.	  4	  (Fall	  2001):	  	  29-­‐‑77.	  	  	  
A	  libertarian	  attack	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  Americans	  did	  not	  have	  conscription	  in	  
the	  United	  States	  until	  the	  Civil	  War.	  	  In	  reality,	  the	  author	  argues,	  the	  militia	  system	  
amounted	  to	  conscription	  and	  the	  government	  did	  use	  it	  in	  all	  wars	  prior	  to	  the	  Civil	  
War	  except	  for	  the	  Mexican	  War.	  	  Useful	  to	  show	  that	  compulsory	  service	  was	  an	  
important	  part	  of	  the	  Constitution,	  although	  at	  the	  state	  level	  instead	  of	  national	  
level.	  	  	  
Janowitz,	  Morris.	  	  “The	  All-­‐‑Volunteer	  Military	  as	  a	  ‘Sociopolitical’	  Problem.”	  Social	  
Problems22,	  no.	  3	  (February	  1975):	  	  432-­‐‑449.	  	  	  
Janowitz	  argues	  that	  the	  all-­‐‑volunteer	  army	  endangers	  civilian	  control	  of	  the	  
military	  and	  represents	  a	  cleavage	  between	  civilian	  and	  military	  society,	  both	  
dangerous	  side	  effects	  for	  American	  democracy.	  	  A	  useful	  counterpoint	  to	  the	  
arguments	  of	  the	  Gates	  Commission.	  	  	  
-­‐‑-­‐‑-­‐‑-­‐‑-­‐‑.	  	  “The	  Social	  Demography	  of	  the	  All-­‐‑Volunteer	  Armed	  Force.”	  Annals	  of	  the	  
American	  Academy	  of	  Political	  and	  Social	  Science	  406	  (March	  1973):	  	  86-­‐‑93.	  	  	  
Almost	  concurrent	  with	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  all-­‐‑volunteer	  force,	  
Janowitz	  wrote	  this	  essay,	  arguing	  that	  the	  composition	  of	  military	  personnel	  would	  
change	  in	  significant	  ways	  because	  of	  the	  end	  of	  conscription.	  	  Useful	  as	  a	  
counterpoint	  to	  the	  arguments	  made	  by	  the	  Gates	  Commission.	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Kennedy,	  David	  M.	  	  “The	  Wages	  of	  a	  Mercenary	  Army:	  	  Issues	  of	  Civil-­‐‑Military	  
Relations.”	  Bulletin	  of	  the	  American	  Academy	  of	  Arts	  and	  Sciences	  59,	  no.	  3	  
(Spring	  2006):	  	  12-­‐‑16.	  	  	  
Critic	  of	  the	  all-­‐‑volunteer	  army	  of	  Stanford	  University,	  in	  a	  speech	  responding	  
to	  the	  Iraq	  War	  and	  calling	  attention	  to	  the	  impact	  of	  a	  “mercenary”	  army	  on	  
American	  society,	  which	  had	  been	  studiously	  ignored	  by	  the	  Gates	  Commission.	  	  	  	  
Kolodziej,	  Edward	  A.	  	  “Congress	  and	  Foreign	  Policy:	  	  The	  Nixon	  Years.”	  Proceedings	  
of	  the	  Academy	  of	  Political	  Science	  32,	  no.	  1	  (1975):	  	  167-­‐‑79.	  	  	  
An	  account	  of	  Congress’s	  foreign	  policy	  decisions	  made	  during	  the	  Nixon	  
presidency.	  	  Useful	  for	  placing	  the	  Nixon/Congress	  decision	  to	  end	  the	  draft	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  larger	  foreign	  policy	  concerns	  and	  decisions.	  	  	  
Lacy,	  James	  L.	  	  “Military	  Manpower:	  	  The	  American	  Experience	  and	  the	  Enduring	  
Debate.”	  In	  Towards	  a	  Consensus	  on	  Military	  Service:	  	  Report	  of	  the	  Atlantic	  
Council’s	  Working	  Group	  on	  Military	  Service,	  edited	  by	  Andrew	  J.	  Goodpaster,	  
Lloyd	  H.	  Elliott,	  and	  J.	  Allan	  Hovey	  Jr.,	  20-­‐‑51.	  	  New	  York:	  	  Pergamon	  Press,	  
1982.	  
Lacy	  gives	  an	  overview	  of	  US	  military	  manpower	  policies	  throughout	  
American	  history.	  	  Useful	  for	  comparisons	  of	  different	  times	  and	  policies	  and	  
arguments	  for	  and	  against	  each.	  	  	  
Laird,	  Melvin	  R.	  	  “A	  Strong	  Start	  in	  a	  Difficult	  Decade:	  	  Defense	  Policy	  in	  the	  Nixon-­‐‑
Ford	  Years.”	  International	  Security	  10,	  no.	  2	  (Fall	  1985):	  	  5-­‐‑26.	  	  	  
A	  brief	  account	  of	  US	  foreign	  policy	  in	  the	  Nixon/Ford	  years,	  by	  Nixon’s	  
secretary	  of	  defense.	  	  Useful	  for	  placing	  the	  all-­‐‑volunteer	  military	  in	  the	  context	  of	  
the	  demands	  placed	  on	  it	  in	  the	  immediate	  aftermath	  of	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	  	  	  
Lock-­‐‑Pullan,	  Richard.	  	  “‘An	  Inward	  Looking	  Time’:	  	  The	  United	  States	  Army,	  1973-­‐‑
1976.”	  The	  Journal	  of	  Military	  History	  67,	  no.	  2	  (April	  2003):	  	  483-­‐‑511.	  	  	  
An	  account	  of	  the	  post-­‐‑Vietnam,	  post-­‐‑draft	  US	  Army,	  as	  it	  tried	  to	  rebuild	  
itself	  after	  the	  war	  and	  carry	  out	  the	  country’s	  directive	  that	  ended	  the	  draft.	  	  Useful	  
for	  demonstration	  of	  the	  immediate	  effects	  of	  the	  end	  of	  conscription.	  	  	  
Murray,	  Paul	  T.	  	  “Blacks	  and	  the	  Draft:	  	  A	  History	  of	  Institutional	  Racism.”	  Journal	  of	  
Black	  Studies	  2,	  no.	  1	  (September	  1971):	  	  57-­‐‑76.	  	  	  
Murray	  examines	  the	  drafting	  of	  blacks	  during	  World	  War	  I,	  World	  War	  II,	  
and	  the	  postwar	  era.	  	  He	  argues	  that	  the	  selective	  service	  system	  and	  the	  military	  
exhibited	  clear	  racism	  in	  its	  treatment	  of	  blacks.	  	  While	  these	  conclusions	  have	  been	  
disputed,	  especially	  by	  George	  Q.	  Flynn,	  this	  essay	  is	  important	  as	  an	  exposition	  of	  
the	  understanding	  of	  the	  draft	  during	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	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Peterson,	  Mark	  J.	  	  “Protest	  Politics,	  the	  Media,	  and	  Public	  and	  Elite	  Opinion	  During	  
the	  Vietnam	  War.”	  	  PhD	  diss.,	  Indiana	  University,	  1994.	  
Discussion	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  protests	  on	  elites’	  discussion	  of	  the	  war	  and	  
subsequent	  influence	  on	  public	  opinion.	  	  Public	  opinion	  then	  influenced	  the	  
handling	  of	  the	  war.	  	  Used	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  influence	  that	  mass	  protests	  had	  over	  
the	  course	  of	  the	  war.	  	  	  
Reichley,	  A.	  James.	  	  “The	  Conservative	  Roots	  of	  the	  Nixon,	  Ford,	  and	  Reagan	  
Administrations.”	  Political	  Science	  Quarterly	  96,	  no.	  4	  (Winter	  1981-­‐‑1982):	  	  
537-­‐‑50.	  	  	  
Reichley	  outlines	  the	  conservatism	  of	  the	  Nixon,	  Ford,	  and	  Regan	  
administrations.	  	  Important	  for	  the	  definition	  of	  conservatism	  and	  highlighting	  
specifically	  of	  Nixon’s	  conservative	  policies	  as	  president.	  	  	  
Ribuffo,	  Leo	  P.	  	  “Why	  is	  There	  so	  Much	  Conservatism	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Why	  
Do	  So	  Few	  Historians	  Know	  Anything	  about	  It.”	  The	  American	  Historical	  
Review	  99,	  no.	  2	  (April	  1994):	  	  438-­‐‑49.	  	  	  
An	  argument	  that	  historians	  for	  the	  most	  part	  misunderstand	  conservatism	  
and	  a	  call	  for	  a	  reexamination	  of	  American	  conservatism.	  	  Important	  for	  a	  historical	  
overview	  of	  conservatism.	  	  	  
Rieder,	  Jonathan.	  	  “The	  Rise	  of	  the	  ‘Silent	  Majority.’”In	  The	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  the	  New	  
Deal	  Order,	  1930-­‐‑1980,	  edited	  by	  Steve	  Fraser	  and	  Gary	  Gerstle,	  243-­‐‑68.	  	  
Princeton:	  	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1989.	  
Rieder	  tells	  the	  story	  of	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  Silent	  Majority	  during	  the	  late	  1960s.	  	  
Useful	  for	  this	  perspective	  on	  the	  traditional	  conservatism	  of	  this	  group	  as	  it	  related	  
to	  the	  draft.	  	  	  
Rohr,	  John	  A.	  	  “Just	  Wars	  and	  Selective	  Objectors.”	  The	  Review	  of	  Politics	  33,	  no.	  2	  
(April	  1971):	  	  185-­‐‑201.	  	  	  
A	  historical	  examination	  of	  selective	  objectors	  to	  American	  wars	  based	  on	  
arguments	  that	  the	  war	  was	  unjust	  or	  immoral.	  	  Important	  for	  placing	  the	  
arguments	  of	  draft	  resisters	  during	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  in	  historical	  perspective.	  	  	  
Warner,	  John	  T.,	  and	  Beth	  J.	  Asch.	  	  “The	  Record	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